On amount of force required. On army clothing. On mili tary ap and pro motions. The first occasion in which the Commander-in-Chief is permitted the privilege of taking the royal pleasure at a personal interview is, in regard to the amount of force required for the year. The decision on this point is taken by the Cabinet in Council. It is then communicated, in an official letter, to the Commander-in-Chief, by the Secretary of State. The Commander-in-Chief then formally, and as a ministerial agent, takes the pleasure of the sovereign thereupon. But it is the advice of the queen's ministers, for which they are exclusively responsible. The second occasion of this description is in regard to the patterns of army clothing. These are, in the first place, selected by the Commander-in-Chief, and submitted by him to the queen. They are then sent by the Commander-in-Chief to the office of the Secretary of State, as having passed under the cognisance of the sovereign. The Secretary, if he sees no reason to advise the queen upon the subject, either as concerns the pattern or the expense it involves, then obtains the royal authority to seal the pattern for the adoption of the army. But where any change is contemplated which involves additional outlay, the previous consent of the Secretary for War is indispensable; and practically no great change in uniforms can be made without his concurrence. The third instance is with regard to appointments and pointments promotions in the army. It has always been customary that the appointment of officers in the army, of whatever rank and to whatever military position, should be submitted to the queen, for her approval, by the Commander-in-Chief. Lists of these nominations are, in the case of first appointments, submitted to the Secretary of State for War before they are presented by the Commander-inChief to the queen for her sanction. And all other appointments are submitted to the queen after consultation with the Secretary. So that, as we have already seen, the Secretary of State has the power of exercising a veto on every promotion and appointment in the army, excepting first commissions, and even with respect to these, the existence of an indirect control has been clearly demonstrated. If her majesty approves of the submission list, she places her sign-manual at the top of it. At the bottom of the list there are written directions to the Secretary of State to issue commissions to the persons named therein, and this also is signed by the queen. By a recent statute it is declared, that the affixing of the royal signmanual to the commissions of officers of the Army or of the Royal Marines shall be unnecessary, provided that such commissions are duly authenticated as having been issued by royal command, by the signatures of the Commanderin-Chief and of a Secretary of State, &c. This Act conforms the practice in regard to military commissions to that of naval commissions, which are signed by the Lords of the Admiralty only, and not by the sovereign." The foregoing are the only occasions in which official personal communications take place between the officer commanding the royal army and the sovereign; and in every one of them the virtual control and supremacy of the Secretary of State for War is apparent." his ap Until the beginning of the present century the sove- Responsireign claimed the right of nominating the Commander- bility for in-Chief. Then, as now, a Prince of the Blood was occa- pointment. sionally appointed to this office. And it is only since 1806 that the responsibility of ministers for the control and management of the army has been fully acknowledged.* In 1850, two years before his death, the Duke of Wellington, then Commander-in-Chief, urged his royal high e Hans. Deb. vol clxv. p. 1487. 25 Vict. c. 4. And see ante, vol. i. p. 238. h Hans. Deb. vol. clxv. p. 1486. Rep. on Military Organisation, 1860, pp. xxi. 34, 39, 86. Upon the resignation of the Duke of York, on March 17, 1809, George III., without waiting for any communication from his ministers on the subject, wrote to the Premier (the See ante, vol. i. pp. 56, 324. Offered to bert. ness the Prince Consort to consent to succeed him in Prince Al- the office. The professed object of the Duke, in desiring to see Prince Albert invested with this honourable office, was to maintain the principle of the army being commanded by the sovereign.' He had himself endeavoured to make the practice agree with that theory, by scrupulously taking, on every point, the queen's pleasure before he acted. But, were he gone, he saw no security, unless the prince undertook the command himself, and thus supplied what was deficient in the constitutional working of the theory, arising from the circumstance of the present sovereign being a lady.' Prince Albert admitted the force of this argument, and acknowledged it to be his duty to support the queen's authority in this as in all other matters, but he was strongly impressed with the conviction that the proffered appointment would be incompatible with the adequate discharge of the duties devolving upon him as consort of the queen. He therefore declined to become a candidate for the office, and, after the death of the Duke of Wellington, it was conferred upon Lord Hardinge.1 Its relation to the ministry. While it is imperative upon the Commander-in-Chief that he should administer the affairs of the army in subordination to the will of the ministry for the time being, as expressed by the Secretary of State for War, it is not essential that his political opinions should be identical with those of the party in power. Lord Hill, for example, retained the post of Commander-in-Chief through all the changes of ministry that occurred between 1828 and 1842; though his opposition to the Reform Bill, in 1832, gave great offence, not only to the Prime Minister (Earl Grey) but also to the king." The Duke of Wellington, who, upon the retirement of Lord Hill, in August 1842, by reason of his growing infirmity, succeeded him in office (having previously occupied the post for a short 1 Prince Albert's Speeches, &c. pp. 71-78. And see ante, vol. i. p. 198. m Corresp. William IV. with Earl Grey, vol. ii. pp. 272–280. . per.y time, in conjunction with a seat in the cabinet, in 1827-8)," and continued in command of the army until his death, in 1852. During this interval there were several successive ministries, of different political creeds, and in one of them, that of Sir Robert Peel, the Duke was permitted to hold his office in connection with a seat in the Cabinet, from 1842 until the downfall of the ministry in 1846. The circumstances attending this appointment were as follows: His Grace was already in the Cabinet, though without office, when he was made Commander-in-Chief. But in the year 1837 it seems that he had publicly stated that, in his opinion, the Commander-in-Chief ought not Not proto be a cabinet minister, lest he should be supposed Cabinet to have any political influence or bias upon his mind, office. particularly upon the subject of promotions in the army.' Whereupon, soon after Parliament met in 1842, Lord John Russell called the attention of the House of Commons to the subject, and pointed out that there had been no instance of a member of the Cabinet being entrusted with this executive office since the time of General Conway, in 1782, with the exception of the Duke of Wellington's own case, above mentioned, in 1827. In reply, Sir Robert Peel 'apprehended that there was no constitutional rule against the tenure of a seat in the Cabinet by the Commander-in-Chief,' and considered that it was justified by the analogous cases of the Master-General of the Ordnance and the First Lord of the Admiralty. He added that the Duke of Wellington had retained his seat in the Cabinet upon accepting the command of the army, at the unanimous request of the whole Cabinet, and he himself, as Premier, assumed 'the whole responsibility of the act.' The matter was then dropped. When Lord Hardinge was made Commander-in-Chief, in 1852, he was assured by the Premier (Earl Derby) that And See ante, vol. i. 114. p. Hans. Deb. N. S. vol. xvii. p. 462. • Hans. Deb. vol. lxvi. pp. 1347-1351. And see bid. vol. lxx. p. 611. Has no political he was under no obligation of a party or political nature;' and though he continued in office under a Whig ministry, he was never interfered with in the distribution of patronage, or in the management of business at the Horse Guards." His lordship was succeeded in the command of the army, in July 1856, by his royal highness the Duke of Cambridge, the present Commander-in-Chief. No seat in the Cabinet has at any time been offered to his royal highness, partly because, in the words of Sir Robert Peel, in reference to the case of the Duke of York, ‘it was not probable that a prince of the blood, holding the relation that he did to the throne, should have a seat in the Cabinet; but chiefly in consequence of the more decided opinions entertained as to the inexpediency of such an arrangement, since the re-organisation of the War Department, under the immediate control of a responsible minister of the crown. Being the executive head of the army, and the direct representative of his sovereign's authority, it is considered inexpedient that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise any political functions which might lead to encroachment upon the royal prerogative. For a similar reason, it has functions. also been deemed wrong in principle that his subordinate officers, the quartermaster-general and adjutant-general, or his military secretary, should accept seats in the House of Commons, and enter into the public discussion of military matters. This complete disconnection from the political administration of affairs gives a greater stability to the office of Commander-in-Chief, and enables him to exercise a more independent control over the army. also serves to discourage officers from the hope of professional advancement through political interest." The Commander-in-Chief is, however, a member of the Privy Council, and must be considered as a responsible, although non-political, officer of the existing government. Though P Hans. Deb. vol. cxxx. p. 100. It |