of mind as well as of matter. The laws of nature comprise that mental, moral, and material order, according to which all things are carried on. A miracle cannot be "contrary" to mental laws, if free-agency is a fact. It cannot be "contrary" to moral laws, if it is the result of divine energy, put forth for ends that are good. It cannot be "contrary " to material laws, if it is found to have its place in the eternal purposes of God, equally with the succession of day and night, or any of those moral and material laws according to which the world is governed. There may be intersections among the mental, moral, and material laws of nature. There are:-mind acts upon matter and controls it, and the whole nature of man is held subject to moral law. But a miracle breaks no law when it neutralizes or suspends a lower-it falls in rather with the general workings of nature. "We have (says Archbishop Trench) abundant analogous examples going forward before our eyes. Continually we behold in the world around us lower laws held in restraint by higher, mechanic by dynamic, chemical by vital, physical by moral [mental?]; yet we do not say, where the lower law gives place to the higher, that there was any violation of law, or that anything contrary to nature came to pass; rather we acknowledge the law of a greater freedom swallowing up the law of the lesser."* This passage was said by Mr. Powell to "evince a higher view of physical philosophy than we might have expected from the mere promptings of philology and literature." I hope that we are all desirous of entertaining the very highest view of physical philosophy, that is consistent with truth. I was not myself aware that the "mere promptings of philology and literature "" were at all adverse to forming a correct estimate of any branch of philosophy. On the contrary, I had always thought that precise terms, and accuracy of expression, were essential to all branches of philosophy. Mr. Powell was, perhaps, right in saying that "physical by moral" in the passage from Archbishop Trench, is "not very clear," and I would suggest that "physical by mental" might remove the point of the objection. The question of miracles, indeed, is inseparable from the question of the existence and supremacy of mind. This is the fundamental point, the key to the right understanding of the subject and the clearing up of its difficulties. Admit the existence and supremacy of mind, and we can account for miracles; deny this, and miracles are not only inexplicable but impossible. And I believe we become defenders or doubters of miracles just in proportion as we retain or lose the *On Miracles, ch. ii. fact of the mind's existence and supremacy. The exclusive study of physics is calculated to beget materialistic habits of thought. Physiology and physics have to do with organized and unorganized bodies, and this department of.study implies necessity of nature, rather than liberty of intelligence. Tho natural bias, therefore, which it is liable to beget in the human mind, is one in favour of materialism, and therefore of fatalism. Its natural counteractive is in the study of mind. Mr. Grove, in his address before the British Association, appeared to betray materialistic habits of thought, if not unduly to exalt physical science. He said, "While in ethics, in politics, in poetry, in sculpture, in painting, we have scarcely, if at all, advanced beyond the highest intellects of ancient Greece or Italy, how great are the steps we have made in physical science and its applications." Now it is only since the time of Bacon that physical science has been studied with any degree of success. "When we reflect then (said Dugald Stewart) on the shortness of the period during which natural philosophy has been successfully cultivated, and, at the same time, how open to examination, the laws of matter are, in comparison of those which regulate the phenomena of thought, we shall (1) neither be disposed to wonder that the philosophy of mind should still remain in its infancy, nor (2) be discouraged in our hopes respecting its future progress." MIND AND MATTER. If we believe neither in God, Angel, nor Spirit, miracles are plainly impossible. But if we admit the existence of God and of spiritual beings, and the supremacy of MIND, then miracles are, at least, possible. I would not appeal to Divine sovereignty and omnipotence in support of miracles, because the argument from this source may be questioned by doubters. However true the conclusion, the process by which it is arrived at is not satisfactory. It is an instance of the vicious circle in the eyes of those who have thrown off belief in revelation. It is, therefore, better to seek a foundation, as I think we safely may, among facts and principles in the field of philosophical inquiry. Perhaps I cannot define very satisfactorily to myself what I mean by mind, as distinct from matter; but I know that I think, feel, hope, desire, and will, and I feel an irresistible conviction that my thoughts, feelings, hopes, desires, and volitions all belong to one and the same being, viz., myself. These phenomena, I believe, exhibit the qualities of mind, and prove its existence as convincingly as extension, colour, hardness, &c., prove the existence of matter. At least, I cannot feel more certain of the existence of matter than I do of mind. If I am to draw a distinction, I feel the evidence for mind to be stronger than the evidence for matter; for the former rests upon my own consciousness of subjective facts, while the latter rests upon my perceptions of what is, or what is thought to be, objective. I cannot, then, deny the Ego, and claim with any share of reason to believe in the non-ego. The nonego is the phenomena exhibited to my senses, the subjectmatter of physical science. The ego is the phenomena presented by my own consciousness, the subject matter of mental and metaphysical science. "The evidence for the existence of mind (said Lord Brougham) is to the full as complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of matter. Indeed, it is more certain, and more irrefragable."* Materialists, however, have doubted the separate existence of mind, notwithstanding its greater rapidity of movement, and the phenomena presented by it. But the attempt has been illogical, the very points in dispute being taken for . granted, as a basis to argue upon. If we suppose the substance said to have the qualities of thinking, feeling, &c., to be the same as the substance which is said to have extension, hardness, &c., this supposition only proves the impotence of materialism to grapple with its difficulties. Why should not these two substances underlying the two different kinds of phenomena, if they are to be considered as one and not two, be mind, after all, and not matter? To quote Lord Brougham again on this point :-" We only know the existence of matter through the operations of mind; and were we to doubt of the existence of either, it would be far more reasonable to doubt that matter exists than that mind exists. The existence of the operations of mind (supposing mind to exist) will account for all the phenomena which matter is supposed to exhibit; but the existence and action of matter, vary it how we may, will never account for one of the phenomena of mind.”† However, I am glad to feel myself at liberty to pass over this point, because natural philosophers have given up the question of substance, and confined themselves to the phenomena exhibited, and the laws deducible therefrom; and we may follow their example, and leave out of the question the nature of mind, confining ourselves to the phenomena it exhibits, and the laws deducible therefrom. The two sciences admit of precisely the same inductive principles, and may be prosecuted safely side by side. The law of gravity in the one + Ibid. p. 106. *Discourse on Nat. Theol., p. 56. field has its analogy in the laws of association in the other. Neither field has been barren of fruits, and a student in the one need not undervalue the labours of a student in the other. It is obvious that miracles are impossible upon the principles of materialism. Are they to be considered impossible or unreasonable upon the principles underlying a belief in mind? This appears to me to be the question, for although doubters of miracles have mainly relied upon materialistic arguments, which, if pushed, would go far towards subjecting mind to matter, or excluding it from our books and papers, still I believe most of them would repudiate all sympathy with materialism. We have therefore to meet objectors who will grant the position which we have taken up thus far in reference to mind. Now the two worlds of mind and matter, with their separate facts and phenomena, must be taken into account in the settlement of the question of miracles, because no man ever contended that miracles were possible apart from mind and free agency. It is preposterous to attempt to settle this question, connected as it is with the power and spontaneity of mind or will, by an appeal to the bare order or course of nature in its material aspect. Yet this is neither more nor less than what is attempted mainly to be done by the opponents of miracles in the present day. Whatever the value of their conclusion may be, it cannot be said to follow from their premisses. Instead of the conclusion that miracles are scientifically impossible, following, as Mr. Powell asserted, from the "higher laws of thought," I venture to affirm that that conclusion, in his own essay, was drawn in contravention of the first principles of legitimate argumentation. The supremacy of mind is a thing of daily experience. We know that the laws of nature are under the control of our own will to a limited extent. We are able to control the forces of nature so as to produce what results we please. Matter bows in subjection to the human will. Results are brought about, which in the first instance, it is allowed, are traceable to material or second causes; but when these results are traced backwards, we arrive at last at the human will as their sole efficient cause, acting upon the human body, and through it upon external nature. Here, then, we have an aurεžoÚGIOV or sui potestas, which supplies us with the foundation of a legitimate argument from the less to the greater, in favour of miracles. The power of the Supreme Will exceeds that of man by an infinite difference, and the freedom of the Divine Will must be commensurate with Divine power. Miracles, then, as effects having for their efficient cause the active power of God, are not only possible, but, à priori, probable, from the limited share of freedom and power which we know by experience we have. We cannot conceive of a God of freedom never exercising that freedom. Providence implies the constant exercise of freedom. Without such an exercise there could be nothing for us here below but fate. But this is contrary to the facts of human consciousness and the results of mental study. Physical science might—if taken alone, it would-lead to fatalism; but the higher science of mind supplies the counteractive to this uninviting, one-sided view of nature, and leads the inquirer onwards to the great law of freedom. We know we are free, and we cannot, without an absurdity, suppose man, who was made in the likeness of God, to be free to control the forces of nature, while He who made man is not so. As to material nature, it is, of purpose apparently, endued with a certain elasticity. The orbits of the heavenly bodies bulge and flatten within a given sphere; so do the laws of nature, without any general disturbance, bend before the will of man. This elasticity appears to have been necessary for the harmonious working and general stability of the universe. So may the moral requirements of man have necessitated miracles to instruct him in the knowledge of Divine things. Our social and domestic well-being stands in need of the power and play over matter which we know we have; so may our moral and religious well-being stand in need of that freedom which miracles and the providential care of the great God imply and presuppose. And the fact that we are formed with mind and will, and the power to exercise a certain control over nature's forces for our own happiness and good, warrants the inference that our Maker is not only able but willing to succour and defend us where our own freedom and power cannot reach. He knew from all eternity, doubtless, not only the laws which He proposed to give to matter, but also the wants of His intelligent and moral creatures. He had, doubtless, a care both for the world's general working and also man's benefit. What seems to us irregular, as miracles, cannot possibly be so to Him, with whom there is no past nor future, but simply an Eternal now-an Omnipresent here. Miracles are the effects of His own free will and power, and they may fall in with higher and wider laws than mere physical science has discovered or can discover. Every separate department of science may have a partial unity, but there must be a universal science which compares together particular sciences, and ascends to the whole of things. "If there were only |