of all children's music in the light of these conclusions.. The "music area," if I may so designate it, in the human cortex, is probably either a part of the speech zone, or occupies a highly specialized area adjacent to the speech zone. Music, like speech, is an expressive function, and its normal activity involves all the cortical centers involved in the processes of speech. The speech zone includes the handmotor center, the speech-motor center, the auditory center, and the visual center, all connected with one another and with other cortical centers through systems of neurones of the most bewildering complexity. The use of the speechmotor and auditory centers in oral speech is obvious. The hand has always been, through sign and gesture, a most trusted organ of expression, and through drawing and writing it maintains its important place in persons of culture. When one is involved in a difficulty of expression, as in talking to a foreigner or amid loud noises, he invariably resorts to gesture as the universal language. The eye gained its place in the speech apparatus originally through its perception of facial expression, bodily attitude and gesture, but in higher development it retains its place through the reading of conventional symbols. The higher uses of hand and eye in writing and reading become a part of the speech function late in development.

There is no reason to doubt that this description applies equally well to the development of the music area and function. When hand and eye centers first co-operate with the speech-motor and auditory centers in the special work of the music area, it must be in their lower rather than their higher function, that is to say, in the making and interpreting of related gestures or manual signs. Those, therefore, who favor the use of manual signs in elementary music instruction, have a psychological justification in addition to the many practical advantages. I feel sure that the use of manual signs of some sort in singing is a, if not the, natural transition to the writing and reading of music by means of conventional written symbols. The mind, through the eye, has been accustomed to follow and interpret the doings of the hand so long that it is ready with instant recognition for every manual change. It is common knowl

edge that a monotone can sometimes be made to distinguish and to produce different tones which at first seemed the same, by associating them with different manual signs or other motor adjustments. When their symbols are seen to be different the tones are more easily heard as different. I understand this to mean that the conventional writing and reading of music do not belong naturally in the early years of instruction.

And much the same conclusion may be stated as to technic in general. In spite of years of agitation in educational circles over the necessity of giving attention to content before form, of grasping the reality before attempting a definition, of doing the thing before talking about it, I drop into a music class and find intermediate grade children defining andante, staccato, pianissimo, signature, allegro, cum expressione, etc., without a vestige of real content for any of the terms; and if, perchance, a little singing is permitted, the pupils follow the score with eyes alert for these danger signals along the route, reminding one of the old fashioned teaching of elocution, where the appropriate gestures were accomodatingly indicated in the margin. The idea of controlling expression through content seems unthought of, and it is well, perhaps, considering the barrenness of content. Too often, formal instruction of this technical kind has destroyed whatever of inner response the children naturally gave. The soul of music has been sacrificed to the dissection of its body.

And yet, music is a subject which is especially adapted to laboratory methods of instruction. It makes a strong instinctive appeal and is especially rich in sensory content and rhythmic response. It requires no labored correlations to give it interest. Why then should a teacher barter such a birthright for such a miserable mess of pottage as drill on symbols and signs, on definitions and rules, when experience is lacking to give them any real meaning. Why should not the grammar of music grow out of its practice as the grammar of speech grows out of its use?

Finally just a word regarding the development of appreciation of music. There are many pupils who may not reasonably be expected to become good musicians, but there

are few indeed who may not become lovers of good music. And I am by no means sure that this is not, after all, the chief justification for music teaching. The principal of apperception is fundamental here. Provision should be made for an abundance of music, both vocal and instrumental, in all our schools. This music should be the best obtainable, though I am not one of those who believe that no music is better than poor music. As a rule, music should be carefully selected, as much with reference to the range of the children's voices as that of the singer, and with reference also to the rhythm and the content which will call out a quick and strong response from the children. If we are to provide for the development of the sentiments, as well as of intellect and motor skill, there is no more certain method than providing an environment rich in music and song.

Department of Education,

University of Pittsburg

WILL GRANT CHAMBERS

The Psychological and the Logical

HOSE who have been accustomed to view logic from the standpoint of traditional formal logic with its formid

able array of syllogisms, moods, and figures,—all based on inflexible laws of thought, have also been accustomed to think of psychological inquiry as somewhat foreign to logic proper. The aim of logic has been to formulate methods by means of which reasoning could be depended upon to lead to true conclusions and to lay down rules which must not be violated. Psychology, on the contrary, has always been concerned with conscious processes in general, and while logic as a form of mental activity would in a way fall within the sphere of psychology, still the methods of reasoning and the validity of conclusions have been held to be largely independent of psychological considerations. Not only has this been the case but psychology has undergone considerable change during recent years and this change has been such as to widen the gap which has existed between psychology and formal logic. It is possible, however, that the bearings of functional psychology are more numerous and far-reaching than commonly supposed and that when logically carried out will involve a reinterpretation of many of the logician's presuppositions and methods; it is possible, too, that this reinterpretation may go far toward explaining, or explaining away, many of the logician's long-standing difficulties. It is in this belief that the present article is undertaken. Of course much has been said and written tending to recast formal logic in accordance with the trend of modern psychology, but it will be a long time before this reconstruction will have become so complete and so well understood that all further remarks will be superfluous, and this article is undertaken in the belief that "every little helps." No one can consistently believe in the teachings of the genetic and functional psychology of the present day and still be satisfied with the theory and practice of formal logic. But first of all let us remind ourselves

of the change that psychology has undergone during the last few years.

It should be recognized that "the new psychology" has not broken away from other sciences and pursued a new method of its own but that there has been a general advance all along the line. Natural science has become less dogmatic and more experimental, and hypotheses have largely superseded formal deductions. Biology, with which psychology has formed a strong alliance, has largely broken away from its fixed classification of genera, species, and varieties based on external resemblances, and now tries to trace laws of growth and development. In a very similar way the older rational, faculty psychology contented itself with descriptions and classifications of the faculties of the soul, while modern functional and genetic psychology joins with biology in having much to say about the adjustment of organism to environment. In fact both biologist and psycholgist have come to see that they are dealing with life processes and while the biologist emphasizes the physical side and the psychologist the mental, still they have much in common, and the psychologist certainly must not fail to bear in mind the sort of organism he is dealing with or to recognize the interdependence of the mental and the physical. In place, then, of fixed faculties of mind which are what they are independently of worldly experience, functional, genetic psychology finds the value of mental processes in the part they play in enabling the organism to adjust itself to its surroundings, in other words, to live. It would appear, then, that the psychological carries with it the idea of growth and change while formal logic implies the indubitably fixed and final. To be sure errors of reasoning occur, but the end is to reach results which will be true once for all. Psychology, on the other hand, must give an account of all sorts of experience, good, bad, and indifferent, true and false, agreeable and disagreeable.

*A good statement of the position commonly taken by the logician is to be found in the introduction of Sigwart's comprehensive and wellknown work on logic. Sigwart tells us in the first section of his introduction that the problem of logic is to determine the conditions under which we may be able to arrive at conclusions which "are certain and universally valid;" in whatever line of enquiry we may be engaged, "the com