from a slaveholding to a non-slaveholding State, animo remanendi, the status of the slave is changed, and he becomes free. Second. The mere transit of a slave, either from necessity or convenience, through the territory of a non-slaveholding State, does not change his status or condition of slavery. Between these extremes there are many intermediate points. The temporary residence for business or pleasure of a master with his slave, the sojourning for a season for health, or the constant travelling in search of novelty and pleasure, in short, the many varied circumstances, differing, and distinguishing each case as it arises. On the one hand, the mere announcement by the master of an intention to return to his domicile, at some future and uncertain period, should not operate so as to introduce, by such an evasion of the law, into a State an institution repugnant to its laws. On the other, a mere detention for a limited season of a master, by business or pleasure, could not operate so as to change the status of his slave, when he thereby in no way contravenes the policy of the local law.

§ 153. Where then is the line to be drawn? So long as the residence of the master and his slave is bonâ fide for a temporary purpose, it would seem the comity of nations would protect the master's right. Whenever this privilege of temporary residence is used to evade the law (as at the time of the trial of Somersett's case, when there were in the British Isles 15,000 slaves), it would be the duty of the courts to refuse to extend the principle of comity. In fact, upon all questions of this character, much necessarily has to be left to the discretion of the

courts. In his Conflict of Laws, Judge Story says,

Upon the continent of Europe some of the principal states have silently suffered their courts to draw this portion of their jurisprudence (viz., questions arising under the comity of nations), from the analogies furnished by the civil law, or by their own customary or positive code. France, for instance, composed as it formerly was of a great number of provinces, governed by different laws and customs, was early obliged to sanction such exertion of authority by its courts, in order to provide for the constantly occurring claims of its own subjects, living and owning property in different provinces, in a conflict between the different provincial laws. In England and America, the courts of justice have hitherto exercised the same authority in the most ample manner; and the legislatures have in no instance (it is believed) interfered to provide any positive regulations. The common law of both countries has been expanded to meet the exigencies of the times, as they have arisen, and so far as the practice of nations or the jus gentium privatum has been supposed to furnish any general principle, it has been followed out with a wise and manly liberality."

§ 154. Upon this examination of the principles upon which the comity of nations enforces, in every state, the laws of other and foreign governments, we arrive at three conclusions:

1. That where there is a change of domicile, from a slaveholding to a non-slaveholding nation, the animus remanendi works of itself and instanter

1 Conflict of Laws, § 24.

(simul ac imperii fines intrarunt) the emancipation of the slave.

2. That the mere transit of the master with his slave, either from necessity or convenience, through the territory of a non-slaveholding state, does not change the status of the slave.

3. That, as a general rule, where there is a bonâ fide temporary residence of a master, with his slave, in a non-slaveholding nation, the animus revertendi will protect the master's rights in his slave to the extent of his personal service, and the right to return with him to his domicile. At the same time, if this privilege is used to evade the local laws of the nation with reference to slavery; or the exercise of it becomes so general as to interfere with the policy, or be prejudicial to the interest of the government or its people, the courts will not violate the principles of comity in refusing their aid to enforce these rights.

§ 155. It will be remarked, that in this investigation we have been considering the principles governing the courts of distinct and totally independent nations. How far these principles will be modified, and with how much greater force the requisitions of comity should apply to the States of this Union, bound together by a common constitution, and forming all together, in one view, a single sovereignty, we shall consider fully hereafter.

CHAPTER VIII.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE OPINIONS OF FOREIGN JURISTS.

§ 156. HAVING examined, upon principle, the question, whether the condition of slavery is an exception to the general rule, that the status of an individual is to be determined by the law of his domicile, and having arrived at certain conclusions, our next duty is to consider how far these conclusions are supported by the authority of adjudged cases or the opinions of distinguished jurists.

§ 157. Judge Story, in his Conflict of Laws,' says, "There is a uniformity of opinion among foreign jurists and foreign tribunals, in giving no effect to the state of slavery of a party, whatever it might have been in the country of his birth, or of that in which he had been previously domiciled, unless it is also recognized by the laws of the country of his

1 Section 96. Burge, in his Treatise on Colonial and Foreign Law, vol. i, p. 738, makes the same assertion, almost verbatim ; evidently with Judge Story's work before him; and refers to the same authorities with Judge Story, viz., Christinaus and Groenewegen. Burge also refers to the Conflict of Laws, as an authority, and the later editions of that work refer to Burge as an authority. It is easy to multiply authorities in this way.

actual domicile, and where he is found, and it is sought to be enforced."

Let us examine into the correctness of this broad statement;' and we will first inquire as to the opinions of foreign jurists, and next the decisions of foreign tribunals.

§ 158. In support of his statement, as to the opinions of foreign jurists, Judge Story quotes as follows: "Christinæus states this as a clear rule, affirmed by judicial decisions, 'Propter libertatis personarum usum, hîc per aliquot sæcula continue observatum.' Groenewegen, speaking of slavery, says, Ejusque nomen, hodie apud nos, exolevit. Adeo quidem ut servi qui aliunde huc adducuntur, simul ac imperii nostri fines intrarunt, invitis ipsis dominis, ad libertatem proclamare possint. Id quod et aliarum Christianarum gentium moribus receptum est.'" These are the only foreign jurists that the research of the learned and indefatigable commentator has been able to array in favor of an opinion of great practical moment. Let us inquire who these writers are; the weight to which their opinions

1 As a precedent for disputing the opinions of a jurist so learned in the law, I extract the following from the Life and Letters of Joseph Story, by his son. In the case of Rust v. Low, a note of Lord Hale's to Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium was quoted by the opposing counsel. Mr. Story, in opening, said, "I think I shall satisfy the Court that Lord Hale is mistaken." "What! Brother Story," said Chief Justice Parsons, "you undertake a difficult task." "Nevertheless," was my father's reply, "I hope to satisfy your Honors that he has really misapprehended the authorities on this point." He satisfied the Court of Lord Hale's error. Vol. i, pp. 116-118. 2 Conf. of Laws, § 96.