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To speak therefore of medicine, and to resume that we have said, ascending a little higher; the ancient opinion that man was microcosmus, an abstract or model of the world, hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if there were to be found in man's body certain correspondences and parallels, which should have respect to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, which are extant in the great world. But thus much is evidently true, that of all substances which nature hath produced, man's body is the most extremely compounded. For we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man by the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of these several bodies, before they come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change of affections to work upon their bodies; whereas man, in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite variations; and it cannot be denied, but that the body of man of all other things is of the most compounded mass. The soul on the other side is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed;
- Purumque reliquit
Ethereum sensum, atque auraï simplicis ignem." So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if that principle be true, that "Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum, placidus in loco." But to the purpose: this variable composition of man's body hath made it an instrument easy to distemper, and therefore the poets did well to conjoin music and medicine in Apollo, because the office of medicine is but to tune this curious harp of man's body, and to reduce it to harmony. So then the subject being so variable, hath made the art by consequence more conjectural; and the art being conjectural, hath made so much the more place to be left for imposture. For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or master-pieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause. The master of the ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage. But the physician, and perhaps the politician, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event; which is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell, if a patient die or recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or accident? And therefore many times the impostor is prized, and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see the weakness and credulity of men is such, as they will often prefer a mountebank or witch before a learned physician. And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this extreme folly, when they made Esculapius and Circe brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses, En. vii. 772.
"Dives inaccessos ubi solis filia lucos," etc. For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches, and old women, and impostors, have had a competition with physicians. And what followeth? Even this; that physicians say to themselves, as Solomon expresseth it upon a higher occasion ; "If it befall to me, as befalleth to the fools, why should I labour to be more wise ?" And therefore I cannot much blame physicians, that they use commonly to intend some other art or practice, which they fancy more than their profession. For you shall have of them, antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every of these better seen than in their profession; and no doubt, upon this ground, that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune; for the weakness of patients, and sweetness of life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend on physicians with all their defects. But, nevertheless, these things, which we have spoken of, are courses begotten between a little occasion, and a great deal of sloth and default; for if we will excite and awake our observation, we shall see, in familiar instances, what a predominant faculty the subtilty of spirit hath over the variety of matter or form: nothing more variable than faces and countenances, yet men can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of them; nay, a painter with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of his eye, and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever have been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more variable than voices, yet men can likewise discern them personally; nay, you shall have a buffoon, or pantomimus, will express as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the differing sounds of words, yet men have found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters. So that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man's mind, but it is the remote standing or placing thereof, that breedeth these mazes and incomprehensions: for as the sense afar off is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it of the understanding; the remedy whereof is not to quicken or strengthen the organ. but to go nearer to the object; and therefore there is no doubt, but if the physicians will learn and use the true approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the poet saith:
"Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes:
Which that they should do, the nobleness of the art doth deserve, well shadowed by the poets, in that they made Esculapius to be the son of the Sun the one being the fountain of life, the other as the second stream; but infinitely more honoured by the example of our Saviour, who made the body of ma the object of his miracles, as the soul was the ob ject of his doctrine. For we read not that ever h vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or money except that one for giving tribute to Cæsar, bo only about the preserving, sustaining, and healin the body of man.
Medicine is a science which hath been, as w
have said, more professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in progression. For I find much iteration, but small addition. It considereth the causes of diseases, with the occasions or impulsions; the diseases themselves, with the accidents; and the cures, with the preservations. The deficiencies which I think good to note, being a few of many, and those such as are of a more open and manifest nature, I will enumerate and not place.
The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narralive of the special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom of the layers who are careful to report new cases and decisions for the direction of future judgments. This continuance of Medicinal History I find deficient, which I understand neither to be so infinite as to extend to every common case, nor so reserved, as to admit none but wonders; for many things are new in the manner, which are not new in the kind; and if men will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to observe.
and receptacles the humours do find in the parts,
Inquisitio ulterior de morbis insanabilibus.
Nay farther, I esteem it the office of De euthanasia a physician not only to restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors, and not only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage: for it is no small felicity which Augustus Cæsar was wont to wish to himself, that same euthanasia; and which was specially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made, Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit aquas:" he was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the physicians, contrariwise, do make a kind of a scruple and religion to stay with the patient after the disease is deplored; whereas, in my judgment, they ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the attendances for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death.
In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find much deficience: for they inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and collocations; but they inquire Dot of the diversities of the parts, the secrecies of the passages, and the seats or nestlings of the humours, nor much of the footsteps and impressions of diseases; the reason of which omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies; but the latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from the View of many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts is as full of difference as the outward, and in that is the cause continent of many diseases, which not being observed, they quarrel many times with the humours, which are not in fault, the fault" being in the very frame and mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but Lust be accommodated and palliated by diets and medicines familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true, which was anciently noted, that the more subtile of them appear not in anatomies, because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in life: which being supposed, though the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum was by Celsus justly reproved; yet in regard of the great use of this observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been relinquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery, but might have been well diverted upon dissection of beasts alive, which, notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they are commonly assed over in anatomies as purgaments, whereas it is most necessary to observe, what cavities, nests,
In the consideration of the cures of Medicinæ diseases, I find a deficience in the experimentareceipts of propriety, respecting the particular cures of diseases; for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience by their magistralities, in adding, and taking out, and changing quid pro quo, in their receipts, at their pleasures, commanding so over the medicine, as the medicine cannot command over the disease; for except it be treacle, and mithridatum, and of late diascordium, and a few more, they tie themselves to no receipts severely and religiously: for
as to the confections of sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness, and not for propriety; for they are upon general intentions of purging, opening, comforting, altering, and not much appropriated to particular diseases; and this is the cause why empirics and old women are more happy many times in their cures than learned physicians, because they are more religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the deficience which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of their own practice, partly out of the constant probations reported in books, and partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over certain experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases, besides their own conjectural and magistral descriptions. For as they were the men of the best composition in the state of Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to the senate; so in the matter we now handle, they be the best physicians, which being learned, incline to the traditions of experience, or being empirics, incline to the methods of learning.
turæ in balneis, et aquis medicinalibus.
In preparation of medicines, I do find strange, especially, considering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they are safer for the outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought to make an imitation by art of natural baths, and medicinable fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to receive their virtues from minerals; and not so only, but discerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they receive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which nature, if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the variety of them will be increased, and the temper of them will be more commanded.
de vicibus medicinarum.
But lest I grow to be more particudicinale, sive lar than is agreeable, either to my intention or to proportion; I will conclude this part with the note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence; which is, that the prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their end; for to my understanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so sovereign, or so happy, as that the receipt or use of it can work any great effect upon the body of man: it were a strange speech, which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by nature subject; it is order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mighty in nature; which although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects. And although a man would think by the daily visitations of the physicians, that there were a pursuance in the cure; yet let a man look into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them but inconstancies, and every day's devices, without any settled providence or project; not that every scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more than every strait way is the way to heaven, but the truth of the direction must precede severity of observance.
For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiencies which it hath; being neither fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor wholesome to please.
For Athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to say, for any point of ability, whereunto the body of man may be brought, whether it be of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two parts, strength and swiftness and patience likewise hath two parts, hardness against wants and extremities, and endurance of pain and torment, whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer punishment: nay, if there be any other faculty which falls not within any of the former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and the like, I refer it to this part. Of these things the practices are known, but the philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired; the rather, I think, because they are supposed to be obtained, either by an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by continual custom, which is soon prescribed; which though it be not true, yet I forbear to note any deficiences, for the Olympian games are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use; as for the excellency of them, it serveth for the most part but for mercenary ostentation.
For arts of Pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them is of laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military, and while virtue is in state, are liberal, and while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary; so I doubt, that this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices jocular; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to belong to civil life and education. And thus much of that particular human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind.
FOR Human Knowledge, which concerns the Mind, it hath two parts, the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind; the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof.
Unto the first of these, the considerations of the original of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do appertain; which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way. But although I am of opinion, that this knowledge may be more really and soundly inquired even in nature than it hath been; yet I hold, that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion: for as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven
and earth, by the benediction of a producat, but was | racle-working faith; others, that draw nearer to immediately inspired from God; so it is not possible probability, calling to their view the secret passages that it should be, otherwise than by accident, sub- of things, and especially of the contagion that passject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the eth from body to body, do conceive it should likesubject of philosophy; and therefore the true know-wise be agreeable to nature, that there should be ledge of the nature and state of the soul, must come some transmissions and operations from spirit to by the same inspiration that gave the substance. spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there the conceits have grown, now almost made civil, of be two appendixes, which, as they have been hand- the mastering spirit, and the force of confidence, led, have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how truth, divination, and fascination. to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously, a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended, that ceremonies, characters, and charms, do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it; as images are said by the Roman church to fix the cogitations, and raise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and that ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and intentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, "In sudore vultûs comedes panem tuum." For they propound those noble effects, which God hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiencies in these knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity.
Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and natural; whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens: natural is, when the mind hath a presentation by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts, either when the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is experimental; whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious; such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of sacrifices, the fights of birds, the swarming of bees, and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The politician hath his predictions; "O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit!" which stayed not long to be performed in Sylla first, and after in Casar; so as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now speak of, which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive, and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition, that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion, which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the mind most to consist in itself. By influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits; unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself, is the state which is most susceptible of divine fluxions, save that it is accompanied in this case with a fervency and elevation, which the ancients ted by fury, and not with a repose and quiet, as
it is in the other.
Fascination is the power and act of imagination more intensive upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant: for of that we speak in the proper place; wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended natural magic, have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with the power of mi
The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, is of two kinds: the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth direction or decree, the latter action or execution. It is true that the imagination is an agent or nuncius in both provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to imagination before reason have judged, and reason sendeth over to imagination before the decree can be acted for imagination ever precedeth voluntary motion, saving that this Janus of imagination hath differing faces; for the face towards reason hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print of good, which nevertheless are faces,
"Quales decet esse sororum."
Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger, but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, "That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen," who may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams.
again, in all persuasions, that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather pleasure, or play of imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider of the imagination; no more than we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendeth to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason; so as poesy had its true place. As for the power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine "De animâ," whereunto most fitly it belongeth: and lastly, for imaginative or insinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content ourselves with the former division, that Human Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, Rational and Moral.
The part of Human Philosophy which is Rational, is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity for as it was truly said, that knowledge is “pabulum animi;” so in the nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned "ad ollas carnium," and were weary of manna; which though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which men's affections, praises, fortunes, do turn and are conversant; but this same "lumen siccum" doth parch and offend most men's watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of things as they are in worth, “rational knowledges" are the keys of all other arts; for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, "That the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of forms;" so these be truly said to be the art of arts; neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen : even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow.
The arts intellectual are four in number, divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred; for man's labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the arts must be four; art of inquiry or invention; art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of elocution or tradition.
Invention is of two kinds, much differing; the one of arts and sciences, and the other of speech and arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience,
as if in the making of an inventory, touching the estate of a defunct, it should be set down, That there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the WestIndies had never been discovered, if the use of the mariner's needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange, if sciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.
That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment, standeth plainly confessed: for first, logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a cuique in sua arte credendum. And Celsus asknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, "That medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered." And Plato, in his Theætetus, noteth well, "That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience." And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things, refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.
"Dictamnum genetrix Cretea carpit ab Ida, Puberibus caulem foliis, et flore comantem Purpureo: non illa feris incognita capris, Gramina cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ." So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors, that the Ægyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but almost all brute;
"Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis,
Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam," etc.
And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first struck the flints he expected the spark; and therefore we see the West-Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion: so as it should seem, that hitherto men are rather be holden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the potlid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance, or any thing else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other.
"Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes
For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which brute beasts are capable of and do put in use: which is a perpetual intending