divided between single commissioners, and only difficult and unusual cases brought up to the Board, collectively. Latterly, indeed, discussions at the Board were reduced to a minimum.'* 'The main object of substituting for the Board of Audit a single chief with supreme authority in the department is to fix the whole responsibility of the due execution of all the duties upon one public officer. It tends also to insure definite and uniform decisions on questions requir ing them, nor is the advantage really lost of that deliberative and collective judgment which is considered to be afforded by a Board consisting of several members. In his decisions as the responsible chief of a great public department, the Comptroller and Auditor-General must be held to express not merely his own individual and unaided judgment, but the well-considered and matured opinions of the department which he represents, including the Assistant Comptroller and Auditor and all the most experienced officers under him. These decisions are recorded in the books of the office, and are consequently known to the whole establishment, who constitute a sufficiently numerous and influential body to counteract any personal leaning which might possibly exist in the mind of the chief, and bias his judgment." duties. It is the duty of the Audit office to ascertain facts, to Its special make them known to those whom they concern, and who are in a position to deal with them; to sift the pecuniary transactions of the several public accountants of the kingdom, to investigate the real nature of those transactions, to classify them, to consider the legal and financial questions arising out of them, to distinguish between what requires notice and what does not, and to lay before the House of Commons and the executive the results of its deliberations." Wherefore, the practice of the office in the examination Corresp. Excheq. and Audit Act, Com. Papers, 1867, No. 97, pp. 39-42. ↑ Ibid. pp. 9, 10. The Audit relation to of accounts submitted to them has been as follows: Each account, when received, is placed in the hands of an inspector, whose duty it is to take a general view thereof, to satisfy himself of its substantial accuracy. It is then referred for examination to one or more examiners, who are bound by rules specially prepared for their guidance to take note of all irregularities, and to bring them under the notice of the inspector. All questions of a minor character are disposed of by the inspector (with whom, in fact, it rests to judge how far they are so, and what items he shall pass and allow), and those only of a more important nature, and involving a decision by a superior authority, are brought before the commissioner under whom the inspector works. With very few exceptions these questions are finally decided by the commissioner, and such alone are referred for decision to the Board as may appear to him to require their deliberate attention." It is worthy of notice, that while apparently a new and untried system was introduced by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, so far as the business of the Audit Office is concerned, the Act is to a great extent an embodiment of the existing practice. The business, we are assured, will continue to be conducted as heretofore, with this difference only, that references or appeals on difficult questions, when they arise, will be decided by a single responsible chief, instead of by the majority of a Board of four members, or by the casting vote of the chairman. A special share of the work will, moreover, be assigned to the Assistant Comptroller, in lieu of that heretofore entrusted to one of the commissioners.i We have now to consider Mr. Romilly's complaint that under the new Act the Comptroller and Auditor-General the Trea is virtually the servant of the Treasury.' It is true that in the new forms of procedure authorised by the Act, the Treasury is, in some cases, substituted for the Ex sury. Corresp. &c. Exch. and Aud. Act, i Ibid. pp. 40, 46. Ibid. pp. 28, 29. chequer, or the Privy Seal Office, in the issue of formal orders for giving effect to parliamentary grants. But it is equally true that the substantial powers of the Treasury over the Audit department are materially diminished by this statute. For example, the Treasury can no longer prescribe rules for the conduct of the internal management of the Audit Office. This power is now vested in the AuditorGeneral. The necessity for the sanction of the Treasury for the promotion, suspension, or dismissal of Audit officers is now dispensed with, and the Auditor-General is constituted the supreme head of his department. The subordinate officers are thereby secured against any arbitrary interference of the executive government; their salaries are fixed by Order in Council, and their position made entirely dependent upon their conduct and efficiency.' ports to The 21st section of the Act provides that the reports Annual reof the Comptroller and Auditor-General on the Appro- House of priation Accounts shall be annually sent to the Treasury Commons. at a stated period before the meeting of Parliament for presentation to the House of Commons. This provision was inserted with the object of enabling the Treasury, on the part of the executive government, to obtain such explanations from the several departments as might appear to be required, and to accompany the reports with such observations as they might think fit to offer thereon: thus supplying the House of Commons with additional information in reference to the appropriation of the public grants. And the Treasury merely act ministerially in transmitting such reports to the House: if they should not communicate them within the time prescribed, the Comptroller and Auditor-General is empowered, by , m *See ante, vol. i. pp. 540-543. Corresp. Exch. and Audit Act Com. Papers, 1867, No. 97, pp. 42, 44. Other instances of exemption from Treasury control are mentioned in Ibid. p. 10. functions. the 32nd section, forthwith to present any such report himself. The particulars to be embraced in the Comptroller's reports to the House of Commons are enumerated in the 32nd clause as follows:-He shall call attention to every case in which it may appear to him that a grant has been exceeded; or that money received by a department from other sources than the grants for the year to which the account relates has not been applied or accounted for according to the directions of Parliament; or that a sum charged against a grant is not supported by proof of payment; or that a payment so charged did not occur within the period of the account, or was for any other reason not properly chargeable against the grant. Thus far our attention has been mainly directed to a consideration of the duties of the Exchequer and Audit department so far as the Audit branch is concerned. Its Exchequer Exchequer functions need not be here enlarged upon, as they have been already explained in a former chapter. It will suffice to say that the ancient authority of the Exchequer in the receipt and custody of the entire public revenue, and in restricting issues therefrom to such purposes only as have been sanctioned by Parliament-remains unimpaired; although a simpler machinery has been substituted for the cumbrous process hitherto in use in order to give effect to a grant of supply by Parliament.° If any question should arise between the Exchequer and the Treasury upon which the Comptroller and Auditor-General, before executing any direction of the Treasury for the issue of public money, may need aid or counsel to guide his opinions and strengthen his judgment, he is at liberty to follow the practice of his predecessors at the head of the Exchequer, and obtain the " See ante, vol. i. pp. 536-542. The new Forms enjoined under the Act of 1866 are appended to the Treasury Minute of March 2, 1867, for carrying the Act into effect. Commons Papers, 1867, vol. xxxix. p. 337. opinion of the law officers of the crown to assist him in determining any difficult point of law that may be involved in the application." system. But, after all, the position of independence given to the Efficiency Comptroller and Auditor-General by the Act of 1866, of new and his direct accountability to Parliament alone for his official conduct, furnishes both Parliament and the public with more ample securities and safeguards for a thorough and impartial examination and audit of the public accounts, as well as for a more complete and efficient check and control over the public expenditure, than have ever heretofore existed." Bills. By the Act 29 Vict. c. 25, to consolidate and amend Exchequer the laws regulating the preparation, issue, and payment of Exchequer bills and bonds, all such bills are directed to be prepared at the Bank of England, and issued upon the joint authority of the Treasury and the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and to be signed by the Comptroller or Assistant Comptroller." tion of de As we have already remarked, the Exchequer and OrganisaAudit Departments Consolidation Act went into operation partment. on April 1, 1867. The first step taken in the organisation of the new department was to assign to the immediate direction of the Assistant Comptroller and Auditor the duties heretofore appertaining to the Exchequer office. Soon afterwards, the Comptroller and Auditor-General issued a minute detailing the permanent arrangements to be adopted in his office for giving effect to the Act P Corresp. Exch. and Audit Act, Com. Papers, 1867, No. 97, pp. 13, 42. It has also been suggested by Sir William Dunbar, that the Comptroller and Auditor-General should be empowered to confer with a Council, to consist of the Speaker of the House of Commons, a Baron of the Exchequer, an Equity Judge, and the Deputy-Speaker. This would prevent any question as to his ability to resist any pressure that might be brought to bear upon him by the Treasury, or other great public de partments, in the discharge of his a Ibid. p. 47, and see Hans. Deb. See Treasury Minute of March 9, 1867, to give effect to the Exchequer Bills Act. Commons Papers, 1867, vol. xxxix. p. 413, |