III. Law of Equalisation produces two movements-independent and successive: 1. Property against Birth; 2. Numbers against Property; IV. Law of Development operating in Modern Times upon four Elements-Race-Religion-The Municipal System-The idea of Empire; Sacrifice of Order to Individual Liberty in the earlier ages of Europe, whereas Guarantee of the Feudal System-the Clan-Devotion to the Person of the Compared with Ancient Philosophy and Paganism in its influence upon private Necessity of its existence from the nature of Christianity.-How far a Political V. Secondary Revolutions proceeding from the greater Antagonism of Elements in Modern Times. VI. Effects of Material Civilisation in furtherance of the Law of Equalisation. VII. Place of Development-Theatre of either Civilisation-Influence of climate, soil, extent, and geographical situation and circumstances. VIII. Time of Development-Influence of a recorded Civilisation upon its successor-History. Probable difference in the final consequences of Revolutions-Anticipations-Conclusion. A COMPARISON OF ANCIENT AND MODERN REVOLUTIONS. WE are told that we have no right to regard history as a science; and it is obvious that we cannot presume to treat its philosophy as an exact science, for the reasons which have been so ably stated by its Regius Professor at Oxford.* Yet we shall not cease to regard the chief tendencies it records as certain, nor to speak of them with propriety as its ascertained laws; although, like many other principles of the moral world, they may not be universally and invariably cogent. Grant that there are modifications, exceptions, disturbing influences, it is sufficient for our purpose that there is something more considerable than these, and to which, in the long run, these are subordinate. It can be demonstrated that there are such tendencies and it matters little whence they proceed; that is to say, it matters not at all to the historian, though it may be important to the deductions of the theologian or the metaphysician. It is sufficient that they are and that we can perceive them in action, to know that we must reckon with them as paramount in the sphere of history. Nor is it of much consequence practically (though the question is * Lectures on Modern History, delivered in Oxford, 1859-61. By Goldwin Smith, M. A., Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of so warmly debated) whether the will of individuals be free or not free to resist or obey them. The motives and actions of mankind in the aggregate are so amenable to average classifications and estimates, that for historic purposes the alternative is of little moment. It was not long since that our engineers, after many failures, discovered that they could build as firmly on the sand as on the rock, when once they had ascertained the right principles of construction; and thus, even if it were true that "the quicksand of free will" is incapable of sustaining any superstructure erected hitherto, it does not follow that the wider and better induction, to which it is clear we are constantly tending, may not warrant conclusions which are now thought presumptuous. Admitting even that there are limitations to our further discoveries, at all events we are justified in the attempt to collect and combine the generalisations which are the discoveries of recent years. To whatever point these may carry us, if there is a possibility of their indicating in any sense, or in any degree, the consequences before us, it is by some such process only that we can judge of their significance. To form any conception of the revolutions to come, it is necessary to know the causes, the nature, and effects of those which have occurred up to the present date; and hypotheses offered to explain such crises of history deserve encouragement, apart from their * * It behoves us to remember that if history is a science, it is emphatically a пего science" Scienza nuova, "-as it was termed by Vico, and that our acquaintance with its phenomena is not only recent, but limited. "Elle est la conquête de notre age," says Victor Cousin, and it is too early to pronounce of what use it may ever be, as regards consequences which are yet in futuro. Its inferences may for ever be restricted to the aggregate, as distinguished from the special sequence of events, and they may exceed or fall short of the reality even there, because they are concerned with elements which, to some extent, are so variable. But the wind and the weather seemed equally capricious to our forefathers, and yet we are beginning to calculate and predict their vicissitudes. It is therefore, at least, a permissible speculation, that as our knowledge of its phenomena goes on increasing, history 'may attain to something like prophetic strain," though subject to limitations less or greater, and its data may not be inadequate always, because they are as yet known only in part, nor altogether illusory because they are inexact. |