the same result. And if anything in relation to the construction of the Constitution can be regarded as settled, it is that which we now give to the word "citizen" and the word " people." The decision that the Cir And upon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the Court is of opinion, that, upon the facts stated in the plea in abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and not en- cuit Court titled as such to sue in its courts; and, consequently, that the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction of the the case was case, and that the judgment on the plea in abate- of course adment is erroneous. had no juris'diction of verse to Dred Scott. Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly expressed and affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years. And the government in express Const. Art. i. terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if sect. 9, § 1. the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words too plain to be misunderstood. And iv. sect. 2, no word can be found in the Constitution which § 2. gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in hist rights. Const. Art. Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the Court that the Act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of "Missouri the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by Compromise" held the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that unconstituneither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, tional. were made free by being carried into this terri See Const. Note Decla ration of Independence. tory; even if they had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becoming a permanent resident. Extract from JUSTICE BENJAMIN R. CURTIS, dissenting. I dissent from the opinion pronounced by the Chief Justice, and from the judgment which the majority of the court think it proper to render in this case. One mode of approaching this question is, to inquire who were citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution can have been no other than citizens of the United States under the Confederation. By the Articles of Confederation, a Government was organized, the style whereof was, 'The United States of America.' This Government was in existence when the Constitution was framed and proposed for adoption, and was to be superseded by the new Government of the United States of America, organized under the Constitution. When, therefore, the Constitution speaks of citizenship of the United States, existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, it must necessarily refer to citizenship under the Government which existed prior to and at the time of such adoption. Without going into any question concerning the powers of the Confederation to govern the territory of the United States out of the limits of the States, and consequently to sustain the relation of Government and citizen in respect to the inhabitants of such territory, it may safely be said that the citizens of the several States were citizens of the United States under the Confederation. . . Did the Constitution of the United States deprive them or their descendants of citizenship? 1857] TEXT 347 That Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States, through the action, of the Con in each State, of those persons who were qualified Through the by its laws to act thereon, in behalf of themselves ratification and all other citizens of that State. In some of the stitution. States, as we have seen, colored persons were among those qualified by law to act on this subject. These Instanced by New Hampcolored persons were not only included in the body shire, Massaof the people of the United States,' by whom the chusetts, Constitution was ordained and established, but in New York, at least five of the States they had the power to act, and North and doubtless did act, by their suffrages, upon the Carolina, question of its adoption. It would be strange, if bers of the we were to find in that instrument anything which colored race deprived of their citizenship any part of the people only citizens of the United States who were among those by but many of them had the whom it was established. "franchise New Jersey, where mem were not I can find nothing in the Constitution which, of electors." proprio vigore, deprives of their citizenship any class of persons who were citizens of the United States at the time of its adoption, or who should be native-born citizens of any State after its adoption; nor any power enabling Congress to disfranchise persons born on the soil of any State, and entitled to citizenship of such State by its Constitution and laws. And my opinion is, that, under the Constitution of the United States, every free person born on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of that State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United States. The conclusions at which I have arrived on this part of the case are: FIRST. That the free native-born citizens of each Citizenship. State are citizens of the United States. SECOND. That as free colored persons born within Colored citi some of the States are citizens of those States, such zenship. persons are also citizens of the United States. Rights of THIRD. That every such citizen, residing in any citizenship. State, has the right to sue and is liable to be sued in the Federal courts, as a citizen of that State in which he resides. FOURTH. That as the plea to the jurisdiction in this case shows no facts, except that the plaintiff was of African descent, and his ancestors were sold as slaves, and as these facts are not inconsistent with his citizenship of the United States, and his residence in the State of Missouri, the plea to the jurisdiction was bad, and the judgment of the Circuit Court overruling it was correct. I dissent, therefore, from that part of the opinion of the majority of the court, in which it is held that a person of African descent cannot be a citizen of the United States; and I regret I must go further, and dissent both from what I deem their assumption of authority to examine the constitutionality of the act of Congress commonly called the Missouri to the ground Compromise act, and the grounds and conclusions announced in their opinion. This refers taken by Taney that all territory acquired after the year 1787 was under the constitutional law of the country. Hence, citizenship from the Federal Government could not extend to the new territories. Louisiana I consider the assumption which lies at the basis of this theory to be unsound; not in its just sense, and when properly understood, but in the sense which has been attached to it. That assumption is, that the territory ceded by France was acquired for the equal benefit of all the citizens of the United States. I agree to the position. But it was acquired for their benefit in their collective, not their individual, capacities. It was acquired for their benefit, as an organized political society, subsisting as 'the people of the United States,' under the Constitution of the United States; to be administered justly and impartially, and as nearly as possible for the equal benefit of every individual citizen, according to the best judgment and discretion of the Congress; to whose power, as the Legislature of the nation which acquired it, the people of the United States have committed its administration. Nor in my judgment, will the position, that a prohibition to bring slaves into a Territory deprives any one of his property without due process of law, bear See Magna Charta, Art. examination. 39. See Petition It must be remembered that this restriction on See Confirmatio the legislative power is not peculiar to the Constitu- Chartarum, tion of the United States; it was borrowed from Art. I. Magna Charta; was brought to America by ancestors, as part of their inherited liberties, has existed in all the States, usually in the very words of the great charter. our of Right, § 2. and See Bill of Rights, Art. VI. CONTEMPORARY EXPOSITION BENTON (1857) From the day of becoming a landholder, the old Continental Congress first, and the Federal Congress since, have exercised the right of every other landholder to prevent trespasses, intrusions, and settlements upon their territory, expelling with military force, and punishing with fine and damages, the violater of its rules. All This began under the Confederation, and has continued ever since. All the old settlers on the frontiers can remember the dragooning the settlers on the United States territory, driving them off, and destroying their houses and growing crops. can remember the old familiar operation of cutting up a Territory, running a line through it, giving one half to the Indians, and driving the white people from it, and their slaves also. Such is the power which Congress exercises over its territory, and with which the Constitution has nothing to do. To sum up, in a few words, the results of this Examination, and to present the conclusions under a single view, and it is shown that the Constitution was not made for Territories, and does not include them that it cannot be extended to them by law, and if it could, would be barren and fruitless without law to put it into operation that no law could be made under it to give any help to the slaveholder, either in recovering his property, if the slave ran away, or in bringing back for justice |