and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and intrenched them, as much as discourse can do, against corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the comparison between a contemplative and an active life, in the distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, in their encounters between honesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured. Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and received notions of virtue and vice, and common matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine; for life consisteth not in novelties or subtilities: but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to i give glory either to the subtilty of disputations, or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence: "Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui." Doctrine should be such as should make men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher, being directed to the auditor's benefit, and not to the author's commendation; and therefore those are of he right kind which may be concluded as Demos-pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had stayed a thenes concludes his counsel, "Quæ si feceritis, non ratorem duntaxat in præsentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam, non ita multo post statu rerum strarum meliore." Neither needed men of so ex-lent parts to have despaired of a fortune, which he poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the observations of asbandry, as of the heroical acts of Æneas: Nee sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum Quam sit, et angustis hunc addere rebus honorem.” Georg. iii. 289. And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and rtive life, these georgics of the mind concerning The husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the Exem1 par or Platform of Good, and the Regiment or Cul1 Tare of the Mind; the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, #pply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto. The doctrine touching the Platform or Nature of Good considereth it either simple or compared, either the kinds of good, or the degrees of good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputations which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen divinity, are by the christian faith discharged. And, Aristotle saith, "That young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope;" so we must all acknowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future world. Freed therefore, and delivered from this doctrine of the philosopher's heaven, whereby they feigned en higher elevation of man's nature than was, for we see in what a height of style Seneca writeth, Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, secufitatem Dei," we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours; wherein for the nature of good, positive or simple, they have set it down excellently, in describing the forms of virtue and duty with their situations and fovures, in distributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: Bay farther, they have commended them to man's mature and spirit, with great quickness of argument little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and especially if they had consulted with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound: which being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner. There is formed in every thing a double nature of good, the one as every thing is a total or substantive in itself, the other as it is a part or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form: therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the loadstone, but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies: so may we go forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world. This double nature of good and the comparative thereof is much more engraven upon man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and being; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, "Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam:" but it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the holy faith well declaring, that it was the same God that gave the christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematized and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity, and infinite feeling of communion. This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant. For first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle for all the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative, are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man's self, in which respects, no question, the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence; not much unlike to that comparison, which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation; who being asked what he was, answered, "That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants to utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet their friends, and some came to look on, and that he was one of them that came to look on." But men must know, that in this theatre of man's life, it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on neither could the like question ever have been received in the church, notwithstanding their "Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus;" by which place they would exalt their civil death and regular professions, but upon this defence, that the monastical life is not simply contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or else of writing or taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God; as Moses did when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch the seventh from Adam, who was the first contemplative, and walked with God; yet did also endow the church with prophecy, which St. Jude citeth. But for contemplation, which should be finished in itself, without casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not. It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended; the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue, as it is used in some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits, to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and attended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they would have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and season; and Herillus, who placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief: all which are manifest to tend to private repose and contentment, and not to point of society. It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance; as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune: as Consalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting, "He had rather die one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for long, by one foot of retreat." Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed "that a good conscience is a continual feast;" showing plainly, that the conscience of good inten tions, howsoever succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature, than all the provision which can be made for security and repose. It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy, which grew general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or profession; as if the purpose had been not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a particular and kind course of life to that end, introducing such a health of mind, as was that health of body, of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health: whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities; so likewise that health of mind is most proper, which can go through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes's opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, and could refrain their mind in præcipitio, and could give unto the mind, as is used in horsemanship, the shortest stop or turn. Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations; whereas the resolution of men truly moral, ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, e teli crassiore, and not so fine, as that every thing should catch in it and endanger it. To resume private or particular good, it falleth into the division of good active and passive: for this difference of good, not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household terms of Promus and Condus, is formed also in all things, and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the one to preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or mul tiply themselves; whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier; for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent; and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the patient; in the pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food: in divine doctrine, "Beatius est dare, quam accipere:" and in life there is no man's spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, more than sensuality Which priority of the active good is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune: for if we might have a perpe tuity and certainty in our pleasures, the state of them all advance their price; but when we see it is Magni æstimamus mori tardius," and "Ne gloriers de crastino, nescis partum diei," it maketh us to sre to have somewhat secured and exempted from which are only our deeds and works; as it is sl,"Opera eorum sequuntur eos." The preeminence likewise of this active good is upheld by the affretion which is natural in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the pleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of passive good, can have to great latitude. "Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris: elus, somnus, ludus per hunc circulum curritur; mori ile non tantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, sed **am fastidiosus potest." But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much variety, whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their ptions, progressions, recoils, re-integrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it ras well said, "Vita sine proposito languida et raga est," Neither hath this active good any identy with the good of society, though in some case it Lath an incidence into it: for although it do many mes bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a rapect private to a man's own power, glory, amplifation, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it eth a contrary subject. For that gigantine te of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla, and infinite other smaller model, who would have all men happy or Thappy as they were their friends or enemies, and ld give form to the world according to their own retours, which is the true theomachy, pretendeth, and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth farst from good of society, which we have deterzined to be the greater. seek an advancement local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove internal: so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the means to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative or perfective. To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be the most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor well inquired. For the good of fruition or contentment, is placed either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude; the one having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good. Whether of these is the greater good, is a question controverted; but whether man's nature may not be capable of both, is a question not inquired. The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates's felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions do not want their supports: for the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity: and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations, than in compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advancement, as motion, though in a circle, hath a show of progression. To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision ronservative and perfective. For let us take a review of that which we have said; we have en first of the good of society, the intention hereof embraceth the form of human nature, hereof we are members and portions, and not our * proper and individual form; we have spoken five good, and supposed it as a part of private But the second question decided the true way * particular good. And rightly, for there is im- maketh the former superfluous: for can it be essed upon all things a triple desire or appetite doubted but that there are some who take more reeding from love to themselves; one of pre-pleasure in enjoying pleasures, than some other, and ng and continuing their form; another of Nancing and perfecting their form; and a third of tiplying and extending their form upon other mg whereof the multiplying or signature of it nother things, is that which we handled by the me of active good. So as there remaineth the conng of it, and perfecting or raising of it; which Her is the highest degree of passive good. For preserve in state is the less, to preserve with dvancement is the greater. So in man, "Igneus est ollis vigor, et cœlestis origo." I approach or assumption to divine or angelical are is the perfection of his form; the error or dimitation of which good, is that which is the temst of human life, while man, upon the instinct of in advancement formal and essential, is carried to yet nevertheless are less troubled with the loss or "Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat So have they sought to make men's minds too uni- ciently to contrary motions: the reason whereof I sup- | make learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active pose to be, because they themselves were men dedi- men would or could become writers. cated to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. In which I cannot but mention, honoris causa, For as we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a your majesty's excellent book touching the duty of ground, though it be sweet and have show of many a king, a work richly compounded of divinity, mochanges, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange rality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other and hard stops and passages, as a set song or vo- arts; and being in mine opinion one of the most luntary; much after the same manner was the di- | sound and healthful writings that I have read, not versity between a philosophical and a civil life. distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coldAnd therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of jew-ness of negligence; not sick of business, as those ellers, who if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity, as they destroy not magnanimity. Having therefore deduced the good of man, which is private and particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good of man which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself; though neither can a man understand virtue without some relation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic, but not if it be well observed; for it concerneth the regiment and government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in architecture the direction of the framing the posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing it; and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidently express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto. This part of duty is subdivided into two parts; the common duty of every man as a man or member of a state, the other the respective or special duty of every man in his profession, vocation, and place. The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed, than deficient; which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best for who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, and place? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, “That the vale best discovereth the hills;" yet there is small doubt but that men can write best, and most really and materially, in their own professions; and that the writing of speculative men of active matter, for the most part, doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they magnify them in excess; but generally it were to be wished, as that which would | are who lose themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action, and far removed from that natural infirmity whereunto I noted those that write in their own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure: for your majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria, or Persia, in their extern glory, but a Moses, or a David, pastors of their people. Neither can I ever lose out of my remembrance, what I heard your majesty in the same sacred spirit of government, deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, "That kings ruled by their laws as God did by the laws of nature, and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prero gative, as God doth his power of working miracles." And yet notwithstanding, in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your majesty, as a prime or eminent example of Tractates concerning special and respective duties, wherein I should have said as much if it had been written a thousand years since: neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence; no, it is flattery to praise in absence, that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent, and so the praise is not natural but forced, either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excel lent table of Cæsar's virtue, and made to his face; besides the example of many other excellent per sons wiser a great deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent. But to return, there belongeth farther to the handling of this part, touching the duties of profes sions and vocations, a relative or opposite touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled. But how? Rather in a satire and cynically, than sen ously and wisely; for men have rather sought s wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to dis cover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledg with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: "Quærenti derisori scientiam, ipsa se abscondit: sed studioso fit obviam." But the ma- vine Providence. I cantelis et malis arti So then we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good. De cultura animi. naging of this argument with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for it; but if you are him first, he dieth: so is it with deceits and eril arts, which if they be first espied, lose their life; but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do: for it not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and gong upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and Batures of evil: for without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good spon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, with-iteration doth he inculcate this part: so saith Cicero at the help of the knowledge of evil: for men of errupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachen, schoolmasters, and men's exterior language. So except you can make them perceive that you Now the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opimons, they despise all morality; "Non recipit stulta verba prudentiæ, nisi ea dixeris, quæ versantur . Forde ejus." Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image, or statua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion: whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words, "Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit, virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendæ autem ejus modos et vias ignorare: non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quærendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat; utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo." In such full words and with such Into this part touching respective duty doth also pertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant: so likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighPourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not 26 they are parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons. The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it also not simply alone, but comparatively, whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public as we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was said? "Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores." So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both ides. Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their ociates, and cast forth the question touching the lling of a tyrant being an usurper, they were diided in opinion, some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was Better than a civil war; and a number of the like eases there are of comparative duty : amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a all injustice, which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: "Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, * multa juste fieri possint." But the reply is good, "Auctorem præsentis justitiæ habes, sponsorem faturæ non habes;" men must pursue things which are just in present, and leave the future to the Di in great commendation of Cato the second, that he This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry, the rather because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant, and such wherein the common talk of men, which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass, is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant. First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command, neither the nature of the earth, nor the |