Spaniards was to embark immediately to subdue South America. I told him there was absurdity on the face of these paragraphs, as the same newspapers announced with more authenticity the disbanding of the Spanish army. The President himself is singularly disturbed with these rumours of invasion by the Holy Alliance.

C. F. ADAMS, editor, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams. VI. 185, 194, 226.

JEFFERSON (1823)

TO THE PRESIDENT

MONTICELLO, October 24, 1823.

DEAR SIR, The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is labouring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavour should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, of all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which

the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it.

I have been so long weaned from political subjects, and have so long ceased to take any interest in them, that I am sensible I am not qualified to offer opinions on them worthy of any attention. But the question now proposed involves consequences so lasting, and effects so decisive of our future destinies, as to rekindle all the interest I have heretofore felt on such occasions, and to induce me to the hazard of opinions, which will prove only my wish to contribute still my mite towards anything which may be useful to our country. And praying you to accept it at only what it is worth, I add the assurance of my constant and affectionate friendship and respect.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, Complete Works. VII. 315, 317.

MADISON (1823)

TO PRESIDENT MONROE

Oct. 30, 1823.

DR SIR, — I have just received from Mr. Jefferson your letter to him, with the correspondence between Mr. Canning and Mr. Rush, sent for his and my perusal, and our opinions on the subject of it. . . . The professions we have made to these neighbours, our sympathies with their liberties and independence, the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the Great Powers, confederated against the rights and reforms of which we have given so conspicuous and persuasive an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade.

TO RICHARD RUSH

MONTPELIER, Nov. 13, 1823. DR SIR, I have received your favour of September 10. Whatever may be the motives or the management of the British Government, I cannot pause on the question whether

we ought to join her in defeating the efforts of the Holy Alliance to restore our Independent neighbours to the condition of Spanish Provinces. Our principles and our sympathies; the stand we have taken in their behalf; the deep interest we have in friendly relations with them; and even our security against the Great Powers, who, having conspired against national rights and reforms, must point their most envenomed wrath against the United States, who have given the most formidable example of them; all concur in enjoining on us a prompt acceptance of the invitation to a communion of counsels, and, if necessary, of arms, in so righteous and glorious a cause.

JAMES MADISON, Works. III. 339, 345.

WEBSTER (1826)

Now, Sir, it did so happen, that, as soon as the Spanish king was completely reëstablished, he invited the coöperation of his allies, in regard to South America. In the same month of December, of 1823, a formal invitation was addressed by Spain to the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, proposing to establish a conference at Paris, in order that the plenipotentiaries there assembled might aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of her revolted provinces.

The proposed meeting, however, did not take place. England had already taken a decided course; for as early as October, Mr. Canning, in a conference with the French minister in London, informed him distinctly and expressly, that England would consider any foreign interference, by force or by menace, in the dispute between Spain and the colonies, as a motive for recognizing the latter without delay. It is probable this determination of the English government was known here at the commencement of the session of Congress; and it was under these circumstances, it was in this crisis, that Mr. Monroe's declaration was made. It was not then ascertained whether a meeting of the allies would or would not take place, to concert with Spain the means of reëstablishing her power; but it was plain enough they would be pressed by Spain to aid her operations; and it was plain enough, also, that they had no particular liking to what was taking place on this side of the Atlantic, nor any great disinclination to interfere. This was the posture of affairs; and, Sir, I concur entirely in the senti

ment expressed in the resolution of a gentleman from Pennsylvania, that this declaration of Mr. Monroe was wise, seasonable, and patriotic.

It has been said, in the course of this debate, to have been a loose and vague declaration. It was, I believe, sufficiently studied. I have understood, from good authority, that it was considered, weighed, and distinctly and decidedly approved, by every one of the President's advisers at that time. Our government could not adopt on that occasion precisely the course which England had taken. England threatened the immediate recognition of the provinces, if the Allies should take part with Spain against them. We had already recognized them. It remained, therefore, only for our government to say how we should consider a combination of the Allied Powers, to effect objects in America, as affecting ourselves; and the message was intended to say, what it does say, that we should regard such combination as dangerous to us. Sir, I agree with those who maintain the proposition, and I contend against those who deny it, that the message did mean something; that it meant much; and I maintain, against both, that the declaration effected much good, answered the end designed by it, did great honour to the foresight and the spirit of the government, and that it cannot now be taken back, retracted, or annulled, without disgrace. It met, Sir, with the entire concurrence and the hearty approbation of the country. The tone which it uttered found a corresponding response in the breasts of the free people of the United States. That people saw, and they rejoiced to see, that, on a fit occasion, our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that, without departing from our duty, we had done something useful, and something effectual, for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the country possessed, and of the respect and honour which belonged to it, pervaded all bosoms. Possibly the public enthusiasm went too far; it certainly did go far. But, Sir, the sentiment which this declaration inspired was not confined to ourselves. Its force was felt everywhere, by all those who could understand its object and foresee its effect.

DANIEL WEBSTER, Works. III. 202, 203.

CRITICAL COMMENT

DANA (1866)

It is to be borne in mind that the Declarations known as the Monroe Doctrine have never received the sanction of an act or resolution of Congress: nor have they any of that authority which European governments attach to a royal ordinance. They are, in fact, only the declarations of an existing administration of what its own policy would be, and what it thinks should ever be the policy of the country, on a subject of paramount and permanent interest.

Confining itself to a declaration against interposition to oppress or control, or to extend the system of the Holy Alliance to this hemisphere, the message avoids committing the government on the subject of acquisition, either by the United States or the European powers, and whether by voluntary cession or conquest. . . . In further explanation of the Monroe Doctrine it is to be noticed that it is correctly called a doctrine and no more. There is no intimation what the United States will do in case of European interposition, or what means it will take to prevent it. . . . And public opinion may be considered as settled on the point that the action of the nation, in any case that may arise, must be unembarrassed by pledge or compact: and, further, as equally settled, against the introduction of anything approaching the nature of a Holy Alliance for this continent, though it be in the interests of republican institutions. RICHARD HENRY DANA, Wheaton's Elements of International Law. 109

111.

VON HOLST (1875)

In August, 1823, Rush learned from Canning that the Holy Alliance was beginning to seriously think of interfering in colonial affairs in favour of Spain. England's position on the question had meanwhile substantially changed. If Castlereagh had been willing in 1818 to make the return of the colonies under Spanish dominion the basis of the attempt at intervention, Wellington had by this time used very different language at the congress of Verona, and now Canning declared himself ready to act in direct opposition to the plans of the Holy Alli