terregnum should continue for an unreasonable length of time, it would be proper for the House of Commons to interpose, and by an address to the crown, endeavour to put an end to so injurious and inconvenient a delay.t Such addresses have been passed, or proposed to be passed, upon several occasions, and they have usually elicited from the sovereign a response in harmony with the constitutional opinions therein expressed."

Upon the occurrence of a change of ministry, it is cus- Interviews tomary for the out-going ministers to explain to their between successors, at personal interviews, the state of the public and new business in their respective departments. They are also

bound in honour to communicate to the proper officers any private information upon public affairs that may have been forwarded to them upon the presumption that they were still in office."

ministers.

official

All public officers are required to leave behind them, Custody of when they retire from office, whatever public documents documents. may have come into their possession during their term of office, in order that a complete history of all public transactions may be preserved in the archives of the department. Private letters, however, do not come within this rule, even though they may exclusively relate to affairs But no ex-minister is at liberty to quote in Parliament from any document which he may have received while in office unless it has first been made public by being laid before Parliament.*

of state.

When an opposition comes into office, it is not expected to abandon its own engagements and adopt those

sition, when in office.

y

The oppo- of its antagonists.' And though, as we have seen, it is customary for in-coming ministers to ratify and give effect to the intentions of their predecessors in the distribution of personal honours and rewards," yet they are under no such obligation in any matter which involves a question of public policy. If they disapprove of contemplated arrangements, agreed upon by their predecessors, but not fully completed when the change of ministry took place, they are justified in peremptorily overruling such arrangements; and they may properly avail themselves of any technicality to refrain from the formal completion of a grant, appointment, or commission, issuable by the crown, for which they are not willing to become responsible."

It has never been the usage in England for any government, upon acceding to office, to make use of its power and influence in Parliament to bring under investigation the acts of its predecessors. Those acts were open to parliamentary criticism when they were performed, and being uncondemned at the time must be presumed to have been sanctioned. It is, of course, competent to Parliament to investigate particular matters of complaint against individual ex-ministers, whenever facts are brought to light which call for enquiry. But the power of a government should never be employed against their predecessors in office to obtain a censure upon their past policy for mere party considerations, or to promote an enquiry into the policy and justice of public measures which were undertaken by them whilst they held the reins of government, except with a view to the reform of administrative defects or abuses."

y Sir G. C. Lewis, Hans. Deb. vol. alleged falsification of despatches, cliii. p. 1424. under a former administration. Hans. Deb. vol. clxii. p. 37; ante, vol. i. p. 603, n.; see also ante, p. 378.

2 See ante, p. 415.

a See cases in Parl. Deb. vol. ix. p. 426; Hans. Deb. vol. clxix. p. 777; ibid. vol. clxxxv. p. 1321; and ante, p. 319.

As for example, the allegations against Lord Palmerston, in 1861, for

C

Lord John Russell and Sir Robert Peel, Hans. Deb. vol. lxvii. pp. 147, 184.

Our sketch of the origin, development, and present state of the governmental system of England, and of its relation to the crown on the one side, and to Parliament on the other, is now complete.

the past.

In reviewing the successive phases through which the Review of constitution has passed, from the Norman Conquest to our own day, we observe that they exhibit, in turn, the supremacy of political power in the crown, under prerogative government; in the higher classes, from the period of the Revolution to the Reform Bill of 1832; and in the aristocratical and middle classes combined, from that epoch until now. By the enlargement of the representation in 1867 and 1868, we have entered upon a new era, Beginning wherein the democratic element will undoubtedly be in of a new the ascendant, and under which we may expect to find era. all our institutions, both in Church and state, severely tried.

It seems fitting, at such a time, to point out, to those who are now entrusted with political power, the practical operation of that system, wherein the various excellences of the monarchical and aristocratical elements have hitherto harmoniously combined, with those of popular representation, to ensure a vigorous and stable government, to promote the national welfare, and to maintain the liberty of the subject unimpaired.

The continuance of these blessings to the British nation, under their extended franchises, must depend upon their holding fast their allegiance to those fundamental principles of government which form the unwritten law of the constitution, and embody the wisdom and experience of many generations. By a recognition of these principles, the authority of the crown, and the influence of property, have each been permitted a legitimate share in controlling the deliberations of the House of Commons, which has now become the centre of supreme political power in the state. A House of Commons wherein the executive is strong-and wherein the advisers of the crown can

political

Mr. Mill's timely ad

Commons.

administer the government, and guide the course of legislation, upon a definite policy, known and approved by an adequate majority of that chamber-is the last refuge of the ancient monarchy of England. But in order to secure this result, the House of Commons itself must be free; not subservient to the fluctuating will of the people, or hampered by pledges in respect to its future actions. Otherwise, it cannot give an intelligent support to the queen's government, by whomsoever it is administered, or rightly fulfil its appointed functions. A House of Commons dependent upon popular caprice, and swayed to and fro by demagogues out of doors, will inevitably produce a ministry which will be a reflex of its own instability, and which will attempt to govern without having a fixed policy, and as the mere exponent of the will of an unenlightened and tyrannical democracy.

I cannot more appropriately conclude this chapter than vice to the by quoting the words of one of the most eminent exHouse of pounders of representative government, whose ideas, though elaborated in the closet, have been tested and confirmed by practical experience in Parliament. In one of his latest speeches to the House of Commons he says:—

'When a popular body knows what it is fit for, and what it is unfit for, it will more and more understand that it is not its business to administer, but that it is its business to see that the administration is done by proper persons, and to keep them to their duties. I hope it will be more and more felt that the duty of this House is to put the right persons on the Treasury Bench, and when there to keep them to their work. Even in legislative business it is the chief duty-it is more consistent with the capacity-of a popular assembly, to see that the business is transacted by the most competent persons: confining its own direct intervention to the enforcement of real discussion and publicity of the reasons offered pro

e See an able and instructive article on 'Democratic Government in Vic

toria,' in the Westminster Review for April, 1868.

and con; the offering of suggestions to those who do the work, and the imposition of a check upon them if they are disposed to do anything wrong. People will more value the importance of this principle the longer they have experience of it.' This wholesome advice has been given at a very seasonable time; and it may be hoped will not be disregarded by the representatives of the people in the Reformed Parliament.

' Mr. J. S. Mill, June 17, 1868; Hans. Deb. vol. cxcii. p. 1731.