correlative. And, granting this, he was asked to explain how, "upon any principle of natural selection, this intellect came at all? We have only as yet the animal-something between the man and the gorilla; but it could not speak nor think. From whence then did intellect and speech proceed?"-Now I beg your especial attention to all that Mr. Wallace could reply to such an essential question. He said: "Mr. Reddie also wants to know how the intellect came at first. I don't pretend to answer that question, because we must go so long back. If Mr. Reddie denies that any animal has intellect, it is a difficult question to answer; but if animals have intellect in different proportions, and if the human infant, the moment it is born, has not so much intellect as an animal, and if, as the infant grows, the intellect grows with it, I do not see the immense difficulty, if you grant the universal process of selection from lower to higher animals. If you throw aside altogether this process of selection, you need not make the objection about the intellect."* Now, in the first place, there is an ignoratio elenchi in this reply; for the objection has been urged expressly to enable us to test the theory (assuming its possibility) on a point in which we can test it; and, besides, Mr. Wallace ought to have seen that he had also answered himself. It is his own proposition, that speech and intellect would go together; and if that be so, then the inferior animals have not the intellect, so defined, that goes with speech. But the difference between the intelligence of the dumb creation and the intelligence of speaking man might well form the subject of further investigation, which might fitly be brought before this Society. No doubt the intellect of the child grows with its growth; but then the child is the child of intelligent and speaking man; and let me ask, would its intellect grow even now as it does, if the child was not taught to speak? The problem Mr. Wallace had to solve, and failed to solve, was how intellect and speech could come of themselves, to endow an animal whose progenitor had neither one nor other?

Before I bid farewell to Darwinism, I must notice Mr. Wallace's reply to another pertinent objection raised in the Anthropological Society. He said: "Dr. Hunt asserts that archæology shows that the crania of the ancient races were the same as the modern. Well, that is a fact I quoted on my own side, and his quoting it against me only shows that you can twist a fact as you like. I quoted it as a proof that you must go to an enormous distance of time, to bridge over the difference between the crania of the lower animals and man.

*Anthropological Review, vol. II. p. clxxxiii.

I said, perhaps a million, or even ten millions, of years were necessary."

I beg leave to recall attention to the fact, though no doubt known to many present, that the famous Neanderthal skull, of which so much was made both by Sir Charles Lyell and Professor Huxley as probably a specimen of this missing linkwhich is still, however, missing-between men and apes, has been proved to be merely an abnormal formation, arising from synostosis or ossification of the sutures, and that similar deformed skulls of perfectly modern date are in existence. And so we are still without a single specimen of the crania that, if found, would be considered as bridging over the gulf between man and apes.

Having mentioned Sir Charles Lyell's name in connection. with Darwinism, I must observe that, in his Antiquity of Man, he adopts the theory, and recommends it as "at least a good working hypothesis," in the absence of any proof of its probability, or even possibility, upon the sole ground that the geological record, which at present contradicts it, is so very imperfect. This has been characterized as not merely an instance of non-induction, or "hasty generalization," based upon a limited or partial knowledge of facts, which is so rightly and strongly condemned by Lord Bacon, even when the facts we do know are not inconsistent with the hypothesis we adopt; but as, indeed, a "glaring specimen of positively false generalization, the hypothesis being not in accordance with any recognized facts or principles whatever, but directly in the teeth of all our knowledge and experience."

Having made use of the word Darwinism, I also feel bound to notice, that Mr. Darwin has not himself worked up his theory so as to apply it to man's development, though Professor Huxley is no doubt right in saying, plainly, that that is the goal to which it tends. Strictly speaking, Mr. Darwin has not professed to prove anything beyond "the origin of species by his theory. And all that he has proved as a naturalist, is the fact, that numerous varieties of plants and animals are developed within the limits of each particular species. He has not proved a single instance of development beyond these limits of nature's laws; and most certainly no permanence of development in any such case. He has indeed shown that the classifications of naturalists may probably in some cases be at fault, and that what they may have called different species are sometimes only varieties. But this rather goes against his theory, and may be the true explanation of the few exceptional and only apparent approximations to the origination of new species which he almost claims to have observed.

But

even were we to grant that a new variety might, under special influences, become so distinct as to form a new species, that would still leave us very far short of transmutation from one genus to another, and farther still from the change from vegetable to animal life, or from any of the inferior animals to man. All beyond the probable, but not proved, origin of species, is mere speculation, with not a ghost of a proof in support of it. And when Sir Charles Lyell admits that the palæontological facts are as yet against the theory, what does that mean? Namely, that, so far as we know, there have not ever been the necessary graduated forms in existence which the theory requires before it can be thought possible even by its advocates. But, of course, we must remember, that even if the gradations in nature were found to be finer and more shaded off one into another than they are yet known to be, that would not by any means prove that any one form had been developed out of another. At present, and within the historical period, this does not happen, and has never happened. To suppose that it did take place continually, though a long time back," is to assert that nature's laws have been reversed. I do not understand how that can ever be established upon scientific or inductive grounds!

*[At the meeting of the British Association at Birmingham last year, I ventured to oppose the polygenous theory, chiefly by an appeal to all the facts of which we have knowledge relating to the savage and civilized races of mankind. The monkey theory was then left out altogether; for, to say truth, it had not a single advocate who ventured to raise his voice in the Ethnological section! Mr. John Crawfurd, the venerable President of the Ethnological Society, plainly denounced it; though he is one of the most strenuous advocates of the polygenous theory which derives all the civilized races of mankind from savage progenitors. But when he was asked to give a single instance of a savage race who had civilized themselves,-as some justification of his extraordinary faith that all the civilization of the world owes its origin to savagery -he was ominously silent.

As the discussion of this question has thus already been approached from the point of view both of the so-called Darwinians and of those who hold a polygenous theory which makes out man to have been originally a savage,-there can be no reason why, on the present occasion, and especially in this

* Vide Note, p. 214.

Society, the subject may not be contemplated from the nobler. stand-point which is furnished us in Holy Scripture, in contrast with all conflicting hypotheses. What our religion teaches us of man's origin is nothing new. And, to examine it freely, we need not go beyond the scope of the objects of this Society, by entering upon theological discussion or exegesis of Scripture. Our arguments, on the contrary, may be exclusively rational and based upon our knowledge of nature. They may be directed-like miracles at the foundation of our religionto those who believe not, and not merely to those who believe the Scriptures. But we have no right to conceal the fact, that we have not invented the theory we may have adopted. And my endeavour shall now be to prove that, apart altogether from its origin, the religious theory ought to be adopted by all rational men, as being in accordance with all evidence and analogy, and with all our experience and knowledge of the human family. Surely there is no appeal to natural things in Scripture, that is not an appeal to man's reason, and to all he can investigate and discover with respect to the nature that surrounds him. When St. Paul argues that the invisible things of God-His Eternity, His power and Godhead-are clearly witnessed by the things that do appear, that is, by the whole visible creation,-is not that an appeal to man's reason, which throughout the whole world, except among the few most degraded races or rather tribes of mankind, has been universally and rationally responded to? Is not the beneficence of the Creator-"filling our hearts with food and gladness"-equally a matter of rational proof, appreciable by all mankind? And so, when it is recorded that God created man in His own image, and gave him dominion over the inferior creatures, have we not a hypothesis of man's place in nature, that also appeals to all we can discover of man's past history, and to all we know now of mankind throughout the world?

Without presuming to fathom all that is meant by man being created in God's image and likeness, and taking merely the generally understood and universally accepted idea among Jews and Christians for ages, that man was created a perfect being, "upright," "very good" (for how, if created at all, could he come otherwise than perfect from the hand of God?),taking that as what religion teaches us of our origin, I wish to show what a wide field of investigation and inquiry we may have in this Society, without in the least trenching upon the territory of the theologian or the Scripture expositor. Not that I undervalue theology or Scriptural exigesis, any more than I would admit that religion is not one of the

most important considerations affecting anthropology. If this were disputed, indeed, I might appeal to other quarters, which might possibly have greater weight with some, outside this Society, who do not with us accept Holy Scripture as key of knowledge."

"the

For instance, in M. Boudin's Etudes Anthropologiques, published in Paris in 1864, he begins by citing Cicero as one of the most eminent philosophers of antiquity who has defined man as a religious animal. "There is not, in fact, any other animal," says Cicero, "who has knowledge of God. And there is no nation so barbarous or so savage, that even if it is ignorant what deity it ought to have, does not at least know that it ought to have a deity of some kind." (De Leg., lib. II. cap. 8.) Boudin then goes on to quote Plutarch, as saying, "You may find peoples in cities deprived of walls, of houses, of gymnasia, of laws, of monies, of literature; but а people without God, without prayers, without oaths, without religious rites, without sacrifices, is what nobody has ever seen." (Adv. Colleton.) In citing Cicero's definition of man as a religious animal, Boudin refers, in a foot-note, to a curious exception, or rather attempt to make an exception to this, which I quote as having a peculiar value in the present day. He says, "Buddhism alone has the credit of attempting to teach religion to beasts. The author of a Tibetian work, translated into the Mongol tongue, and from Mongol rendered into French by Klaproth, who treats of the origin of the progress of the religion of Buddha in India and in other Asiatic countries, recounts the following: 'When the veritable religion of Chackiamouni (Çakya-Muni) had been spread in Hindostan and among the most distant barbarians, the high priest and chief of the Buddhist faith, not seeing any others of mankind to convert, resolved to civilize the large species of monkey called jaktcha or raktcha; to introduce among them the religion of Buddha, and to accustom them to the practice of duties, as well as the exact observance of sacred rites. This enterprise was entrusted to a mission under the direction of a priest regarded as an incarnation of the saint Khomchim-Botitaso. This priest succeeded perfectly, and converted a prodigious number of apes to the Indian faith.'"-You smile at this story, as so recounted, even although you may before have heard of the sacred monkeys kept in the Buddhist temples. It is doubtful whether the story would be accepted in the Ethnological or Anthropological societies. But, if you reject it here, and laugh at it; if the notion of monkeys being taught religious duties and observances by men is truly ridiculous; how much more ridiculous and absurd must be the