dence cannot operate as a change of rights.

This rule as laid down, applies to cases where slavery is recognized and exists in both the original and new domicile. The extent to which the comity of nations requires the tribunals of a State to recognize and enforce the private rights of citizens of another State, will be considered hereafter.

§ 81. A still more complicated case of conflict might arise, where the deed or other instrument, determining the rights of the applicant for freedom, is executed within one jurisdiction, the birth occurs in another, and the trial of the question of freedom is heard in still another. In other words, the lex loci contractus, the lex soli natalis, and the lex fori all differ. In such a case the lex loci contractus would generally control the question. But if it be in conflict with the policy of the law of the forum where the trial is had, the Court will not enforce a rule, contravening the policy of their own government.3

§ 81 a. If the domicile of the female slave, at the time of the execution of the deed or other instrument of emancipation, be within another jurisdiction, which subsequently becomes the solum natale of the child, in that case, the law of the domicile would control the lex loci contractus, it being the policy of all the slaveholding States to regulate the condition of all slaves domiciled within their jurisdiction, so long as they remain within that jurisdiction.

'Sidney v. White, 12 Ala. (N. S.) 728.

2 Story's Conf. of Laws, § 242, et seq.; Blackmore v. Phill, 7 Yerger, 452.

Story's Conf. of Laws, § 244, and authorities there cited.

§ 82. We shall hereafter consider, in another connection, the law of domicile, as applied to slaves.' For the present, it is sufficient to state that, as a general rule, the domicile of the master is that of the slave, and this not being "of choice" of the slave, but by operation of law (necessarium), by no act of his can it be changed."

1 Sections 129-133.

Phillimore on the Law of Domicile, 25, 60.

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CHAPTER IV.

OF THE SLAVE AS A PERSON-PERSONAL SECURITY.

§ 83. HAVING ascertained the origin and sources of negro slavery, and having traced that origin to the pure or absolute slavery existing among the tribes of Africa, and having seen that negro slavery is in no wise opposed to the law of nature, except so far as the power to kill or to maim may be claimed therefrom, it follows, that no actual enactment of the legislative power is necessary for its introduction into any country where no municipal law is thereby infringed. Hence, we find it true, that, with the exception of Georgia (where it was at first prohibited),' no law is found on our statute books authorizing its introduction.

§ 84. The condition of these slaves in their native country having been one of absolute slavery, including the power over life, such would be their condition in the country to which they were removed, except so far as the same may be modified by the existing laws of their new domicile, and such subsequent legislative enactments as may have been made for their benefit. The law of nature, denying the power over life and limb, being a part of the law of

'See Stephens's History of Georgia, vol. i.

every civilized state, such power never existed in any of the United States, although it required municipal law to prescribe the punishment for such offences. Many subsequent legislative enactments have been made, regulating the power of the master, and protecting and giving rights to the slave. Having none prior to these enactments, to the municipal law we look for all his rights.

84 a. In the Roman law, a slave was a mere chattel (res). He was not recognized as a person. But the negro slave in America, protected as above stated by municipal law, occupies a double character of person and property. Having now ascertained who are and may be slaves in America, a natural division of our subject suggests itself in considering the slave, first, AS A PERSON, and then, AS PROPERTY.

§ 85. In treating of slaves as persons, we shall inquire of their rights and disabilities, of the authority and rights of the master, and of the relation of slaves to persons other than their masters. To a great extent, these necessarily will be considered together, yet, as far as possible, we shall endeavor to treat them in the order in which they are named.

§ 86. Of the three great absolute rights guaranteed to every citizen by the common law, viz., the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property, the slave, in a state of pure or absolute slavery, is totally deprived, being, as to life, liberty, and property, under the absolute and uncontrolled dominion of his master,*

See The State v. Mann, 2 Dev. Law, 268.

2 Coke Litt. 116 b; Neal v. Farmer, 9 Geo. Rep. 555; The State v. Mann, 2 Dev. Law, 265; Jackson ex dem. &c. v. Lervey, 5 Cow. 397; Fable v. Brown, 2 Hill Ch. 396.

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so that infringements upon these rights, even by third persons, could be remedied and punished only at the suit of the master for the injury done him in the loss of service or the diminution in value of his slave.' As before remarked, however, no such state of slavery exists in these States. And so modified is the slavery here, partly by natural law, partly by express enactment, and more effectually by the influence of civilization and Christian enlightenment, that it is difficult frequently to trace to any purely legal sources many of those protecting barriers, the denial of whose existence would shock an enlightened public sense.

§ 87. Statute law has done much to relieve the slave from this absolute dominion, and the master from this perilous power, more especially so far as regards the first great right of personal security. In all of the slaveholding States, the homicide of a slave is held to be murder, and in most of them, has been so expressly declared by law. In Georgia,

'Authorities cited above. The rule seems to be held different in North Carolina; the battery of a slave by a third person, being held indictable. State v. Hall, 2 Hawks, 582. Upon close examination, however, the decision seems to be based upon a usage sanctioned by the acquiescence of the legislature. In Athens the same rule applied. See Smith's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. "Servus." But murder of a slave was punished; see same, and authorities cited. In Rome, the master might kill the slave at pleasure, until a constitution of Claudius enacted that it should be murder. Suetonius Claud. 25.

Rev. Code of N. C. 192; Statutes at Large of S. C. vol. vi, 158; New Digest (Cobb) Geo. 785, 982; Laws of Alabama (1823), 639; Hutchinson's Code Miss. 519; Civil Code, Louisiana, Art. 192; Rev. Code of Missouri, ch. xlvii, art. viii, § 39; Laws of Ten