for any body of men to be brought within the sphere of "British influence.”

The popular defence, then, of the arbitrary rule of subject races -if there can be said to be a popular defence of that which the vast majority, when they chance to think about the matter at all, regard simply as part of the established order of things-rests upon two hypotheses; the first that benevolence justifies despotism, and the second that benevolence characterises despotism. Can either of these hypotheses be verified? The one raises a question of ethics, the other a question of fact; and hence the method of investigation must be different. That such investigation is one of paramount importance is self-evident, when we recall to mind the enormous area of the territory and the vastness of the population, both positive and relative, over which our sway extends, and remember also that we are daily enlarging that sway. Of this territory and population it is calculated that more than onethird of the first and about one-fourth of the second have been added to the Empire within the last quarter of a century—it is the outcome of modern Imperialism, the new Zeitgeist-and the process is still going on. The freedom enjoyed by Englishmen is denied to vast dependencies more than eight times as populous as the United Kingdom; and we continue to engage in the work of subjugation. A heavy responsibility thus rests upon the dominant race; there must be an absolute justification for this, or they stand convicted of a colossal crime. Unless the Imperialist can actually verify both the hypotheses referred to, he is condemned by the principle of liberty to which he professes allegiance, and his rule resolves itself into tyranny pure and simple.

THE PROCESS OF SUBJUGATION.

Now alien rule has almost invariably to be preceded by conquest. Coloured races do not intuitively perceive the advantage of relinquishing their freedom, and voluntarily submit themselves to a foreign yoke; and before we can govern them we have to subdue them. The question, therefore, of whether despotic rule is justifiable must, in the first instance, take the form of an inquiry as to whether subjugation is justifiable. No doubt, whatever be the result of that inquiry, it does not dispose of the problem; since the fact remains that we have (rightly or wrongly) compelled innumerable tribes to recognise our supremacy; and that being so, we must accept the responsibilities of the situation, and the question of whether or not we are properly discharging those responsibilities has in any case to be faced. But the nature of those responsibilities must in part be determined by the answer we give to the preliminary inquiry; whilst the modern development of aggressive Imperialism raises such question to the first rank.

Is there, then, a moral basis for the subjugation of one race another race? The material basis is, of course, superior force; b it is impossible to extract from this any moral basis. What have to discover is, whether or not superior force can be legitimate employed for the purpose indicated; and, if so, what are the co ditions which make its employment legitimate.

And in considering this initial problem we are, in the first pla confronted with the fact that various races are, or were, in alm exclusive possession of definite portions of the globe, and th unless we are prepared to elevate the maxim beati possedentes in an ethical axiom, this points to at least the theoretical possibility recourse to force being justifiable. For access to the soil is esse tial to man's existence, and if a scanty population roving ov immense tracts of land should claim absolute territorial rights a refuse admittance to any cutside, it might be equivalent to denyi them the right to exist. If a claim to the absolute individu ownership of the soil is untenable (and, anomalous as are our En lish land laws, even they stop short of recognising this) as bei inimical to the general interests of the community, such a claim on t part of a group of individuals might prove inimical to the interests the rest of the world. Possession may be nine points of the law, a it may also be several points of morality, but it must in the la instance yield to the common necessities of the race; and whilst large group welded together undoubtedly acquire definite rights respect of the territory they occupy and have developed, they d not create that territory and can establish no title to its exclusi and unqualified appropriation. Morality is concerned with t conduct of man to man, and this presupposes the existence of ma and therefore recognises, in the first place, a common right to obta the necessaries of existence; and, since the absolute ownership land for all purposes and under all conditions, whether by an ind vidual or by a group, may mean the power to determine wheth others shall exist: if this is conceded morality disappears. take two extremes-in one given area population may be so dense to render healthy existence impossible; in another given area pop lation may be so sparse as to allow of almost limitless expansio If, then, mere possession of territory conferred the right of unqual fied monopoly, the many might starve whilst the few were plethori and, yet, such an unqualified monopoly might be claimed, and on by force be successfully disputed. Hence, that it is within t bounds of possibility for circumstances to arise which should justi recourse to subjugation is manifest.

But the argument may be carried a stage further, and illustr tions of a different character selected. If morality is concern with the conduct of man to man, not only does it presuppose t existence of man, but its supreme function is to secure such freedo

and opportunity to enjoy that existence as shall be consistent with the like freedom and opportunity of others. This may be infringed in a variety of ways. Not only may life itself be ruthlessly destroyed, but such torture or cruelty may be practised as may even render death preferable to life. Men may live in a state of terrorism under some tyrannical ruler or despotic body and be almost powerless to help themselves. Or the race may itself be the tyrant a veritable hostis humani generis—inflicting revolting barbarities upon other races. To assert that in these cases a foreign Power, if one exist with the will and capacity to arrest the inhumanity, must be content to play the part of passive spectators, in the name of national or racial rights, would once more exhibit a strange ethical misconception. It is true that there are some who discover in Christianity the proclamation of an absolute doctrine of non-resistance to evil, and they at least offer a valuable protest against the converse extreme doctrine of the lex talionis, and are entitled to all honour in a world where the latter doctrine finds ready acceptance, not less by so-called Christian than by other nations. But to withdraw all restraint upon individual licence would speedily reduce society to anarchy-using the term in its popular and worst sense and not in its literal and best sense. And if society is justified in seeking to prevent individual crime, it is difficult to see why nations should not be justified in seeking to prevent racial crime; and it is possible that this can only be effected by subjugation. Lest, however, this statement should lead to hasty generalisation in accordance with pre-conceived opinion, let it be stated that all the argument, as thus baldly enunciated, can establish is the indefensibility of laying down a general rule to the effect that conquest must be necessarily and always inherently vicious. A positive principle has yet to be arrived at.

Without further multiplying illustrations as to the possibility of circumstances amounting to justification for subjugation-illustrations which are little needed in an age when the spirit of conquest is in the ascendency, and which have, indeed, partly been cited as affording some clue to the nature of the positive principle referred to, and as suggesting that the justification must be of a more solid character than that usually advanced-the other side of the case must now be examined for a moment. Obviously subjugation is in itself a bad thing. It can only be brought about by the employment of physical force, or in other words by war. And war, in the first place, means the destruction of life, and to that extent is an acknowledgment of the impotence of morality. Nor can it be regarded in the light of moral retribution, since, though we assume that life may be justly forfeited to the community, the penalties of war are seldom visited upon the guilty, and are in no case confined to them. Indeed, one of the most damning features of war, even if

it can be contemplated as punitive, is that there is inva vicarious atonement; that its pains to a greater or less e (generally greater) are borne by the innocent. Nor do its ho stop at the destruction of life, for those who are suddenly cut are spared the prolonged physical agonies which it inevitably b to numbers of the living-here again not, as a rule, to the a culprits. And, once more, war for the time being is subversi liberty; and, when it results in subjugation, means the perma arrest of liberty. And liberty is the one thing which is dear to all the world over, the one thing which should be held the sacred. Hence, an evil which can only be remedied at the cos life or poignant physical and mental suffering, and at the of liberty, must be grave indeed. We are in fact driven to refuge in a paradox, and to say that the only justification for destruction of life and liberty is to prevent the destruction of and liberty. There are many wrongs in this world which, if peaceful remedy for them can be discovered, moral men must content to endure, lest in seeking to remove them by force

commit a greater wrong. The sword is a two-edged weapon may be typical of justice, but it must result in injustice; justice is dearly bought at the cost of a greater injustice.

If, then, a moral basis for the subjugation of one race by anot race is to be found, it can only be in that principle which, for w of a better name, may be called humanitarianism. The term is to which different significations are attached, but it is perhaps best word that can be selected to indicate the promotion of general welfare of mankind. It imports a recognition of solidarity of the human race; it means that the good of individual, or of the group, must yield to the common good, a that only by promoting the common good can the maximu individual good be secured; it implies that the progress of t world, without distinction of race, colour, or nationality, should the paramount object of human effort. And when this princip demands and only when this principle demands-the subjugati of an alien race, and when in pursuance of that principle, and of other, the work of subjugation is undertaken, the ethical justific tion is established. Personal or national gain on the part of th conquering race (other than such as shall accrue to mankind general) must be neither sought nor obtained; an honesty purpose is essential, and the pursuit of selfish interests (as disting from self-preservation) is absolutely forbidden. There must be a

actual benefit, eventually if not immediately, conferred upon th subjugated peoples, and a contribution towards the advancement o civilisation. Unless these essential conditions are complied with no ethical case can be established for the withdrawal of liberty, o for the enormous evil which is consequent on the process.

Theoretically, then, this particular problem, difficult through it is, seems to admit of solution. If we have not arrived at its actual solution as it presents itself in varying forms in national experience, we have, it is submitted, an unimpeachable guiding principle for men who claim to be governed by moral considerations, in the application of which the solution should be found in each particular case. Practically, however, it is to be feared we have made little appreciable progress. For when we look at the question from the historical point of view, we find that the essential conditions are never complied with, and that as a matter of fact subjugation does not proceed from humanitarianism; and to demand that it should seems to "ask more of human nature than human nature is capable of giving." Of course the common belief is that the good of the conquered race will undoubtedly be promoted and the cause of civilisation advanced; and this contention is constantly put forward as a defence of conquest, thereby, at any rate, recognising the necessity of a justification and in part the validity of the principle laid down, But on the other hand there is perfect candour as regards the pursuit of national interests; the advantages of expansion and need for new markets are frankly, if inconclusively proclaimed; and although to this extent it may seem that the validity of the principle is challenged, yet it is scarcely so in fact, for it is generally sought to reconcile the pursuit of national interests with the promotion of the good of mankind as a whole. However this may be, it is safe to say that selfish considerations of some character are invariably present, and that they generally preponderate, if they do not constitute the sole motive. Whatever attempts may subsequently be made to temper despotism with benevolence, subjugation itself is determined upon almost entirely from patriotic considerations. Certainly no instance can be cited of the conquest of another race having been undertaken without regard to the interests of the conquerors, and solely with a view to promote the welfare of mankind; and the dominant consideration is the acquisition of territory. As regards conflicts between white races, perhaps a rare illustration may be found of benignity both of purpose and of result in the American Civil War, but it cannot be said that the liberation of the slaves was the only motive which inspired the North. And in modern history, the one occasion when humanitarianism not only justified but strenuously demanded forcible intervention for the purpose of arresting the most abominable tyranny, no such intervention took place.

The contention, however, usually is that, whatever be the motives animating the subjugating race, good must result, because such race is a superior one, representing a higher form of civilisation, and the result therefore necessarily contributes to the progress of the world. But then this contention is put forward by the subjugating race itself;