by which any controverfy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, which are repugnant to the common fentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages. The doctrine, which founds all lawful government on an original contract, or consent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the ableft of its partizans, in profecution of it, fcrupled to affirm, that abfolute monarchy is inconfiftent with civil fociety, and fo can be no form of civil government at all*; and that the Supreme power in a state cannot take from any man by taxes and impofitions, any part of his property, without his own confent or that of his reprefentatives f. What authority any moral reasoning can have, which leads into opinions, fo wide of the general practice of mankind, in every place but this fingle kingdom, 'tis easy to determine ‡.

• See Locke on government, Chap. 7. §. 90. + Id. Chap. 11. §. 138, 139, 140.

The only paffage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to government is afcrib'd to a promife is in Plato in Critone; where Socrates refuses to escape from prison, because he had tacitly promis'd to obey the laws. Thus he builds a tory consequence of paffive obedience, on a whig foundation of the original contract.

New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If no man, till very lately, ever imagin'd that government was founded on contract, 'tis certain it cannot, in general, have any fuch foundation.

ESSAY

ESSAY XXVI.

IN

Of PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.

N the former effay, we endeavour'd to refute the Speculative fyftems of politics, advanc'd in this nation; as well the religious fyftem of the one party, as the philofophical of the other. We come now to examine the practical confequences, deduc'd by each party, with regard to the measures of fubmiffion, due to fovereigns.

As the obligation to justice is founded intirely on the interefts of fociety, which require mutual abftinence from property, in order to preserve peace amongst mankind; 'tis evident, that, when the execution of justice would be attended with very pernicious confequences, that virtue must be fufpended, and give place to public utility, in fuch extraordinary and fuch preffing emergencies. The maxim, fat Juftitia & ruat Cælum, let juftice be perform'd, tho' the universe be deftroy'd, is apparently false, and by sacrificing the end to the means, fhews a prepofterous idea of the fubordination of duties. What governor of a town makes any fcruple of burning the fuburbs, when they facilitate the advances of

enemy? Or what general abftains from plundering a neutral country, when the neceffities of war require it, and he cannot otherwise maintain his army? The cafe is the fame with the duty of obedience to magistrates; and common fenfe teaches us, that as government obliges to obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, it must always, in extraordinary cafes, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. Salus populi fuprema Lex, the fafety of the people is the fupreme law. This maxim is agreeable to the fentiments of mankind in all ages Nor is any one, when he reads of the infurrections against a Nero, or a Philip, fo infatuated with party-fyftems, as not to wish fuccefs to the enterprize, and praife the undertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in spite of their fublime theory, are forc'd, in fuch cafes, to judge, and feel, and approve, in conformity to the rest of mankind.

RESISTANCE, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the queftion can only be, amongst good reafoners, with regard to the degree of neceffity, which can justify resistance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I must confefs, that I fhall always incline to their fide, who draw the bond of allegiance the clofeft poffible, and confider an infringement of it, as the laft refuge, in desperate cafes, when the public is in the highest danger, from a cruel and abandon'd tyranny. For befides the mischiefs of a civil war, which commonly attends infurrection; 'tis certain, that where a difpofition to

rebellion

rebellion appears amongst any people, it is one chief cause of tyranny in the rulers, and forces them into many violent measures, which they never would have embrac'd, had every one feem'd inclin'd to fubmiffion and obedience. 'Tis thus the tyrannicide or affaffination, approv'd of by ancient maxims, instead of keeping tyrants and ufurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now justly, upon that account, abolish'd by the laws of nations, and univerfally condemn'd as a base and treacherous method of bringing to justice thefe difturbers of fociety.

BESIDES; we must confider, that as obedience is our duty in the common course of things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can any thing be more prepofterous than an anxious care and follicitude in ftating all the cases, in which refistance may be allow'd. Thus, tho' a philofopher reasonably acknowledges, in the course of an argument, that the rules of justice may be difpens'd with in cafes of urgent neceffity; what should we think of a preacher or cafuift, who should make it his chief study to find out fuch cases, and enforce them with all the vehemence of argument and eloquence? Would he not be better employ'd in inculcating the general doctrine, than in difplaying the particular exceptions, which we are, perhaps, but too much inclin'd, of ourselves, to embrace, and to extend ?

THERE are, however, two reasons, which may pleaded in defence of that party amongst us,

h

have, with fo much induftry, propagated the maxims of refiftance; maxims, which, it must be confeft, are, in general, fo pernicious, and fo deftructive of civil fociety. The firft is, that their antagonists carrying the doctrine of obedience to such an extravagant height, as not only never to mention the exceptions in extraordinary cafes (which might, perhaps, be excufable) but even pofitively to exclude them; it became neceffary to infift on these exceptions, and defend the rights of injur'd truth and liberty. The fecond, and, perhaps, better reason, is founded on the nature of the British constitution and form of government.

'Tis almoft peculiar to our conftitution to establish a first magistrate with fuch high pre-eminence and dignity, that, tho' limited by the laws, he is, in a manner, fo far as regards his own perfon, above the laws, and can neither be queftion'd nor punish'd for any injury or wrong, which may be committed by him. His minifters alone, or those who act by his commiffion, are obnoxious to juftice; and while the prince is thus allur'd, by the prospect of perfonal fafety, to give the laws their free course, an equal fecurity is, in effect, obtain'd, by the punishment of leffer offenders, and at the fame time a civil war is avoided, which would be the infallible confequence, were an attack, at every turn, made directly upon the fovereign. But tho' the conftitution pays. this falutary compliment to the prince, it can never reasonably be understood, by that maxim, to have determin'd its own deftruction, or to have establish'd

a tame