CHAPTER VI. OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. § 111. THE right of personal liberty in the slave is utterly inconsistent with the idea of slavery, and whenever the slave acquires this right, his condition is ipso facto changed. Hence, the enjoyment of it for a number of years has been held to be strong presumptive evidence of former emancipation.' § 112. Blackstone defines this personal liberty to "consist in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.' The slave, while possessing the power of locomotion, moves not as his own inclination may direct, but at the bidding of his master, who may, of his own will, imprison or restrain him, unless he thereby infringes some provision of statute law. So utterly opposite is the position of the slave from that of the freeman in respect to this right, that we could not better define his condition, than to say it is the reverse of that of the freeman. 'The State v. Hill, 2 Speers, 150; Hunter v. Shaffer, Dudley (Ga.) Rep. 224; Fox v. Lambson, 3 Halsted, 275; Linam v. Johnson, 2 Bailey, 137. § 112 a. But while the slave's power of locomotion is thus within the absolute control of the master, no third person has any right to restrain or imprison him, except by order of the master, or in cases provided by law. Hence, disobedience of a slave to the order of a person who has no right to control him, in the absence of statute law, would be no justification to such person for a battery or other injury committed on the slave.1 § 113. Reasons of policy and necessity, however, require that so long as two races of men live together, the one as masters and the other as dependents and slaves, to a certain extent, all of the superior race shall exercise a controlling power over the inferior. If the slave feels that he is solely under the power and control of his immediate master, he will soon become insolent and ungovernable to all others. If the white man had, then, no right by law to control, the result would be, the excitement of angry passions, broils, and bloodshed. Hence have arisen, in the States, the various police and patrol regulations, giving to white persons other than the master, under certain circumstances, the right of controlling, and, in some cases, correcting slaves. But if the white person exceeds the authority given, and chastises a slave who has given no provocation, he is liable for the trespass.3 § 114. Necessarily, much of the time of the slave 'White v. Chambers, 2 Bay. 70. This case goes still farther, and holds, that insolence from the slave would not justify a battery. See also ante, § 96. Ex parte Boylston, 2 Strobh. 43; ante, § 96. 3 Caldwell v. Langford, 1 McMul. 275. is not employed in his master's service. The long hours of the night, the Sabbath day, and the various holidays, are times when, by the permission of masters, slaves enjoy a quasi personal liberty. At such times, it cannot be expected that the watchful eye of the master can follow them. Frequent and large collections of them would necessarily occur, and, having no business to occupy their thoughts and conversation, mischief and evil would be the consequence of their assemblage. It has been found expedient and necessary, therefore, in all the slaveholding States, to organize, in every district, a body of men, who, for a limited time, exercise certain police powers, conferred by statute, for the better government of the slave, and the protection of the master. Upon these policemen or patrol, for the time, greater powers and privileges are necessarily conferred, for the execution of their office, in controlling the liberty and movements of the slave. § 115. The power and authority of the patrol, however, are limited by the statutes prescribing them, and they are not at liberty to overleap these bounds.1 Hence, in South Carolina, it was held, that under the authority to disperse unlawful assemblies of negroes, the patrol had no right to interfere with an open assemblage, for the purpose of religious worship, where white persons were also assembled." Nor with an orderly meeting of slaves, with the consent of their masters, upon the premises of a slaveholder, 1 Per Johnson, J., in Bell v. Graham, 1 N. & McC. 281; Tate v. O'Neal, 1 Hawks, 418. Bell v. Graham, 1 N. & McC. 281. with his permission and occasional presence.' Nor can the patrol correct a slave giving no provocation, who is without his master's inclosure, with a permit or ticket authorizing it.2 If the patrol inflict excessive punishment upon a slave, they will be liable to the master for the trespass. Some degree of discretion, however, is necessarily allowed them.3 § 116. The necessity for patrol regulations being to control slaves when not under the control of their masters, it would seem that the patrol, upon principle, could never interfere with the master's control of his own slave, and upon his own premises. It would require very express enactment to justify such interference. § 117. Yet the master's privilege extends only to his own slaves, and he cannot so act towards them as to interfere or injure his neighbors. Hence, the enactments in many States, against persons permitting assemblages of the slaves of others upon their premises, without the consent of their owners." Hence, also, a master, in many States, is prohibited from furnishing spirituous liquors to his own slaves in such quantities as to enable them to furnish others. Hence, also, in almost all the States, the penalties against the master for permitting his slaves 'State v. Boozer, 5 Strobh. 21; The State v. Boyce, 10 Ired. 536. 2 Caldwell v. Langford, 1 McMul. 275. 3 Tate v. O'Neal, 1 Hawks, 418; see ante, § 96. The State v. Boozer, 5 Strobh. 21. 5 Commonwealth v. Booth, 6 Rand. 669; Commonwealth v. Foster, 5 Grat. 695; State v. Brown, 8 Humph. 89. The State v. Weaks, 7 Humph. 522. to hire their own time, or to go at liberty, to the injury of others.1 § 118. To restrain the slave altogether from leaving his master's premises, during the time that he is not employed in his master's business, would be unnecessarily harsh towards that dependent class. Hence, by the permission of the master, the slave may be allowed to travel the highway, or to visit and remain at other places; in which event, he is not subject to be controlled or corrected by the patrol, unless found violating some provision of law.* The evidence of such permission is called a permit or pass. The particularity with which it should be written, and what it should contain, must necessarily depend upon the requisition of the statutes regulating patrols. A substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient. On the other hand, the master is not permitted to violate the whole policy of the legislation of a State by giving his slave a "permit" or "pass" for an indefinite or unreasonable period of time, especially if it professes to allow the slave privileges forbidden to the slave, and penal in the master." § 119. From this quasi liberty of the slave, during the Sabbath and other holidays, flow many interesting questions as to the liability of the master or hirer for the acts of the slave at such times, which will be considered hereafter. 1 Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 6 J. J. Marsh. 184; Parker v. Commonwealth, 8 B. Monr. 30. 2 The State v. Boozer, 5 Strobh. 21. |