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nal, 66 were too long;" which is his only apology for not specifying any. Throgmorton, in his private audience of queen Mary, assured that princess that if she would be graciously pleased to observe all that Randan and the bishop of Valence had promised, "the states of Scotland would perfect their duty to their majesties, by sending a suitable embassy to Paris; for the only grievance which the king, or the queen, or the cardinal, had deigned to specify was, that the Scottish parliament had sent a mean man to Paris to convey their prayers, though the person so described was sir James Sandilands, preceptor [head] of the order of St. John of Jerusalem (or Malta) in Scotland. The cardinal neither urged that the ambassadors had exceeded their powers, nor complained of the parliament for having overpassed the concessions by a change of religion. If the temporary government had acted as a republic, he should have remembered that the legislative, and in effect the executive, power had been ceded to them by the agreement at Leith. He made no distinction between the treaty with Elizabeth and the grants to the people of Scotland. If he had objected to the latter part of the treaty as containing a promise to a foreign sovereign, that the king and queen of Scotland would observe the conditions which they had granted to their own subjects (which he never does), at least he ought to have offered to ratify the prior article *, which recognised the undisputed right of Elizabeth to her own throne; and to engage that they should never assume, nor allow to be used by others, to them or for them, the title or arms of England. To this article there was no objection on the ground either of Elizabeth's illicit interference in Scottish affairs, or of the default of the Scottish parliament. The refusal or the delay and evasion of so harmless a stipulation, which was important to England, manifested a hostile mind against Elizabeth, and an inflexible purpose to keep very formidable pretensions hanging over her head; ready, whenever she was weak or they were

* Rymer, xv. 393. Dumont, Corps Diplomat. v. part. i. 63,

strong, to crush her throne. Probably it was not considered by either party in these conferences, that the effect of a refusal of ratification was to restore the state of war. Either party might indeed forbear from actual warfare, but that forbearance would be an abstinence from the exercise of a right; for when either party refused to complete the contract which was to close a war, the belligerent rights of the opposite party were necessarily revived.

Cecil, however, from the beginning, founded the advice which he gave his sovereign to take a part in Scottish affairs, on the more comprehensive principle of the justice and policy of self-defence.* "It is agreeable to God's law," said he, " for every prince and public state to defend itself not only from present peril, but from perils that may be feared to come. It is manifest that France cannot any way so readily, so puissantly offend, yea invade and put the crown of England in danger, as if they recover an absolute authority over Scotland. The long deep-rooted hatred of the house of Guise, which now occupieth the king's authority against England, is well known. What chiefly stays the execution of their purpose against England, is the resistance in Scotland, where they have lately sent a great seal with the arms of England." Maitland of Lethington, who destroyed the effect of great abilities by a capricious inconstancy, which repelled all trust, seconded with his wonted talents the

reasoning of Cecil.+ "The fear of conquest," says he,

"made the Scots to hate the English and love the French. The case changed,-when we see them (the French) attempt conquest, and you (the English) show us friendship,-shall we not hate them and favour you? especially now that we are come to a conformity of doctrine, and profess the same religion with you, which I take to be the straitest knot of amity that can be devised."

These reasonings on the justice and policy of armed interference for a friendly party, where the safety of a

A Brief Consideration of the Weighty Matter of Scotland. 1 Forbes's State Papers, 387.

Robertson, Hist. of Scotland, App. No. II.

state requires it, are in substance common to all ages and nations; though they were not expressed by the statesmen of the sixteenth century in the artificial language of what was afterwards called international law. Their principal defect is, that they may often be used with equal plausibility by several contending parties; though it is generally evident that one only has justice on its side. In the particular case before us, the defect does not seem to be considerable. The true question always being, which party is really influenced by self-defence, and which employs it merely as a pretext, it cannot be doubted that Elizabeth sought an ascendant in Scotland for her own safety, while the house of Guise pursued the same object for their aggrandisement. To this may be added, that the first wrong was done by the princes of Lorrain, in setting up their niece as a pretender to the English crown; and that this wrong was grievously aggravated by their perseverance in it. They obstinately persisted in using the royal arms of England as a flag round which every discontented and disaffected Englishman might rally; and this, even after their own ministers had pledged them by a solemn treaty to discontinue such an incentive to revolt. It has already been observed, that the reasonings of Cecil and of Maitland were not conveyed in the specious and subtle language of modern jurists: they were, nevertheless, conformable to the most approved principles. These ancient statesmen do not seem to have been aware of the difficulty of reconciling the rights of self-defence with the apparently conflicting duty of every community to respect the independence of every other, and to manifest their sense of justice by abstaining from interference in the internal affairs of independent countries. The solution, however, of that difficulty flows from the simple principle which is the basis of Cecil's advice. The right of defence, whether exercised to repel an attack or to prevent it, is the selfsame right, and extends to conventions with contending parties in a community, as much as to those which subsist with contending states. When a contest for supreme

power prevails in a country, foreign states, who have no jurisdiction in the case, are neither bound nor entitled to pronounce a judgment on the armed litigation. Their relations with each other being formed for the welfare of the subjects of each, they must treat the actual rulers of every territory as its lawful government. In all ordinary cases, they should treat the pretenders as alike legitimate wherever they are obeyed; and preserve the same neutrality in the war between parties as if it were waged between independent states. It is a very obvious inference from these premises, that foreign sovereigns may ally themselves with a possessor of authority, if defence and safety require it, on the same ground that they form alliances with the most anciently established government. Whenever it is lawful to make war, it is equally lawful to obtain strength by alliances. It would, doubtless, be more for the general welfare of mankind to adjust their differences by institutions making some approach to a discerning and honest judgment, than to leave them to the blind and destructive arbitrament of war. But as long as nations assail their neighbours by arms, they must be resisted by the same cruel and undistinguishing expedient. The laws of war (as they are called) are the same in civil as in foreign warfare. It is as much forbidden by international morality to league with an unjust state, as it is in private litigation to support an unjust suitor. But as independent nations have no common superior, their wars must be practically treated, by those who desire to remain neutral, as if they were just on both sides. In some extraordinary instances of notorious and flagrant wrong, neutral nations may be entitled, and even perhaps sometimes bound, to interpose for the prevention of injustice and inhumanity. In such extraordinary emergencies, whether a nation is influenced by a regard to its own safety, or by a disinterested reverence for justice, both these principles point to the same practical result. For as the general prevalence of a disposition to act justly and humanely is the principal safeguard of nations as well as of individuals, to which

the terrors of law or even of arms are only occasional and inadequate auxiliaries, it is not possible to set the example of bidding open defiance to humanity and justice without impairing the security of states, in proportion to the extent of such acts of criminal audacity.

Had Francis II. lived a little longer, the princes of Lorrain meditated an exercise of his authority, which would have anticipated some of the tragical scenes of a succeeding period. All the great lords, officers of the crown, members of the privy council, and other considerable persons, were commanded to attend an assembly of the states-general, to be holden at Orleans, at Christmas, 1560, that they, as well as the deputies of the three estates, might sign a confession of the catholic faith, which was afterwards to be circulated through every parish, and tendered for subscription to every individual in the kingdom. The subscription was to cancel past offences; but defaulters were to be punished by condemnation and confiscation, to be followed by banishment or death.* The execution of these or the like designs was postponed for twelve years, and reserved for other chiefs, by the death of Francis II., a nominal king, whose insignificant name was the tool of the Guises, and only served to fix a few dates, or to mark the limits of a brief period, distinguished by no conspicuous occurrences. But the reign of Francis, thus unimportant in itself, was big with the confusions which ensued.

By his death, Catherine de' Medici recovered part of the authority which the princes of Lorrain had engrossed. In the mean time Mary Stuart, in the flower of her youthful beauty, accustomed to sway in a gallant court, hating the queen-mother, over whom she had wantonly triumphed, was soon weary, either of enduring Catherine's new superiority at court†, or of dragging

* Castelnau, liv. ii. c. 12. Vol. i. 58. ed. de Brux. 1731. folio. The same project is adverted to by De Thou, Hist. sui Temp. lib. xxvi. c. 2. ii. 39, 40. ed. Lond. 1733.

+ "The queen-mother was blythe of the dethe of king Francis her sonne, because she had na guiding of him, but only the duke of Guise and the cardinal his brother, by reason that the queen our maistress was their

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