[7]

ESSAY II.

Of the LIBERTY of the PRESS.

T

HERE is nothing more apt to surprise a foreigner, than the extreme liberty, which we enjoy in this country, of communicating whatever we please to the public, and of openly cenfuring every measure, enter'd into by the king or his minifters. If the administration refolve upon war, 'tis affirm'd, that either wilfully or ignorantly they mistake the interest of the nation, and that peace, in the present fituation of affairs, is infinitely preferable. If the paffion of the minifters lie towards peace, our political writers breathe nothing but war and devastation, and reprefent the pacific conduct of the goverment as mean and pufillanimous. As this liberty is not indulg'd in any other government, either republican or monarchical; in Holland and Venice, no more than in France or Spain; it may very naturally give occafion to these two queftions, How it happens that Great-Britain enjoys fuch a peculiar privilege? and, Whether the unlimited exercise of this liberty be advantageous or prejudicial to the public?

As to the firft question, Why the laws indulge us in fuch an extraordinary liberty? I believe the reafon

B 4

reafon may be deriv'd from our mix'd form of go. vernment, which is neither wholly monarchical, nor wholly republican. Twill be found, if I mistake not, a true obfervation in politics, that the two extremes in government, of liberty and flavery, commonly approach nearest to each other; and that as you depart from the extremes, and mix a little of monarchy with liberty, the government becomes always the more free; and on the other hand, when you mix a little of liberty with monarchy, the yoke becomes always the more grievous and intolerable. I shall endeavour to explain myself. In a government, fuch as that of France, which is entirely abfolute, and where laws, cuftom, and religion concur, all of them, to make the people fully fatisfied with their condition, the monarch cannot entertain the leaft jealousy against his fubjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great liberties both of speech and action. In a government altogether republican, fuch as that of Holland, where there is no magiftrate fo eminent as to give jealousy to the flate, there is alfo no danger in intrufting the magiftrates with very large difcretionary powers; and tho' many advantages refult from fuch powers, in the prefervation of peace and order; yet they lay a confiderable reftraint on men's actions, and make every private fubject pay a great respect to the government. Thus it feems evident, that the two extremes, of abfolute monarchy and of a republic, approach very near to each other in the moft material circumftances. In the first, the magiftrate has no jealousy of the people : In the fecond, the people have no jealousy of the ma

giftrate:

giftrate: Which want of jealoufy begets a mutual confidence and trust in both cafes, and produces a fpecies of liberty in monarchies, and of arbitrary power in republics.

To juftify the other part of the foregoing obfervation, that in every government the means are moft wide of each other, and that the mixtures of monarchy and liberty render the yoke either more eafy or more grievous; I must take notice of a remark of Tacitus with regard to the Romans under the emperors, that they neither could bear total flavery nor total liberty, Nec totam fervitutem, nec totam libertatem pati poffunt. This remark a famous poet has tranflated and applied to the English, in his admirable description of queen Elizabeth's policy and government.

Et fit aimer fon joug a l'Anglois indompté,
Qui ne peut ni fervir, ni vivre en liberté.
HENRIADE, Liv. 1.

ACCORDING to thefe remarks, we are to confider the Roman government under the emperors as a mixture of defpotifm and liberty, where the defpotifin prevail'd; and the English government as a mixture of the fame kind, but where the liberty predominates. The confequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing obfervation; and such as may be expected from thofe mixed forms of govern ment, which beget a mutual watchfulness and jealousy. The Roman emperors were, many of

B 5

them,

them, the most frightful tyrants that ever difgrac'd human nature; and 'tis evident their cruelty was chiefly excited by their jealousy, and by their observing, that all the great men of Rome bore with impatience the dominion of a family, which, but a little before, was no ways fuperior to their own. On the other hand, as the republican part of the government prevails in England, though with a great mixture of monarchy, 'tis oblig'd, for its own prefervation, to maintain a watchful jealousy over the magiftrates, to remove all discretionary powers, and to fecure every one's life and fortune by general and inflexible laws. No action must be deem'd a crime but what the law has plainly determin'd to be fuch: No crime must be imputed to a man but from a legal proof before his judges; and even thefe judges must be his fellow-fubjects, who are oblig'd, by their own intereft, to have a watchful eye over the encroachments and violence of the minifters. From these caufes it proceeds, that there is as much liberty, and even, perhaps, licentiousness in Britain, as there were formerly flavery and tyranny in Rome.

THESE principles account for the great liberty of the prefs in these kingdoms, beyond what is indulg'd in any other government. 'Tis fufficiently known, that defpotic power would steal in upon us, were we not extremely watchful to prevent its progrefs, and were there not an eafy method of conveying the alarum from one end of the kingdom to the other. The spirit of the people muft frequently be rouz'd to curb the ambition of the court; and the dread

of

of rouzing this spirit, must be employ'd to prevent that ambition, Nothing fo effectual to this purpofe as the liberty of the prefs, by which all the learning, wit and genius of the nation may be employ'd on the fide of liberty, and every one be animated to its defence. As long, therefore, as the republican part of our government can maintain itfelf against the monarchical, it must be extremely jealous of the liberty of the prefs, as of the utmost importance to its prefervation.

SINCE therefore the liberty of the prefs is fo effential to the fupport of our mix'd government; this fufficiently decides the fecond queftion, Whether this liberty be advantageous or prejudicial; there being nothing of greater importance in every ftate than the preservation of the ancient government, especially if it be a free one. But I would fain go a step farther, and affert, that fuch a liberty is attended with fo few inconveniencies, that it may be claim'd as the common right of mankind, and ought to be indulg'd them almost in every government; except the ecclefiaftical, to which indeed it would be fatal. We need not dread from this liberty any fuch ill confequences as follow'd from the harangues of the popular demagogues of Athens and tribunes of Rome. A man reads a book or pamphlet alone and coolly. There is none present from whom he can catch the paffion by contagion. He is not hurry'd away by the force and energy of action. And fhould he be wrought up to never fo fe ditious a humour, there is no violent refolution preB 6 fented