influence which they possess as members of Parliament, serve as the mouthpiece and representatives therein of the monarchical element in our constitution." Contemporaneously with the introduction into our political system of the constitutional usage whereby the sovereign abstains from exercising direct and external authority over the Houses of Parliament, in matters of legislation, we find the modern machinery for the control of legislation on behalf of the crown coming into play. The last occasion upon which an English sovereign vetoed a Bill presented for the royal assent was in 1707, whilst the first resolution of the House of Commons, to forbid the reception of petitions for grants of money without the consent of the crown, was agreed to in the previous year. Thenceforth, the rules of Parliament, which prohibit the introduction of a Bill to appropriate any portion of the public revenue, except at the recommendation of the crown, through a responsible minister, and which require the consent of the crown before either House can agree to a Bill affecting the royal prerogative, together with the admitted right of ministers, so long as they retain the confidence of the House of Commons, to regulate the course of public business-have secured the rights of the sovereign, as a constituent part of the legislative body, as unmistakeably, if not more effectually than by the direct interposition of a personal veto.

'The authority of the crown in England,' says Lord Derby, does not depend upon the veto which her Majesty theoretically possesses to impose upon Acts of Parliament after they have passed, but upon the right and proper influence which she exercises over her ministers, and through them, over both branches of the legislature, which gives her the opportunity of exercising her

Royal Veto on Bills;

judgment upon measures before they have been submitted
to Parliament, not after they have received its assent.""
To the same effect, Lord Palmerston states that it is a
fundamental error' to suppose that the power of the
crown to reject laws has ceased to exist.'
That power
survives as before, but it is exercised in a different man-
ner. Instead of being exercised upon the laws presented
for the royal assent, it is exercised by anticipation in the
debates and proceedings of the two Houses of Parlia-
ment. It is delegated to those who are the responsible
advisers of the crown; and it is therefore not possible
that a law passed by the two Houses should be presented
to the crown, and should then by the crown be refused.
And why is this? Because it cannot be imagined that a
law should have received the consent of both Houses of
Parliament, in which the responsible ministers of the
crown are sitting, debating, acting, and voting, unless
those who advise the crown have agreed to that law,
and are therefore prepared to counsel the sovereign
to assent to it. If a law were passed by the two Houses
against the will and opinion of the ministers of the day,
those ministers must naturally resign their offices, and
be replaced by men in whose wisdom Parliament reposed
more confidence, and who agreed with the majorities in
the two Houses.'

But, if need be, the dormant power of the crown to veto a bill presented by the two Houses of Parliament for the royal assent could be revived and exercised;-provided only that a ministry could be found to assume the responsibility of such an act for her Majesty has no constitutional right to abdicate that part of her prerogative which entitles her to put a veto upon any measure she thinks fit.'" And although no minister can introduce a measure into either House without the

consent of the crown, such consent is only given in the first instance in the executive capacity of the sovereign. It implies no absolute approbation of the measure, but merely signifies the royal pleasure that the two branches of the legislature should consult upon the merits of the case. As a branch of the legislature whose decision is final, and therefore last solicited, the opinion of the sovereign remains unshackled and uncompromised until the assent of both Houses has been received. Nor is this veto of the English monarch an empty form. It is not difficult to conceive the occasion, when supported by the sympathies of a loyal people, its exercise might defeat an unconstitutional ministry, and a corrupt Parliament.'*

cised in

1858.

A remarkable case, illustrative of this doctrine, occurred in 1858, threatened in relation to the Victoria Station and Pimlico Railway Bill, which to be exeraffected certain rights of property vested in the crown. The First Commissioner of Public Works (Sir Benjamin Hall) had consented to the measure, but during its progress through Parliament a change of ministry took place, and the new Commissioner (Lord John Manners) insisted upon a particular alteration of the scheme, to which the applicants for the same were unwilling to agree. But the House of Lords, before whom the Bill was pending, granted leave to the Commissioners of Public Works to be heard by counsel against the Bill, and it being intimated that unless it were altered the government would advise the crown to veto it, the committee amended the Bill in accordance with the views of the First Commissioner, and it received the royal assent.

powers of

Under ordinary circumstances, however, if ministers Legislative should be unable to prevent the passing of a measure the Lords. through the House of Commons to which they were opposed, they would take advantage of the co-ordinate and independent legislative powers of the Second Chamber, wherein the obnoxious Bill might be rejected, or amended in conformity with their views, or so as to conciliate the favour of the contending parties. Less under the influence of popular passion, or transient political

* Disraeli's Lord George Bentinck, 692, 797. Lords' Journals, vol. xc. 4th ed. p. 65. p. 362.

▾ Hans. Deb. vol. cli. pp. 586--589,

Appeal to

constituent body.

Ministerial

lead in both Houses.

2

excitement than the House of Commons, the Lords often interpose successfully to strengthen the hands of ministers of the crown, by hindering, for a time at least, the adoption of measures which may reasonably be regarded with mistrust or apprehension. Otherwise, and as a last resort before the Bill has gone through both Houses, an appeal must be made to the constituent body, which, if it should result in an unmistakeable expression of public opinion in favour of the particular measure, will ultimately lead to its acceptance by the crown."

(c.) The oversight and control of Business in Parliament.

Ministers of the crown are constitutionally responsible, not merely for the preparation and conduct of legislative measures through both Houses of Parliament, and for the control of legislation which is undertaken by private members, but also for the oversight and direction of the entire mass of public business which may come before either House. Nothing should be left to the will and caprice of a fluctuating majority, but the efforts of ministers should be continually directed to the furtherance of business in Parliament, in such manner as will best promote the public interests, and ensure the convenience of members generally. For ministers are the natural leaders in both Houses, as well as the proper guardians of the powers and privileges of Parliament. Representing therein the authority of the crown, and exercising therein the influence which appertains to them in that capacity, it is their duty to regulate the performance of all parliamentary functions, so as to keep them within proper limits, and in a steady course."

In 1692, before William III. had constructed his first parliamentary administration, a formal complaint was

See ante, vol. i. p. 28; also the case of the Forgery Punishment Bill, ante, p. 302, and that of the Irish Church Suspensory Bill, ante, p. 310; and Hans. Deb. vol. exciii. pp. 975, 1067.

See Bowyer, Const. Law, p. 165. Hearn, Govt. of England, p. 536. Gladstone, Hans. Deb. vol. excii. p. 1190-1194.

Mr.

,tages of

made by ministers to the king, that nobody knew one Adday what the House of Commons would do the next,' this pracand that it were perhaps too confident a thing for any- tice. one to pretend to say the parliament will or will not do anything whatsoever that may be proposed to them.' The present highly organised system of parliamentary government has been elaborated by the wisdom and experience of successive generations, in order to remedy this evil condition, and to establish harmony and unanimity between the crown and Parliament. Now-a-days, immediately upon the formation of a ministry, it assumes, in addition to the ordinary duties of an executive government, other and more important functions-unknown to the theory of the constitution-namely, the management, control, and direction of the whole mass of political legislation, by whomsoever originated, in conformity with its own ideas of political science and civil economy; and so long as it commands the confidence of the House of Commons, it should be able to prevent the adoption by Parliament of any measure, which, in the judgment of ministers, is inexpedient or unwise.d

In view of the great and increasing amount of public business which is now undertaken by ministers of the crown, successive parliamentary committees have advised the adoption of rules to facilitate the distribution and disposal thereof by the government; and the House of Commons has always evinced the utmost readiness in furthering the public business in the hands of ministers, so far as is compatible with the rights and privileges of private members.

A select committee of the House of Commons on public business, in 1848, concluded a report containing numerous valuable suggestions, which were afterwards incorporated into the practice of the House, by expressing their

Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great of Eng. vol. iv. p. 433; vol. v. p. 168. Britain, 2nd ed. vol. ii. App. part d Park's Dogmas, p. 39. ii. p. 240; and see Macaulay, Hist.