(saith Zanchy *.) And if you well consider the nature of gravity, you will plainly see there is no ground to fear any such confusion; for heaviness is nothing else but such a quality as causes a propension in its subject to tend downwards towards its own centre: so that for some of that earth to come hither, would not be said a fall, but an ascension, şince it is moved from its own place; and this would be impossible (saith Ruvio †) because against nature, and therefore no more to be feared than the falling of the heavens.

If you reply, that then according to this, there must be more centres of gravity than one; I answer, it is very probable there are; nor can we well conceive what any piece of the moon would do, being severed from the rest in the free and open air, but only return unto it again.

Another argument he had from his master Plato ‡, That there is but one world, because there is but one first mover, God.

Infirma etiam est hæc ratio (saith Zanchy); and we may justly deny the consequence, since a plurality of worlds doth not take away the unity of the first Mover, Ut enim forma substantialis, sic primum efficiens apparentem solummodo multiplicitatem induit per signatam materiam (saith a countryman of ours §.) As the substantial form, so the efficient cause hath only an appearing multiplicity from its particular matter. You may see this point more largely handled, and these arguments more fully answered by Plutarch in his book, "Why Oracles are silent," and Jacob Carpentarius in his comment on Alcinous.

But our opposites, the interpreters themselves, (who too often do jurare in verba magistri) will grant that there is not any strength in these consequences; and certainly then such weak arguments could not convince that wise philosopher, who in his other opinions was wont to be swayed by the strength and power of reason; wherefore I should rather think that he had some by-respect, which made him De Cælo, l. 1. c. 9.q. 1.

* De operibus Dei, par. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. Metaphys. 1. 12. c. 8. Diog. Laert. lib. 3. § Nic. Hill. de Philosoph. Epic. partic. 379.

rst assent to this opinion, and afterwards strive to prove it. Perhaps it was because he feared to displease his scholar Alexander; of whom it is related, that he wept to hear a disputation of another world, since he had not then attained the monarchy of this; his restless wide heart would have esteemed this globe of earth not big enough for him, if there had been another; which made the satyrist say of him,

Estuat infælix angusto limite mundi †.

"That he did vex himself, and sweat in his desires, as "being penned up in a narrow room, when he was con"fined but to one world." Before, he thought to seat himself next the gods, but now, when he had done his best, he must be content with some equal, or perhaps superior kings.

It may be, that Aristotle was moved to this opinion, that he might thereby take from Alexander the occasion of this fear and discontent; or else, perhaps, Aristotle himself was as loth to hold the possibility of a world which he could not discover, as Alexander was to hear of one which he could not conquer. It is likely that some such by-respect moved him to this opinion, since the arguments he urges for it are confessed by his zealous followers and commentators, to be very slight and frivolous; and they themselves grant, what I am now to prove, that there is not any evidence in the light of natural reason, which can sufficiently manifest that there is but one world.

But however some may object, would it not be inconvenient and dangerous to admit of such opinions that do destroy those principles of Aristotle which all the world hath so long followed?

This question is much controverted by some of the Romish divines: Campanella hath writ a treatise in defence of it, in whom you may see many things worth the reading and notice.

To it I answer, That this position in philosophy doth

* Plutarch. de tranq. anim. † Juvenal. Apologia pro Galileo.

16

THAT THE MOON MAY BE A WORLD.

not bring any inconveniency to the rest, since it is not Aristotle, but truth, that should be the rule of our opinions; and if they be not both found together, we may say to him, as he said to his master Plato*,

"Though Plato were his friend, yet he would rather "adhere to truth than him."

I must needs grant, that we are all much beholden to the industry of the ancient philosophers, and more especially to Aristotle, for the greater part of our learning; but yet it is not ingratitude to speak against him, when he opposeth truth; for then many of the fathers would be very guilty, especially Justin, who hath writ a treatise purposely against him, But suppose this opinion were false, yet it is not against the faith, and so it may serve for the better confirmation of that which is true; the sparks of error being forced out by opposition, as the sparks of fire by the striking of the flint and steel. But suppose too that it were heretical, and against the faith, yet may it be admitted with the same privilege as Aristotle, from whom many more dangerous opinions have proceeded: as that the world is eternal; that God cannot have while to look after these inferior things; that after death there is no reward or punishment, and such like blasphemies; which strike directly at the fundamentals of our religion.

So that it is justly to be wondered, why some should be so superstitious in these days, as to stick closer unto him, than unto scripture, as if his philosophy were the only foundation of all divine truths.

Upon these grounds, both St. Vincentius and Serafinus de Firmo (as I have seen them quoted) think that Aristotle was the viol of God's wrath, which was poured out upon the waters of wisdom by the third angel†: but for my part, I think the world is much beholden to him for all his sciences. But yet it were a shame for these later ages, to rest ourselves merely upon the labours of our forefathers, as if they had informed us of all things to be known; and + Rev. xvi. 4.

*Ethic. 1. 1. c. 6.

when we are set upon their shoulders, not to see further than they themselves did. It were a superstitious, a lazy opinion, to think Aristotle's works the bounds and limits of all human invention, beyond which there could be no possibility of reaching. Certainly there are yet many things left to discovery, and it cannot be any inconveniency for us to maintain a new truth, or rectify an ancient error.

But the position (say some) is directly against scripture ; for,

1. Moses tells us but of one world, and his history of the creation had been very imperfect, if God had made

another:

2. St. John, speaking of God's works, says, he made the world, in the singular number, and therefore there is but one. It is the argument of Aquinas *, and he thinks that none will oppose it, but such who with Democritus esteem some blind chance, and not any wise Providence, to be the framer of all things.

3. The opinion of more worlds has in ancient times been accounted a heresy; and Baronius affirms that for this very reason Virgilius was cast out of his bishoprick †, and excommunicated from the church.

4. A fourth argument there is urged by Aquinas: if there be more worlds than one, then they must either be of the same, or of a diverse nature; but they are not of the same kind; for this were needless, and would argue an improvidence, since one would have no more perfection than the other not of divers kinds; for then one of them could not be called the world or universe, since it did not contain universal perfection. I have cited this argument, because it is so much stood upon by Julius Cæsar la Galla §, one that has purposely writ a treatise against this opinion which I now deliver; but the dilemma is so blunt, that it cannot cut on either side, and the consequences so weak, that I dare trust them without an answer: and (by the way) you

* Part 1. Q. 47. Art. 3.
§ De Phenom, in Orbe Lunæ.

† Annal. Eccl. A. D. 748.

+ Ibid.

VOL. I.

may see this later author in that place, where he endeavours to prove a necessity of one world, doth leave the chief matter in hand, and take much needless pains to dispute against Democritus, who thought that the world was made by the casual concourse of atoms in a great vacuum. It should seem that either his cause or his skill was weak, or else he would have ventured upon a stronger adversary. These arguments which I have set down are the chiefest which I have met with against this subject; and yet the best of these hath not force enough to endanger the truth that I have delivered.

Unto the two first it may be answered, that the negative authority of scripture is not prevalent in those things which are not the fundamentals of religion.

But you will reply, though it do not necessarily conclude, yet it is probable if there had been another world, we should have had some notice of it in scripture.

I answer, it is as probable that the scripture should have informed us of the planets, they being very remarkable parts of the creation; and yet neither Moses, nor Job, nor the Psalms (the places most frequent in astronomical observations) nor any other scripture mention any of them but the sun and moon. Because the difference betwixt them and the other stars, was known only to those who were learned men, and had skill in astronomy. As for that expression in Job*,, the stars of the morning, it is in the plural number, and therefore cannot properly be applied to Venus. And for that in Isaiah, n, it is confessed to be a word of obscure interpretation, and therefore is but by guess translated in that sense. It being a true and common rule, that Hebræi rei sideralis minime curiosi cœlestium nominum penuria laborant. The Jews being but little skilled in astronomy, their language does want proper expressions for the heavenly bodies; and therefore they are fain

* Job xxxviii. 7. Isa. xiv. 12. Fromond. Vesta, t. 3. cap. 2. So 2 Reg. xxiii. 5. ♫bia, which is interpreted both for the planets and for the twelve signs.