under parliamentary government, has thus been enabled to maintain-with more or less adherence to their party principles, or to their political programme-the constitutional control over the proceedings of Parliament in matters of legislation which appertains to their office: a control which the majority ordinarily possessed by ministers of the crown in the legislative chambers enables them to exercise without infringing upon the independence of Parliament.

If, however, a Bill is introduced, or an amendment carried, in either House, to which ministers are unable to agree, and they are unwilling to permit it to pass that House upon the chance of its being rejected by the other, a ministerial crisis must ensue; and ministers will either request the House to re-consider its vote, unless they are prepared to take the consequences of defeating the ministry upon a vital question, or they will at once appeal to the country, or retire from office.d

A mere defeat, or even repeated defeats, in the House of Commons, upon isolated questions, would not necessarily require the resignation of a ministry which retains the general confidence of Parliament. But if ministers declare that they regard the passing of a particular measure, in a certain shape, as a matter of vital importance, the rejection of their advice by Parliament is tantamount to a vote of want of confidence, and must occasion their resignation. For if the ministers of the crown do not sufficiently possess the confidence of the House of Commons to enable them to carry through the

6

See ante, vol. i. p. 140; Lord John Russell, Hans. Deb. vol. cxvi. pp. 632-634: and see ibid. vol. cli. pp. 551-563; vol. cxcii. pp. 485-494, 622, 841.

d See ante, vol. i. p. 145.

See ante, vol. i. (defeats of Sir R. Peel's ministry) pp. 125-127; (defeats of the Melbourne ministry) 130 note, 132; (defeats of the Aberdeen ministry), Hans. Deb. vol.

cxxxiii. p. 1075; ibid. vol. cxxxv. p. 227; (defeats of the Derby ministry) ante, vol. i. p. 155; and upon the general doctrine, see Grey, Parl. Govt. Ed. 1864, p. 113; Edin. Rev. vol. xcv. p. 228; Hearn, Govt. of Eng. pp. 221-233, and ante, vol. i. p. 132.

See ante, vol. i. pp. 128, 143, 152, 160.

House measures which they deem of essential importance to the public welfare, their continuance in office under such circumstances is at variance with the spirit of the constitution.'

financial

Furthermore, while, as we have already noticed, ques- Defeats on tions of finance and taxation are especially within the questions. province of the House of Commons to determine, and they should be free to act in relation to such questions without being hampered with the possible effect of their votes upon the stability of the ministry," yet, as regards the estimates, it is otherwise. When ministers assume the responsibility of stating that certain expenditure is necessary for the support of the civil government, and the maintenance of the public credit, at home and abroad, it is evident that none can effectually challenge the proposed expenditure, to any material extent, unless they are prepared to take the responsibility of overthrowing the ministry. No government could be worthy of its place if it permitted its estimates to be seriously resisted by the Opposition; and important changes can be made therein only under circumstances which permit of the raising of the question of a change of government."

tion or dis

solution?

After the defeat of ministers upon a vital question, in Resignathe House of Commons, there is but one alternative to their immediate resignation of office, namely, a dissolution of Parliament, and an appeal to the constituent body.' This alternative, however, is not constitutionally available whenever a majority of the House of Commons has condemned a ministry; it should only be resorted to under certain circumstances, to be presently explained.* While the decision of the House upon any question

Resol. House of Commons, June 4, 1841 (ante, vol. i. p. 131). See also, Mr. Disraeli and Lord John Russell's observations. Hans. Deb. vol. ci. pp. 704-707, 710.

cxci. p. 1747.

J See Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii. pp. 54, 95; Gladstone, Hans. Deb. vol. cxcii. p. 1606.

*See post, p. 405; Toulmin Smith, Parl. Rememb. 1859, p. 74: Edin. Mr. Gladstone. Hans. Deb. vol. Rev. vol. cxxviii. p. 575.

See ante, vol. i. p. 517.

a dissolu

tion.

Threats of which is calculated to affect the relations of ministers towards the House of Commons is pending, it is highly irregular and unconstitutional to refer to a dissolution of Parliament as a probable contingency, with a view to influence the conduct of members upon the particular occasion. For the Houses of Parliament should always be in a position to exercise an unbiassed judgment upon every question brought before them, fearing neither the crown on the one hand nor the people on the other.'

When a dissolution

should

But after an appeal to the country has been determined upon, the dissolution should take place with the least postake place. sible delay; that is to say, as soon as the necessary business before Parliament has been disposed of; the Opposition meanwhile aiding the ministry in completing the same, and refraining from any further attempt to embarrass them."

By necessary business is to be understood such measures as are imperatively required for the public service, or as may be proceeded upon by common consent. 'It is inconsistent with all usage, and with the spirit of the constitution, that a government should be enabled to select the measures which it thinks proper to submit to the consideration of a condemned Parliament,' or, 'to exercise its own discretion, for party purposes, as to what measures it will bring forward or what it will withhold.'" Upon the same principle, it is customary, when Parliament is about to be dissolved upon the occurrence of a minis terial crisis, to restrict the grant of supplies to an amount sufficient to defray the indispensable requirements of the public service, until the new Parliament can be assembled." In 1868, however, this wholesome constitutional rule was departed from, by common consent, for reasons of public convenience.P

See Hans. Deb. vol. ix. pp. 346- n Sir R. Peel, Mirror of Parl. 348, 435, 449, 588; Romilly's Life, 1841, pp. 2136, 2137; and see post, vol. ii. p. 194; Mirror of Parl. 1841, p. 410. p. 2113; Hans. Deb. vol. cl. pp. 1076, 1085; vol. cliii. p. 1256; and ante, vol. i. p. 146.

m See ante, vol. i. pp. 136, 146.

• See ante, vol. i. p. 486. P Hans. Deb. vol. excii. pp. 1120, 1223, 1602.

advised.

And here it may be suitable to notice the particular When it occasions upon which, by constitutional usage, a minister may be is justified in advising the crown to exercise its prerogative of dissolving Parliament.

Firstly, a dissolution may properly take place in order to take the sense of the country in regard to the dismissal of ministers by the sovereign, as in 1784," in 1807," and in 1834.t

Secondly, on account of the existence of disputes between the two Houses of Parliament, which have rendered it impossible for them to work together in harmony." But happily there have been no cases of this kind since the complete establishment of parliamentary government. Thirdly, for the purpose of ascertaining the sentiments of the constituent body in relation to some important act of the executive government; or some question of public policy upon which the ministers of the crown and the House of Commons are at issue."

Fourthly, whenever there is reason to believe that the House of Commons does not correctly represent the opinions and wishes of the nation. Upon this ground, ever since 1784, 'it has been completely established, as

X

See ante, vol. i. p. 77.

See ante, vol. i. p. 93.

+ Ibid.

P. 124. "Hans. Deb. vol. lxxxiii. p. 34. As in 1679, because of the refusal of the House of Lords to proceed with the impeachment of Lord Treasurer Danby (Parry's Parls. p. 590); in 1701, because of dissensions on account of the impeachment of Somers and other ministers; and in 1705, on account of disputes in the case of the 'Aylesbury men.' Burnet's Own Time, A.D. 1701, 1705; State Trials, vol. xiv. p. 695.

As in 1806, after the failure of the negotiations for peace with France, and to strengthen the hands of government in the continued prosecution of the war. Parl. Deb. vol. viii. p. 27; but see Mirror of Parl. 1835, p. 64.

As in 1831 (see ante, vol. i. p. 119); in 1852 (ibid. p. 146); in 1857 (ibid. p. 151); in 1859 (ibid. p. 154); and in 1868 upon the Irish Church question. Upon this occasion Mr. Disraeli claimed a right to dissolve upon other grounds, the propriety of which were disputed by Mr. Gladstone. But upon the question at issue between ministers and the House of Commons, Mr. Gladstone admitted that a dissolution would be justifiable, provided that there was a rational prospect of the adverse vote of the House being reversed by the country. As Mr. Disraeli entertained a strong conviction that the country would support him, he had clearly a right to make the appeal. See post, p. 410.

* See Russell, Memorials of Fox, vol. ii. p. 245.

When it is

able.

the rule of the constitution, that when the House of Commons refuses its confidence to the ministers of the crown, the question whether, in doing so, it has correctly expressed the opinion of the country, may properly be tested by a dissolution; and that the House of Commons cannot attempt to resist this exercise of the prerogative, by withholding the grants of money necessary for carrying on the public service till a new Parliament can be assembled, without incurring the reproach of faction."

The prerogative of dissolution, however, should be objection- exercised with much forbearance. Frequent or abrupt dissolutions of Parliament blunt the edge of a great instrument given to the crown for its protection,' and whenever they have occurred, have always proved injurious to the State."

It is not a legitimate use of this prerogative, to resort to it when no grave political question is directly at issue between the contending parties, and merely in order to maintain in power the particular ministers who hold the reins of government." The dissolution in 1834 has been impeached on this ground. It was avowedly done for the purpose of strengthening the newly appointed ministers in the House of Commons, and without reference to any great question of state policy. Though Sir Robert Peel's arguments in defence of it were very plausible, the result was unfavourable to his administration, and the dissolution itself was condemned by the House of Commons. The king was obliged to recall the ministers whom he had previously dismissed, and it is

b

y Grey, Parl. Govt. new ed. p. 79.
Peel, Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 44,

294.

Sir R. Peel, Hans. Deb. vol. lxxxvii. p. 1042; Sir R. Peel and Lord John Russell, ibid. vol. cxix. p. 1070; ibid. vol. cl. p. 1076, and Peel's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 295. Upon this principle Lord John Russell re

frained from advising a dissolution when his administration was defeated in the House of Commons, in 1852 and for the same reason he declared that the dissolution upon the defeat of Lord Palmerston's government in 1857 was not justifiable. Hans. Deb. vol. cl. pp. 1076, 1077.

Peel's Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 43-48.