think for one moment upon the fact of absence or defect in the There's nothing situate under heaven's eye, But we find, besides "imperfection," also pain; here again, therefore, the "Divine perfections" are at variance, according to the objector, with the "established order of things," for it is "clogged" with physical evil. There are, it is true, compensating considerations; enjoyment may be heightened by suffering, and even death itself rendered easy by a little preparation on a bed of pain; yet the fact of death and previous suffering remains, that is to say, physical evil. And, further, the Theist has also moral evil to "clog" his own system. He is troubled, not only with imperfections, with suffering, but also with sin. Man came into existence like other organized beings, we believe, under a law suited to him as a moral agent; he was endued with knowledge and understanding, with freedom to obey or disobey. But he did not follow the law of his nature he does not do so now-he violates that law and falls into sin. "What then shall we say to these things? Shall the thing formed (man with a free-will leading him into sin) say to Him who formed it, Why hast thou made me thus ?" This charge would be as reasonable as that against "Divine wisdom," against "our ideas of the Divine perfections," on the hypothesis of miracles. "The order of things" is not freed from "imperfections" when miracles are taken out of the way. As to the unchangeableness of God, it has no special bearing upon the question of miracles. The Theist, or the advocate of "continuity," is as much open to its difficulties as the Christian apologist. If God, from all eternity, purposed that the race of man should make progress from an obscure beginning, He may also have purposed that miracles should have their place and use on the great theatre of time. God must have a purpose, and that purpose must be fixed; but it may have conditions which admit of human freedom being played in its own orbit or within prescribed limits. There is, we are sure, freedom even in dependence. The Almighty's omnipotence does not swallow up that limited power which He has assigned to man. His omnipresence does not blot from existence that place which we, His creatures, occupy in space and time; His omniscience does not absorb nor quench that little light which our reason gives us; in short, the infinite does not annihilate the finite; otherwise, dependence would find no place in which to write its name, Divine Sovereignty no creature over which to exercise its just control. The unchangeableness of God must, therefore, be viewed in its relation to other things, such as the Divine purpose. pro There is yet another objection from metaphysics that perly falls to be noticed here. No testimony, it has been objected, can reach to the supernatural, and therefore no miracle can be proved by the evidence of sense. This objection was urged for another purpose in a famous atheistical work (Système de la Nature) published in 1780. The writer, said Lord Brougham, "began by endeavouring to establish the most rigorous materialism, by trying to show that there is no such thing as mind. The whole fabric is built upon this foundation; and it would be difficult to find in the history of metaphysical controversies, such inconclusive reasoning, and such undisguised assumptions of the matter in dispute, as this fundamental part of his system is composed of. He begins by asserting that man has no means of carrying his mind beyond the visible world, that he is necessarily confined within its limits. He asserts what is absolutely contrary to every day's experience, and to the first rudiments of science-that we know, and can know, nothing but what our senses tell us. ."* In Essays and Reviews the objection against miracles (not mind) stands thus: "No testimony can reach to the supernatural; testimony can only apply to apparent sensible facts; testimony can only prove an extraordinary and perhaps inexplicable occurrence or phenomenon; that it is due to supernatural causes is entirely dependent on the previous belief and assumption of the parties." objection, that we "can know nothing but what our senses tell us," appears to me to be the same as saying that "testimony can only apply to apparent sensible facts:" but in the former case it was urged to get rid of mind, in the latter, to get rid of miracles. But Mr. Powell professed to believe in mind; he held that there is a world of intelligence—vonτóv, as * Discourse on Nat. Theol. ; note, p. 235. The well as a world of sense,-óparóv. The difficulty which occurs to my mind is, how, upon the principles of this objection to miracles, he could believe in those grand truths of physical science which he parades so ostentatiously. Were we to confine ourselves to bare facts,-"the testimony of sense,"-even physical science itself must stand still; for how could we arrive at the conception of a general law? Generalization involves a principle which experience or testimony neither does nor can give. If, then, we cannot get outside "apparent sensible facts," if evidence is bounded by the region of the sensible, those very conclusions of physical science which are brought against miracles can have no foundation to rest upon. But if, on the contrary, we can rise to the conception of a general law, and so leave behind us the region of the sensible, may we not also rise to the conception of the supernatural, when we see works performed in the name of God which no man ever could of himself perform? Mr. Morell, a writer of philosophic acuteness, thinks that Divine or religious truth is not received through the medium of the senses or common understanding, but deep down in our intuitive consciousness; and there may be truth in this so far as it relates to the theory of inspiration; no doubt the highest mental faculties, as the reason and conscience, are the media of Divine communications. And in the case of miracles the presence and aid of God, though unseen, may yet be felt,—it was so when the Apostle said, "In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk."* Here the Apostle disclaimed the power to work the miracle himself, and he had "experience," if not "testimony," reaching directly to the supernatural. Of course a spectator could not have this experience, and the difference between present and past time has, in our case, removed from the region even of the "sensible" to the region of what is only "credible," the evidence for the miracles of the Bible. But a spectator at the time, or a believer now, in the fact of this lame man's cure, may ascend by legitimate reasoning to the supernatural as the only adequate efficient cause. The passage translated by Sir W. Hamilton from a German work, and quoted by Professor Mansel, is worthy of being repeated:-"Nature conceals God; for, through her whole domain, Nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes, without beginning and without end, excluding with equal necessity both Providence and chance. An independent agency, a free original commencement within her sphere, and proceeding from her powers, is * Acts, iii. 6. absolutely impossible. Man reveals God; for man by his intelligence rises above Nature; and, in virtue of this intelligence, is conscious of himself as a power, not only independent of, but opposed to Nature, and capable of resisting, conquering, and controlling her. As man has a living faith in this power superior to Nature, which dwells in him, so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an experience of His existence. As he does not believe in this power, so does he not believe in God; he sees, he experiences nought in existence but Naturenecessity-fate." From facts within we rise to thoughts of God. The sensible gives us knowledge of the external world. But the mind, in virtue of its own intuition and energy, rises from effects to causes. When it rises from effects to causes, it does so by reasoning, as strictly and properly so called, as the inductive philosopher in the process of generalization. Distance is not seen; it is inferred in the mind. Anger is not seen; it is inferred from the expression of the countenance. And God, the Author of miracles, is not seen, yet His presence and power are inferred from His works. OBJECTIONS DRAWN FROM PHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS. The results of physical science have been represented as hostile to faith in miracles. Mr. Powell repeated again and again, in round, bold statements, without a fragment of argument or proof, that such hostility does exist. I have not, however, myself been able to discover any argument against faith in miracles from this source. "The grand truth of the universal order and constancy of natural causes" is beside the question. Things which differ.-Mr. J. S. Mill confounds, in his chapter on Induction, (see his Logic,) two things essentially different, and Mr. Powell, in his Essay, has done the same; viz. belief in causation with belief in the uniformity of nature. Necessary and contingent truths are not distinguished. That every effect must have a cause is an intuitive truth, self-evident and necessary; that the operations of nature must be uniform, is neither an intuitive truth, self-evident, nor necessary. Belief in causation is a fundamental law of the human mind; uniformity of operation in nature is a thing simply of experience. We could conceive of nature's operations being different from what they are without any violation of the fundamental laws of human belief. As to miracles, the question is simply one of fact: the Bible affirms that miracles have been wrought, and physical science has done nothing to disprove the Bible's testimony upon this point. Physical science does not touch the question as to the historical fact of miracles, and it has not attempted to explain them. It has left them simply where they were a century ago. I believe in the "grand truth," repeated so often and needlessly by Mr. Powell," of the universal order and constancy of natural causes." It is "fixed, in my mind, so firmly that I cannot conceive of the possibility of its failure," when left to itself. A miracle has nothing to do with this "constancy," or reverse, of "natural causes "—it is simply the fact, or otherwise, of personal agency producing special results. The phenomena produced by "natural causes," that is, viewed as effects proceeding from merely physical causes, are of necessity uniform and constant, being subject to the law of necessity as opposed to the law of freedom; but the phenomena of mind or personal agency are the reverse-they are not of necessity uniform, being subject to the law of freedom as opposed to the law of necessity. It matters not what hypothesis is accepted to explain the efficiency or activity of "natural causes.' Mr. Stewart enumerated six, and the law of natural selection and struggle for existence, perhaps, might be called a seventh hypothesis; but whether we accept materialism, or the explanation that the phenomena of nature result from certain powers communicated to matter at its first formation, or that the phenomena proceed from general laws, or that the universe is a sort of machine put in motion, and so constructed that the multiplicity of effects which we see are all to be traced to one original act of sovereign power,-I say it matters not which, nor what hypothesis we accept; they all come under the law of necessity; and are, therefore, foreign to the question before us. Physics without mind may exclude the question of miracles; but physics alone can do nothing, either to argue or settle such a question. The real point.-Does the natural exclude the supernatural? Are natural causes and effects so arranged as not to allow the intervention of mind and personal agency? Gravity draws all bodies to the earth, but man puts forth his hand and arrests the falling apple at will. Mr. Powell, however, affirmed that "miracles are inconceivable to reason," opposed to "the primary laws of human belief." But by what primary law of belief we are required to reject miracles without looking at their evidence, is not said. The statements in Essays and Reviews are naked and bold enough; but when we search for argument, we find appeals to fact where reason fails, and appeals to reason where facts are wanting. Miracles are not "inconceivable to reason; " we have no intuitive principles in |