its members. The crown has fo many offices at its difpofal, that, when affifted by the honeft and difinterested part of the houfe, it will always command the refolutions of the whole; fo far at leaft, as to preferve the ancient conftitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we pleafe; we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but fome degree and fome kind of it are infeparable from the very nature of the constitution, and neceffary to the preservation of our mix'd government. * INSTEAD then of afferting abfolutely, that the dependence of parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of British liberty, the countryparty had better have made fome conceffions to their adversaries, and have only examin'd what was the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty. But fuch a moderation is not to be expected of party-men of any kind. After a conceffion of this nature, all declamation must be abandon'd; and a ferious calm enquiry into the proper degree of court-influence, and parliamentary dependence would have been expected by the readers. And tho' the advantage, in such a controversy, might poffibly remain to the country-party; yet the victory would not have been fo compleat as they wish for, nor would a true patriot have given an entire loose to his zeal, for fear of running matters into a contrary extreme, by di *See Differtation on Parties, throughout. minishing * minishing too far the influence of the crown. 'Twas, therefore, thought beft to deny, that this extreme could ever be dangerous to the conftitution, or that the crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament. ALL queftions concerning the proper medium betwixt any two extremes are very difficult to be decided; both because it is difficult to find werds proper to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, in fuch cafes, run so gradually into each other, as even to render our fentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the prefent cafe, which would embarrass the most knowing and most impartial examiner. The power of the crown is always lodg'd in a fingle perfon, either king or minifter; and as this perfon may have either a greater or lefs degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity or fortune, the power, which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. In pure republics, where the power is diftributed among feveral affemblies or fenates, the checks and controuls are more regular in their operation; because the members of fuch numerous affemblies may be prefum'd to be al * By that influence of the crown, which I would justify, I mean only, that arifing from the offices and honours which are at the difpofal of the crown. As to private bribery, it may be confider'd in the fame light as the practice of employing fpies, which is fcarce justifiable in a good minister, and is infamous in a bad one: But to be a spy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous under all ministries, and is to be regarded as a shameless proftitution. Polybius juftly esteems the pecuniary influence of the fenate and cenfors to be one of the regular and constitutional weights, which preferv'd the balance of the Roman government. Lib. 6. cap. 15. ways ways nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and 'tis only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into confideration. But a limited monarchy admits not of any such stability; nor is it poffible to affign to the crown fuch a determinate degree of power, as will, in every hand, form a proper counter-balance to the other parts of the conftitution. This is an unavoidable disadvantage, among the many advantages, attending that species of government. ESSAY ESSAY IX. Whether the BRITISH GOVERNMENT inclines more to ABS OLUTE MONARCHY, or to a REPUBLIC. T affords a violent prejudice against almost every art and science, that no prudent man, however fure of his principles, dares prophefy concerning any event, or foretell the remote confequences of things. A phyfician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after: And still less dares a politician foretell the fituation of public affairs a few years hence. Harrington thought himself fo fure of his general principle, That the balance of power depends on that of property, that he ventur'd to pronounce it impoffible ever to re-establish monarchy in England: But his book was fcarce publish'd when the king was reftor'd; and we fee that monarchy has ever since subsisted upon the fame footing as before. Notwithstanding this unlucky example, I will venture to examine a very important queftion, viz. Whether the British government inclines more to abfolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of these two species of government it will 3 will moft probably terminate? As there seems not to be any great danger of a fudden revolution either way, I fhall at least escape the fhame attending my temerity, if I should be found to have been mistaken. THOSE who affert, That the balance of our government inclines towards abfolute monarchy, may fupport their opinion by the following reafons. That property has a great influence on power cannot poffibly be denied; but yet the general maxim, That the balance of the one depends upon the balance of the other, must be receiv'd with feveral limitations. "Tis evident, that much less property in a fingle hand will be able to counter-balance a greater property in feveral hands; not only because it is difficult to make many perfons combine in the fame views and meafures; but also because property, when united, causes much greater dependence, than the fame property, when difpers'd. An hundred perfons, of 1000 l. a year a-piece, can confume all their income, and no body shall ever be the better for them, except their fervants and tradefmen, who juftly regard their profits as the product of their own labour. But a man poffefs'd of 100,cool. a year, if he has either any generofity, or any cunning, may create a great dependence by obligations, and ftill a greater by expectations. Hence we may obferve, that in all free governments any fubject exorbitantly rich has always created a jealoufy, even tho' his riches bore no manner of proportion to the riches of the ftate. Craffus's fortune, if I remember well, amounted only to about * fix *As intereft in Rome was higher than with us, this might yield above 100,000 7. a year. teen |