Among the feveral projectors who have inftructed the Miniftry on this occafion, our Letter-writer is moft deferving attention. He not only appears in the light of an able. writer, but of a fhrewd politician, and a warm friend to his country. He feems to be well informed of the progrefs and effects of former negociations, and to be as well acquainted with the political views and faithlefs conduct of our enemies. He likewife discovers no flight intimacy with the characters of fome of our former ftatefmen, and he speaks fo circumftantially of fome occurrences during Lord Orford's ministry, as may induce us to believe that he was either an actor in, or an interested obferver, of thofe tranfactions.

The terms, however, which he deems neceffary to be infifted upon in the expected negociation, are not perhaps all of them, fo expedient as they appear to our Author. Our limits will not permit us to give fo exact an analyfis of his scheme, as we could wifh, or to expatiate greatly on fuch propofitions as we may be inclined to controvert; neverthelefs, we propofe to give our readers a general idea of our Author's plan, with fome curfory animadverfions on such parts of it as appear moft exceptionable.

The firft point which he takes under confideration, is the choice of plenipotentiaries; and here he laments, that fo few among the great are capable of conducting the arduous tafk of making a peace. In cafe, however, fit perfons fhould not be found among us for this purpose, he recommends the alternative of concluding a treaty at London; and of appointing those Ministers who directed the war, as plenipotentiaries to conduct a peace.

He then proceeds to enumerate the moft remarkable inftances of French perfidy, which have given rife to all the troubles of Europe for above thefe hundred years; from the peace of Weftphalia down to the treaty of Aix le Chapelle: but he infifts more particularly on their perfidious behaviour with respect to Dunkirk and North America, He therefore propofes that, before any new treaty commences, juftice may be done to the nation with regard to former treaties; and that Dunkirk be demolished previous to the enfuing nego ciation or if that cannot be complied with, that hostages fhould be given to us, as a fecurity that it fhall be faithfully complied with, within a limitted time after the treaty fhall

be concluded.

The latter propofition in truth feems most reasonable: for we cannot fuppofe that the enemy would demolish Dunkirk

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before a treaty begins, and before they are affured whether a peace will be concluded or not. It might be imperious in us to demand, and abfurd in them to comply with fuch

terms.

The Letter-writer in the next place turns his eyes to our North American conquefts, ftrongly recommending it as a principle not to give up any of them: and he infifts with great earneftness on the neceffity of keeping Canada. If that is left to us, he apprehends that Louisbourg, though of infinite fervice to France, can be of little or no ufe to England. He therefore proposes to demolish the fortifications of Louifbourg, and to remove the inhabitants to Nova Scotia. But, he adds, let Cape Breton unfortified and unguarded be left open to the French, if their right to fifh in fome parts of those feas be continued: and he wishes to fee it continued, as the refufal of it, he apprehends would be rather unreasonable.

This propofal of the Letter-writer's feems highly inconfiderate. To leave the French their right of fishery, would afford them a nursery for their feamen, and their vicinity would not only give room for future difputes, but their fifhery would supply them with one of the most effectual means of recruiting their strength, so as to be able once more to fupport perfidy by violence.

With regard to our other conquefts, the Letter-writer hints that the poffeffion of Guadeloupe, an additional fugarifland, when we have fo many of our own, ought not to be infifted on fo ftrenuously as to make it a condition of peace: and that, though Senegal and Goree are of real importance in the Slave and Gum trades, our own American settlements have hitherto supplied us with flaves fufficient for our American purposes and that the trade for gum, is perhaps not of confequence enough to make us amends for the annual mortality of our brave countrymen, employed to guard the African coafts.

Here the Writer's propofal, with refpect to the ceffion of Guadeloupe, may by many be deemed inexpedient. It is generally thought that our fugar colonies are not fufficiently extenfive, and that the retention of Guadaloupe would confequently be of great advantage to the fugar trade.

Our Author having given his thoughts concerning the difpofal of our conquefts, then changes the fcene, and offers fome propofitions for the fettlement of affairs in Germany. He gives it as his opinion, that the continental measures now adopted by England, were neceffary: and that the efforts

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which the French have made in Germany, and the refiftance they have there met with, by the care of the British adminiftration, have contributed more than perhaps we could expect, to our fucceffes in America, and other parts of the world.

In this opinion, we are ready to acquiefce with our Author. We are perfuaded that the vaft armies the enemy have been obliged to maintain in Weftphalia, and on the Rhine, and the prodigious fubfidies they have been obliged to advance to their allies, have involved them in fuch enormous expences, as have prevented them from ftrengthening themfelves at fea, and thereby facilitated our conquefts. On this occafion, we cannot fufficiently wonder at the ridiculous obftinacy of fome fhallow politicians, who, from the impropriety of former continental engagements, argue with undistinguishing zeal against all connections whatever on the

continent.

The Letter-writer is further of opinion, that the confederacy against the King of Pruffia may be broken; but, if contrary to our wifhes and endeavours, his Pruffian Majefty fhould be unable to defend himself, he proposes, that 'Whatever conquests we have made, and may ftill make upon the French, except North America, fhould be given back to the French, for extricating the King of Pruffia out of any • unforeseen diftreffes.' If on the other hand, the King of Pruffia fhould extricate himself, from the dangers which furround him, he proposes these conquefts to be employed to recover Neuport and Oftend from the hands of the French.

In these proposals however, there is perhaps, more generofity than difcretion. We fee no reason why we fhould refign our prefent and future acquifitions, on fuch confiderations and retain no advantage for ourselves, but North America, gained at the expence of fo many millions.—An expence which we ought to be re-imbursed, in money, or fomething equivalent.

In the conclufion, the Letter-writer expatiates with great warmth and earnestness, on the dangers to which our conftitution is expofed at home, from the encrease of the national debt, the establishment of standing armies, and the eagerness of our nobility to wear the badge of military fubjection. Upon the whole, the writer appears to be a man of fenfe and knowledge; and though fome of his propofitions do not carry conviction with them, they yet afford matter of useful confideration. R-d

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Reafons why the approaching Treaty of Peace, should be debated in Parliament: As a Method moft Expedient and Conftitutional. In a Letter addreffed to a Great Man. And occafioned by the Perufal of a Letter addreffed to Two Great Men. 8vo. Is. Griffiths.

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HE public, in our opinion, is much indebted to the fpirited Author of this Pamphlet, for his endeavours to revive the true and original use of Parliament. He writes with boldness, yet with decency: he not only appears to be a man of learning, but one intimately acquainted with the English Hiftory, deeply verfed in the principles of the Britifh Conftitution, and a warm Friend to Liberty. But let the Reader judge for himself, from the extracts we fhall

make.

His propofition is founded on a paffage in the celebrated Letter addreffed to Two Great Men, wherein that writer premises that, by the extinction of factious oppofition,

the Channel of parliamentary Inftruction is stopped, fo ❝ that no other but that of the Prefs is left open, for those "heads of advice, to which it may be worth a Minister's ❝ while to attend."

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On this paffage, our very ingenious Author animadverts in the following terms. Surely, fays he, it must furprize, and grieve every lover of the Britif Conftitution to hear, from fuch good authority, that the extinction of factious oppofition by the happy unanimity of every party, fhould have clofed the channel of parliamentary inftruction. Can inftruction then never reach the ears of a Minister in Parliament, but from the mouth of oppofition?

I use the word oppofition here, in the fenfe in which the letter-writer employs it not as denoting a difference of opinion, but a variance of party, and difagreement of faction.

Inftruction conveyed through fuch a channel, can only * ferve to gratify malignity on the one hand, and mortify pride on the other. It is like the application of a cauftic, which must torture the patient, before it can operate to

his benefit.

No one, Sir, can entertain a higher notion of the dignity of Parliaments than myfelf, or bear greater refpect to -their authority. For the honour, therefore, of those auguft affemblies, nay, for the credit of human nature, I am un

⚫ willing

Reafons concerning the approaching Treaty of Peace, willing to believe, that nothing but enmity to a Minister can open the mouths of our Representatives, and that fenatorial eloquence has its root in faction.

Such a fuppofition, Sir, would be, in the higheft degree, injurious to the reputation of Parliament. Every one is prefumed to come there with a disposition and an ability to serve his country. Confequently, they will be earneft in communicating whatever they deem effential to that purpose, and refolute in oppofing whatever they apC prehend to have a contrary tendency.

The discharge of thefe duties, fuppofes them neither biaffed by their connections with one party, or preju⚫ diced by their enmity to another. A real concern for the common welfare, will direct every speech, and determine, C every vote. They will remember that they are fummoned together to council, not to wrangle; to debate, not to • dictate.

If the worst of avarice is that of fenfe, the parcimony is doubly criminal in a fenator. To advife, is the privilege, nay, the duty, of every one in Parliament; to direct; ⚫ can be the lot but of a few. Men may be unanimous about the end, yet differ with refpect to the means.

But fuch is the pride of human nature, that they who have a capacity for advifing, afpire to govern. Not con6 tent to draw in friendly concert with others of equal abili ties, they are eager to take the lead, and fcorn to affift ⚫ those whom they cannot rule. .

It is difficult to conceive any thing more mortifying and deplorable, than to fee faction, difappointed in its towering ' views of ambition, fit down in fullen filence, and acquiefce with affected unanimity.

Unanimity I cannot call it, fince the mind has no share in the acquiefcence. It is at best but a negative union. Neceffity compels an outward conformity, but the will, yet • continues in oppofition.

An union of this kind, is like a broken glafs decorated ' with curious painting. The colours hide the flaw, but do not repair the fracture.

I ufe party here in pejorem fenfum. An affociation for the purpofe of refifting oppreffion or redreffing grievances, is not a party in the appropriated fenfe of the word. As Salluft obferves, Hac inter bonos amicitia, inter malos fuctio eft.'