it has not been uncommon to appoint members of the House of Commons to serve thereon. represen ment. Since the revival of the Reform question in 1852, the Their true principles of parliamentary representation have be- tation in come better understood, and great and increasing value Parlia is now attached to the representation, in both Houses of Parliament, of prominent and important commissions appointed by the crown, or by statute, whether for instituting enquiries into special subjects, with a view to future legislation thereon, or for the direct fulfilment of certain public trusts. Whenever a commission includes one or more members of either House, satisfactory information can be afforded in reply to questions as to the conduct and progress of a particular investigation, and, in the case of a statutory commission, the legislature are enabled to satisfy themselves that the commissioners are discharging their duty in accordance with the trust which the legislature has confided to them. Moreover, after the presentation of their report, if the conclusions of the commissioners are impugned, the actual presence of one of their number in Parliament would be most serviceable, in explaining or justifying their conduct, instead of leaving their defence to be undertaken, at second hand, by a minister of the crown.h With regard to permanent commissions, which are charged with administrative functions, peculiar necessity exists for their distinct and efficient representation in Parliament. Being held in direct subordination to some political head, and limited to certain prescribed duties, it has not been usual to consider such commissioners as See Hans. Deb. vol. cxc. p. 1457, 1796; ibid. vol. excii. pp. 1838, 1850; and see post, p. 342. Mr. Walpole's Evid. before Sel. Com. on the Ecclesiastical Commission, Commons Papers, 1863, vol. vi. p. 192; Hans. Deb. vol. clxxxv. p. 190; ibid. vol. clxxxvii. p. 93. Mr. Disraeli, Hans. Deb. vol. clxxxvii. p. 1941. And see ibid. Church sion. holding political appointments. Persons are placed on permanent as well as on temporary commissions without reference to their political opinions, and if in Parliament are not removed upon a change of ministry. But so far as members of the House of Commons are concerned, it is evident that by constitutional analogy this exemption from liability to removal from office, must be restricted to unpaid commissioners; and that a salaried member of a permanent commission, being in the service of the crown, should only retain his office, in connection with a seat in the House of Commons, so long as he is a supporter of the existing administration.j As yet, the first Church Estates Commissioner, who is Commis- appointed under a statute passed in 1850, affords the only example of a statutory paid commissioner (not being a minister of the crown) to whom has been granted the privilege of a seat in the House of Commons. No advantage, however, has been taken of this permission, but this Commission was represented in the House of Commons, from 1856 to 1858, by the third commissioner, who, though a salaried officer, is not appointed by the crown, and since 1859, by the second commissioner, who receives no salary. From August 1859 to November 1865 this office was filled by Mr. Bouverie, an unofficial supporter of the Government; it has since been held in conjunction with some ministerial office.' See post, p. 350. This point, however, has only been decided inferentially and not directly. For the proofs that may be urged on behalf of the position taken in the text, see post, p. 258; and note the practice in the case of the Second Church Estates Commissioner, who, though not paid and therefore not removable, is invariably replaced, as a parliamentary representative of the commission, on a change of ministry. * See further concerning this office, post, p. 263. The office of First Church Estates Commissioner' is not considered to be, in itself, a political, but a permanent office. (See Hans. Deb. vol. clxxxviii. p. 1475.) It is only in view of the holder thereof sitting in the House of Commons and representing the commission therein, that it can be placed in the category of political offices. Namely, from November 1865 to August 1866, by Mr. H. A. Bruce, vice-president of the Education Committee, and upon the accession of the Derby ministry by Mr. J. R. Mowbray, judge-advocate-general. mission. sion. In 1863, a committee of the House of Commons appointed to en- Ecclesias quire into the present state of the Ecclesiastical Commission and into tical Comthe expediency of reforming its administration of the ecclesiastical property and revenues, recommended that the management of Church property and the distribution of surplus Church revenues should be assigned to separate corporations; and that the former should be vested in a board to consist of two paid commissioners, who should be ineligible for Parliament. But that there should also be one unpaid commissioner on the board with a seat in the House of Commons for the purpose of representing the commission in that chamber.m Nothing has yet been done to give effect to this recommendation. The Charity Commission is another permanent board, regulated Charity Commisby Act of Parliament, and entrusted with administrative and quasijudicial functions, of very considerable importance." This board is at present represented in the House of Commons by the Vice-President of the Education Committee, who is an unpaid commissioner. In view of a further extension of the powers of the Charity Commission, it was recommended by the Schools Inquiry Commission, in 1868, that in addition to its ministerial representative there should be added to it a member of Parliament, who would be able to explain in his place the reasons for every scheme that was proposed, to show its relations to other schemes, and, in the absence of a minister, to answer any questions that might be asked' in regard to the operations of the board.° The debate in the House of Commons on March 25, 1868, upon Tancred's Charity Bill, a measure originally recommended by the commission, but which had been materially altered by a select committee, and was finally rejected by the House, 'showed the necessity that existed for some efficient representative of the Charity Commissioners in that House.' P represen every trust. It is probable that, ere long, both the Ecclesiastical Parlia and the Charity Commissioners will have their ac- mentary knowledged representatives in the House of Commons; tation of and should there be, hereafter, any other trusts of suffi- important cient public importance to require a mouthpiece in Par- publie liament, the precedent established in the case of the Church Estates Commission will doubtless be followed, and liberty given to some officer connected therewith to sit in the House of Commons. For it is most desirable that that chamber should open its doors to receive accredited and competent representatives from every British Representation in both Houses. prominent and influential public interest. Nevertheless, the strict rule of parliamentary government will undoubtedly require that none but supporters of the existing adminis tration should act as the parliamentary representatives of permanent commissions appointed by the crown; and that however limited may be the scope of his official duties, every member of such a commission, having a seat in the House of Commons, who is charged with the representation thereof in Parliament, should resign his office upon a change of ministry. The only exception to this general rule is in the case of the British Museum. From an early period, this great national institution has been represented in the House of Commons by one of the elected trustees, without any reference to his political opinions. But this is confessedly an anomalous practice, and is only retained on account of certain peculiar advantages attending it, which have rendered it expedient to overlook its manifest infringement of the established principles of parliamentary government. From the repeated objections which have been urged in the House, to the continuance of this practice, it will probably ere long be replaced by some other arrangement more in accordance with constitutional usage. q The representation in Parliament of every prominent should be department of state should not be confined to one chamber merely, but should always, whenever it is practicable, include both Houses. This is most desirable: firstly, because of the respect due to each separate and independent branch of the legislature; secondly, in order to promote harmony between the executive and legislative bodies; and lastly, because it tends materially to facilitate the despatch of public business through Parliament. When the representative of any particular branch of the public service in one House is the chief minister in charge of the same, having a seat in the Cabinet, the department should be represented in the other House by an under See ante, vol. i. p. 482, n.; vol. ii. p. 242, n. secretary, vice-president, or other subordinate officer, as the case may be." of Cabinet House. The proportion of Cabinet ministers to be assigned to Proportion either House of Parliament necessarily varies according ministers to circumstances. It is impossible to fix any rule in in each regard to a matter which must depend altogether upon the strength of parties, and the amount of available talent at the disposal of an existing administration. The prime minister is responsible for the distribution of the chief offices of government between the two Houses of Parliament. But this is not infrequently a very difficult task. As a leading principle it may be stated that every department entrusted with the expenditure of public money should be represented in the House of Commons either by its head, or by its political secretary. Moreover, the increasing weight and influence to which the House of Commons has attained, in public affairs, has rendered it advisable that a larger proportion of cabinet ministers should have seats in that chamber. Under-secretaries of State, however able, are not in a position to declare or defend the policy of government, with the freedom, intelligence, and responsibility that is needful, in order to satisfy the demands of the House of Commons. In fact, they merely hold a brief, and are required to justify a policy in the framing of which they have had no share. It is curious to observe the change in constitutional practice within the present century, in the relative proportion of Cabinet ministers in the two chambers; a change which is a striking indication of the growth of power on the part of the lower House. The first Cabinet of George III. (in 1760) consisted of fourteen persons, thirteen of whom were peers, and but one a member of |