ESSAY VII.

OF THE BALANCE OF POWER:

Ir is is a question; whether the idea of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the phrase only has been invented in the later ages? It is certain that XENOPHON *; in his institution of CYRUS, represents the combination of the ASIATIC powers to have arisen from a jealousy of the increasing force of the MEDES and PERSIANS; and though that elegant composition should be supposed altogether a romance, this sentiment, ascribed by the author to the eastern princes, is at least a proof of the prevailing notion of ancient times.

In all the politics of GREECE, the anxiety, with regard to the balance of power, is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us, even by the ancient historians, THUCYDIDES + represents the league, which was formed against ATHENS, and which produced the PELOPONNESIAN war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of ATHENS, when the THEBANS and LaceDEMONIANS disputed for sovereignty, we find, that the ATHENIANS (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported THEBES against

"And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence. "For that is never, on any account, to be overlooked;

nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one “hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring states from "defending their rights against it." Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express terms.

In short, the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and discernment. If it was not so generally known and acknowledged as at present, it had at least an influence on all the wiser and more experienced princes and politicians. And indeed, even at present, however generally known and acknowledged among speculative reasoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extensive among those who govern the world.

After the fall of the ROMAN empire, the form of government, established by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great measure, for farther conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper boundaries. But when vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of universal monarchy, from the union of so many kingdoms and principalities in the person of the Emperor CHARles. But the power of the house of AUSTRIA, founded on extensive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and silver, were more likely to decay, of themselves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised against them. In less than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was shattered, their opulence dissipated, their splendor eclipsed. A new power succeeded, more formidable

to the liberties of EUROPE, possessing all the advantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects, except a share of that spirit of bigotry and persecution, with which the house of AUSTRIA was so long, and still is so much infatuated.

In the general wars maintained against this ambitious power, GREAT BRITAIN has stood foremost, and she still maintains her station. Beside her advantages of riches and situation, her people are animated with such a national spirit, and are so fully sensible of the blessings of their government, that we may hope their vigour never will languish in so necessary and so just a cause. On the contrary, if we may judge by the past, their passionate ardour seems rather to require some moderation; and they have oftener erred from a laudable excess than from a blameable deficiency.

In the first place, we seem to have been more possessed with the ancient GREEK spirit of jealous emulation, than actuated by the prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with FRANCE have been begun with justice, and even perhaps from necessity, but have always been too far pushed, from obstinacy and passion. The same peace, which was afterwards made at RysWICK in 1697, was offered so early as the year ninetytwo; that concluded at UTRECHT in 1712 might have been finished on as good conditions at GERTRUYTENBERG in the year eight; and we might have given at FRANKFORT, in 1743, the same terms which we were glad to accept of at AIX-LA-CHAPELLE in the year fortyeight. Here then we see, that above half of our wars with FRANCE, and all our public debts, are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours.

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monarchs. For this is the account which POLYBIUS gives of the EGYPTIAN politics *.

CIAN

The reason why it is supposed that the ancients were entirely ignorant of the balance of power, seems to be drawn from the ROMAN history more than the GREand as the transactions of the former are generally more familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclusions. It must be owned, that the ROMANS never met with any such general combination or confederacy against them, as might naturally have been expected from their rapid conquests and declared ambition; but were allowed peaceably to subdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous history of their ITALIC wars; there was, upon HANNIBAL's invasion of the ROMAN state, a remarkable crisis, which ought to have called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared afterwards (nor was it difficult to be observed at the time) † that this was a contest for universal empire; yet no prince or state seems to have been in the least alarmed about the event or issue of the quarrel. PHILIP of MACEDON remained neuter, till he saw the victories of HANNIBAL; and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms still more imprudent. He stipulated, that he was to assist the CARTHAGINIAN state in their conquest of ITALY; after which they engaged to send over forces into GREECE, to assist him in subduing the GRECIAN commonwealth .

Lib. ii. cap. 51.

It was observed by some, as appears by the speech of AGESILAUS of NAUPACTUM, in the general congress of GREECE. See PoLYB. lib. V. cap. 104.

TITI LIVII, lib. xxiii. cap. 33.

The RHODIAN and ACHAEAN republics are much celebrated by ancient historians for their wisdom and sound policy; yet both of them assisted the ROMANS in their wars against PHILIP and ANTIOCHUS. And what may be esteemed still a stronger proof, that this maxim. was not generally known in those ages, no ancient author has remarked the imprudence of these measures, nor has even blamed that absurd treaty above-mentioned, made by PHILIP with the CARTHAGINIANS. Princes and statesmen, in all ages, may, before-hand, be blinded in their reasonings with regard to events: But it is somewhat extraordinary, that historians, afterwards, should not form a sounder judgment of them.

MASSINISSA, ATTALUS, PRUSIAS, in gratifying their private passions, were, all of them, the instruments of the ROMAN greatness: and never seem to have suspected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the conquests of their ally. A simple treaty and agreement between MASSINISSA and the CARTHA GINIANS, so much required by mutual interest, barred the ROMANS from all entrance into AFRICA, and preserved liberty to makind.

The only prince we meet with in the ROMAN history, who seems to have understood the balance of power, is HIERO, king of SYRACUSE. Though the ally of Rome, he sent assistance to the CARTHAGINIANS, during the war of the auxiliaries; "Esteeming it requisite," says POLYBIUS, "both in order to retain his dominions in

SICILY, and to preserve the ROMAN friendship, that "CARTHAGE should be safe; lest by its fall the re66 maining power should be able, without contrast or opposition, to execute every purpose and undertaking.