(6.) The Apoftle affigns to the prefent and the future body, not only different, but contrary qualities: one is corruptible, and the other incorruptible; one animal, the other fpiritual. As far, therefore, as we can determine from the properties affigned, they cannot be the fame body.

(7.) Our Saviour produces an argument (Luke xx. 37.) to prove the refurrection, in oppofition to the Sadducees who denied it, which is utterly inconclufive, and nothing to the purpose, if they meant by that term a refurrection of the body. And therefore, the term there muft neceffarily be understood, in the fimple and general fense, of a per⚫ fon's being raised to life, or to a future state.

(8.) From the vulgar notion of a refurrection of the body, it has been inferred, That there are two future ftates, · one prior, and the other fubfequent to that refurrection; and that the fouls of good men fhall enjoy a ftate of glory ❝ and happiness prior to that event, and then fhall receive an addition of glory and happiness by their reunion with the body. But the New Teftament fays not a word of any fuch addition at the refurrection, or of any life or happiness prior to it; and speaks but of one refurrection, and one fu ture ftate. From which it may be prefumed, that the fuppo fition of a resurrection of the body, as well as these infer6 ences drawn from it, are founded merely in human imagination.

(9.) By fuppofing a refurrection of the body, we needlefsly involve the doctrine of the New Teftament, concerning a resurrection and a future ftate, in difficulties and objections; arifing from the perpetual change of the materials of which our prefent bodies confift, and their being 'incorporated with other bodies, and from other confidera• tions.

(10.) By conftantly taking the word Refurrection in the plain and general fenfe, of men's being raised from death to the poffeffion and enjoyment of another life; we fhall * preferve the fimplicity of the Gofpel, and fhall find its doc"trine, as well as language, moft intelligible and rational.

At death men apparently fink into a state of inactivity ⚫ and infenfibility. To this ftate every perfon is reduced at the moment of death; and many perfons for fome time be⚫fore they are certainly known to be dead. This is the plain, fimple, primary notion of death, and the ftate of the dead: viz. A ceffation of life. Life confifts in activity, fenfibility, and the use of certain powers or faculties, all which ⚫ may

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may be either increased or diminished. By difeafes or old age they are gradually diminifhed, 'till at the moment of death they intirely cease, and life is ended. The question then occurs, Whether after men die, they shall be raised ⚫ from the dead? i. e. whether they shall be raised from that • state of inaction and infenfibility, to which they are reduced at the moment of death, to a state of activity, and to the use of the fame, or any other fenfes, powers, or • faculties ?—If they fhall at any time afterward be so raised; then there is a refurrection of the dead, and a future ftate. • And it may with equal propriety be termed a resurrection; whether they are reftored to life immediately after the mo⚫ment of death; or whether they remain for a period of time in a state of death, i. e. a ftate of infenfibility, or as the New Teftament-writers elegantly term it, fleep, which is the nearest image or resemblance of the state of the dead.

It is by departing from this fimplicity of natural ideas, and by intermixing many additional and metaphyfical fpe'culations and diftinctions, that men have confounded the Gofpel-doctrine of a resurrection, and have ftrangely appropriated that term to the Body, instead of applying it to the Man, or the living, thinking, acting principle in the 6 body.'

We now come to the Difcourfes themselves; in the four firft of which are confidered the apparent intentions of DrVINE WISDOM in the conftitution of the world, and of human nature, together with their confiftency and connection. Infinite power, knowledge, and goodness, Mr. Bourn obferves, may be confidered as comprehending all the perfections of God, fo far as we are able to conceive of his nature. His wifdom, then, we are told, is not to be defined as a diftinct attribute; but as confifting in the application of his infallible knowledge, and almighty power, in obtaining the purposes of his goodnefs: it implies his defign in all his operations, and his employing the fitteft means in order to the beft ends.-The Author thus proceeds:

As to the fupreme and ultimate end, which the All-wife Creator and Ruler hath in view, in the infinite and eter'nal scheme of his creation and providence ; it is most rational in itself, most honourable to God, and most agreeable to the natural fenfe of every good mind, to believe that this end can be no other than the greatest good or ⚫ happiness of the univerfe in general. But this being fo immeasurable an object of our view, infinitely exceeding our Rev. Jan. 1760. • utmost

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• utmost stretch of capacity to conceive of in an adequate manner; we are but very incompetent judges, what things, or what order and conftitution of things, may be moft conducive or requifite to that end.

In the works of any human agent, the greater the defign, and the deeper the skill of the operator, the more difficult it becomes for us to judge aright of the several parts or means, or to comprehend the whole, though the whole be laid before us; and we are often ready to imagine an error in thofe very parts, where, if we understood the whole, the greateft excellence of defign would appear: how much more, in the operations of an infinite mind, ⚫ whose thoughts and ways are above those of men, as the heaven is above the earth? How much more incapable muft we neceffarily be, of eftimating the fitnefs of things and events? How much more liable to judge erroneously, where all that we fee, or can difcern, is so minute a part of an infinite whole?-That there are numberlefs fyftems of rational beings fuperior to, or different from, the fyftem of mankind, is what philofophy and revelation concur in inducing us to believe; the one by the difcoveries made of the material, the other by the intelligences' given us of the intellectual creation. What connexion the order and conftitution of things on earth have with those other fyftems, we cannot comprehend; but neither philofophy nor revelation leads us to imagine, that the human race is a detached and independent part of the creation, having • no relation to other rational beings.

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• This may fuffice to convince us, how unable we are to judge adequately of the divine works; and to fhew us, whence it comes to pafs, that many things in the creation. and order of Divine Providence, appear, as they neceffarily muft, to our narrow minds, imperfect, inconvenient, or evil; because we cannot poffibly know the connexions and dependencies fubfifting between one part and another throughout the univerfe. Many partial evils may be seen and felt, which we may, and ought to refolve, by a rational faith, into the unfearchable wifdom of God: either as being conducive, though we cannot difcern how, to the univerfal good; or as neceffarily refulting from thofe fixed laws and conftitutions, which are requifite to that • end.

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And indeed, if it were not fo, if nothing appeared unaccountable in the creation; where would be the exercise

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of our faith? Where the virtue and excellence of that truft in the wisdom and goodness of GOD, which the holy fcriptures justly represent, as the nobleft principle of action <in the human mind?-The excellency of this faith confifteth, not indeed in believing contrary to, or without evidence, but in being fully perfuaded by those evidences which appear in nature, that all things are directed and governed by the perfect wifdom and goodness of a Sovereign Mind; and in adhering to, and acting upon this perfuafion, notwithstanding the many difficult appearances, and feeming imperfections in the formation of things, and the conduct of Providence; notwithstanding all the partial disorders and evils, which, by divine permiffion, take ' place in the world.

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• That it is reasonable for us to act on this principle, with refpect to the councils and ways of GOD, is evident be- . 'yond contradiction, from that general state of fociety, in 'which we think it right to behave in the like manner, with respect to the defigns and actions of men. For, if the welfare of a nation be fo great an object of view, that few perfons are competent judges of the means most conducive to that end; and if, on this account, it is reafonable in fubjects, to fubmit to, and confide in, the direction of their governors, upon a general prefumption, and with⚫ out any infallible proofs of their wisdom and integrity, and though the fitnefs of their measures is not always apparent; if it is reasonable to put fo much confidence in hu'man governors, of whofe capacity and good intentions we <have had little or no experience; how much more reasonable is it to have faith and confidence in GOD, when we ⚫ have fo various evidence, and conftant experience, of the wifdom of his works, and the goodnefs of his intentions; when, at the fame time, we are fo unable either to comprehend that infinite object, the univerfal good, which is the fupreme end of all his defigns, or to determine what • means are most conducive to it; when, notwithstanding the unfathomable depth of his counfels, and the immenfe extent of his defigns, notwithstanding the littleness of that 'portion of his works and ways which is fubject to our infpection, and the narrowness of the human mind, and incapacity to judge adequately of that little part; yet there occur to our obfervation more, clearer, and fronger evidences of the wifdom of GOD in his vifible works, and with refpect to mankind, as employing fit means to answer good ends, than the fubjects of any human government

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have, or can have, of the wisdom of the ablest and best of governors, or than any particular perfon hath, or can have, of the wifdom of any other perfon or agent whatsoever.

In proof of this, we fhall proceed to confider the inferior, intermediate, and fubordinate ends, which the wisdom of God appears to have in view, in the formation of this world, and the order and procefs of things in it. Our knowledge of the rectitude and goodness of these ends, which are manifeftly intended and anfwered, at prefent, by the order of things in this world, is the foundation on which we must build our judgment and belief of the supreme intention of the Almighty in all his operations and < appointments.'

Now the ends which the wisdom of God appears to have in view in the conftitution of this world, and the things in it, we are told, are these following: first, the production and preservation of life; fecondly, the pleasure of his creatures in the enjoyment of life; thirdly, their acquifition of knowledge; and, laftly, their attainment of virtue and religion. Thefe Mr. Bourn confiders, first, separately, and then, in connexion with, and fubferviency to each other; and what he says upon the fubject, well deserves the attentive perufal of every ferious enquirer: it will tend greatly to establish in his mind juft and comfortable fentiments of the divine character and government, and lay the most solid foundation for a spirit of rational piety and devotion.

In the fifth and fixth difcourfes he confiders the order and beauty of the visible creation, and obferves, that the world is not a compofition of disjointed and incoherent materials, or of parts that bear no proportion or relation to each other, but a regular and perfect fyftem; that the whole earth, is to be confidered in this view, as one work, or one creature of almighty power, probably, amidst numberless others of the fame kind, to which it may ftand related in a manner unknown to us. As every living creature on earth has a relation to its own kind, and to the whole earth; yet is at the fame time compofed of parts, which have a mutual connection with, and fubfervience to each other, whereby it becomes one diftinct and compleat animal; fo the earth itself, it is obferved, may have a relation to other worlds, but is at the fame time a feperate and entire system in itself, with refpect to its conftituent parts and movements, which are all made in fubfervience to the conftitution and defign of the whole.

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