the particles of matter into new configurations, and modify his ethereal agencies within them, in millions of millions of diversified forms. He has done so with the material elements of our earth. Both the animal and vegetable kingdoms display, as we have seen, this multifarious variety. But still one principle of formation, one system of creating mind-one maker, one will, one kind and character of intelligence appears in all. Every thing is exuberantly diversified, but nothing inconsistent or contradictory. There is linked and adjusted counteraction; but no incongruity, hostility, or absurdity. We may apply these remarks to every orb of being we survey. The same GOD; the same accordant system of creation; the same forming mind; the same character of thought and will; the same principles of agency and intention; the same moral and intellectual attributes or perfections; the same science and sympathies -may be expected to appear in all, and to cause in all their several inhabitants a similitude of impressions, feelings, and conduct. From this view, may we not suppose that in nature, virtues, reason, and mental sensibilities, and in the great outlines and constituting principles of knowledge and thought, the angelic classes, and all intelligent beings, and therefore the human race, may have the greatest resemblance to each other?-and that their difference will arise chiefly, from the different use which they make of their essential qualities and attainments; and from the varying and appropriated material knowledge, which the peculiar external world of each may occasion, and enable them respectively to acquire? As far as sacred history has disclosed any circumstances of this sort to us, the parallel has some foundation. There could be a Satan among angels, as well as an Adam among men. Both orders of being are therefore fallible; both furnish instances of transgression. Thus the suggestion, that the human spirit may, in its essential nature, in its improvable capacities, and in its powers and possibilities of progression, be inferior to no order of being which the general Creator has been pleased to form, seems not to be an irrational or an unwarranted conclusion. One marking principle that accompanies the human soul, seems to be, that it shall progressively furnish itself with knowledge, and form its moral character and qualities. It is placed in a world full of the materials of knowledge, which it is to acquire from its sensations, and by its after operations on its perceptions; and abounding also with many living beings, and numerous agencies, which force the soul into action in various respects during all its wakeful hours. Amid the impressions and excitations from all these external things, our intellectual being has to form itself into an individual personality, of some sort or other, during the course of its mortal life, as its nervous organization enlarges as its ideas increase-as its feelings multiplyand as the stimulations and incidents of its daily life successively operate upon it. We strive, by artificial tuition, to give its thoughts and habits, during its younger period, the tendencies we prefer. Instruction is a great assistant: our own conduct a greater. Youth comprehend and imitate what they see, much more than they understand or apply what they hear. But under both circumstances, and in every instance, it is self-formation which forms the matured spirit. The soul is an individual mind, distinct from every other, and always feels and acts as such. It is a separate self, which comes continually into vicinity, and into reciprocating sensations with other selfs, as peculiar, as distinct, and as independent. Each acquires its own sensations; makes its own perceptions and associations; feels alone its own feelings; makes for itself its own reasonings; has and uses its own will, and forms its own judgment and habits. By this separate and distinct self-agency on all its intellectual acquisitions and sensibilities, and amid all the circumstances which occur to it, every soul, as its body grows and as its earthly life continues, forms itself into a personality which is peculiar to itself; which cannot but have many similarities to that in others, from possessing a like frame, and living in the same society, but which always attains and exhibits some qualities, feelings, opinions, and habits particular to itself, and keeping it, while it lives, a specific and individual diversity. Each of us becomes a being generally resembling our habitual associates, but yet distinguished from them all by a special personality of mind, inclination, character, and conduct, with which no other is exactly identified. This difference arises from the principle, that each human spirit is always forming itself through life in its own way, and by its own process, whatever it may be taught and whatever sensations it may receive. It is in no ease only or servilely what its sensations make it; nor what any force, persuasion, or education may be directed to form it to be. Each of these, by putting it under agencies and necessities that impress strongly its attention, and limit its free agency and habits, cause very considerable effect upon it. But amid every impulse, violence, temptation, motive and necessity, to which it can be subjected, or which may be brought to act compulsorily upon it, it will still always be a peculiar self,-a distinct personality,-an individual being,-feeling and thinking and wishing as it may like and choose, though the superior power of other persons or things may fetter its actions. The interior faculty continues to form itself and its mental operations, in its own way and by its own free choice, and cannot but do so, from the essential freedom and independence, on all but its Creator, of its own original and essential nature. With this principle of self-formation, the soul seems also to possess an original and indestructible property of selfwill. This seems to be a natural quality of all intelligence. It cannot but will, as it cannot but perceive, think, and feel; and it cannot but will like itself, because every being can only act like itself, and not like another. It must be that being, before it could do so. The soul must therefore will for itself, as it thinks for itself. This is self-will, as the other action is self-thought. No man thinks in all respects like another, and no man wills in all things like another. Each thinks for himself, and wills for himself, as he sees and hears for himself; and, as we have observed, also forms himself. Self-will, or the willing according to his own nature-to his individual personality-to his separate and interior self, is therefore the inseparable property of every one. None can divest themselves of their will, more than of their thought. They must will while they exist, as they must so long breathe and live. This self-will always wills according to its own nature, upon its own sensations and inclinations, and as it chooses. Self must not be itself before it could do otherwise. This self-will is that which, under another denomination, we call freewill. It is always free to will, and always wills according to its own choice. In this respect it has no master, and no overruling necessity; and can have none, because it is an essential property of intelligence to will, of which only annihilation can deprive it. The compulsion which we feel, comes not upon our will, but upon our acting on our volitions. We have a natural and unavoidable freedom of will, but we have not as free a power of acting upon our will. All external things act more or less on our free agency, but not on our freewill The prisoner, blinded, beaten, and chained in a dungeon, can yet will as he pleases, and has repeatedly shown that he does so. Even under the severest tortures, inflicted on purpose to compel him to will as his tormentors require, the human spirit has on numerous occasions proved, that it is not only still exerting its freewill in opposition to the agencies which make it suffer for doing so, but that it can even avow that it will continue to exercise its liberty. Even where it seems to yield to violence, it is rather an extorted verbal submission than an actual surrender of its freedom. It only forms a new self-will in the apparent acquiescence. It wills to comply with the injunctions of the cruel power, in its words and conduct; but I cannot doubt that it also, in its secret movements, wills to hate the persecutor and his requisition, and the conformity to which, in this violence, it assents. Its hostile will remains as it was, and keeps its freedom as strongly as ever; though it wills, for the sake of ending the inflicted pain, to submit to speak and act as the oppressor has enjoined. It seems to me that it cannot but do so. The will cannot destroy its own essential freedom by any act of its volition, as the mind cannot divest itself of its power to think. It may, by new resolutions of its will, alter its expressions of it, and its acting upon it. But that, under the pressure of disagreeable necessities, the human action and the will are continually at variance, though no external sign of the difference is suffered to appear, we may perceive every day in society, and not unfrequently feel in our own personal experience. The will never seems to change but by its own choice, and then it makes the alteration only because it wills to do so. It exerts its freedom in adopting the mutation, because it does not alter until it pleases to change. For these reasons, I infer that this self-will, or freewill, always willing as it chooses, though not often able to act as it wishes, is an essential property of the human soul, of which it cannot divest itself, nor be divested. LETTER XXI. On the peculiarities of the human body, which contribute to the superiority of man his erect head and form-his peculiar legs and feet-his powerful arm and hand-his delicate and sensitive skin.-The female creation. THE bones, muscles, blood, arteries, veins, nerves, and brain of the human frame-its breathing, digestive, nutritive and circulating systems-its sensorial organs, and its moveable legs-its desire and need of food-and its sensual appetites and passions-are all similar or nearly so to those of most quadrupeds; and are shared by us in common, more or less, with all animated nature. In these we are like other animals, and they are like us-in these resemblances we are so nearly related, that if we were to be judged by a superficial view of our bodily structure alone, the brute and the man would be thought to differ more in figure than in nature, and might seem to be in more fraternal kinship than is usually admitted. And yet if more closely compared, the human body is found to have some peculiarities, which, even exclusive of its unequalled soul, attach to man a decided and permanent distinction and superiority, which no order of animals can rival, imitate or acquire. Of these it will be sufficient to particularize four differences, which are quite enough to confer on our species the power of subduing, transcending, and governing every other class and kingdom of terrestrial nature. The first is the os sublime-the erect structure, which both Ovid and Cicero remarked and panegyrized.* All other animals are so framed in their bodily construction as not to possess this beauty and this advantage. They are made to be prone, with the exception of the Simia tribe; and they cannot raise themselves on their hind feet without pain, awkwardness, and inefficiency for any continuance. And though the ape and baboon class have more power of supporting an erect posture, yet they cannot do it with the facility, activity, strength, energy and natural ability of man, and do not appear to derive any benefit from it over * "Pronaque cum spectant animalia cætera terram, Os homini sublime dedit:-cœlumque tueri Met. L. 1, v. 84. Cicero's eloquent allusion to this distinction in man, occurs in his moral "Officia," addressed to his son Marcus, |