seasons of the weather, no more can the physician | ill-nature, benignity or malignity. And therefore I the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune; for to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these things therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application; "Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo:" and so likewise, "Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo." But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary, which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the body. So then the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound and true distributions, and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men's natures and dispositions, especially having regard to those differences which are most radical, in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention: for if it deserve to be considered, "that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small," which Aristotle handleth or ought to have handled by the name of magnanimity, doth it not deserve as well to be considered, "that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few ?" So that some can divide themselves, others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, "that some minds are proportioned to that which may be despatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit," cannot sufficiently marvel, that this part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures, according to the predominances of the planets; lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations, which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals handsomely and livelily painted forth; a man shall meet with, in every day's conference, the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, "huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione," and the like: and yet nevertheless this kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are found, many of them, but we conclude no precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both history, poesy, and daily experience, are as goodly fields where these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that receipts might be made of them for the use of life. Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent, and not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness. prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable for tune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like. And therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, "benignitas hujus ut adolescentuli est." St. Paul concludeth, that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, "Increpa eos dure," upon the disposition of their country, "Cretenses semper mendaces, malæ bestia, ventres pigri." Sallust noteth, that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories; "Sed plerumque regiæ voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles. sæpeque ipsæ sibi adversa." Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition, "Solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius." Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and sudden for So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, tune for the most part defeateth men, "Qui magnam which is commonly ascribed to God, as a magna- felicitatem concoquere non possunt." So the Psalm nimity. So farther deserved it to be considered by showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the Aristotle, "that there is a disposition in conversa- enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune: tion, supposing it in things which do in no sort "Divitiæ si affluant, nolite cor apponere." These touch or concern a man's self, to soothe and please; observations, and the like, I deny not but are touchand a disposition contrary to contradict and cross:" ed a little by Aristotle, as in passage in his Rheto and deserveth it not much better to be considered, rics, and are handled in some scattered discourses: "that there is a disposition, not in conversation or but they were never incorporate into moral philoso talk, but in matter of more serious nature, and sup-phy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the posing it still in things merely indifferent, to take pleasure in the good of another, and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another?" which is that properly which we call good-nature or Jam tum tenditque fovetque." knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulddoth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diver sity of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician; except we mean to follow the indiscre i tion of empirics, which minister the same medicines | For as in the government of states, it is sometimes to all patients. necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within. Another article of this knowledge, is the inquiry touching the affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the cures; so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men's matures, it followeth, in order, to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the affections. Fer as the ancient politicians in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the oras to the winds; because as the sea would of elf be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable, if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation: so it may be fitly mid, that the mind in the nature thereof would be emperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did t put it into tumult and perturbation. And here Again I find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of Ethics, and never Bandled the affections, which is the principal subert thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally, and in a second dene, as they may be moved by speech, he findeth gate for them, and handleth them well for the tity but where their true place is, he preterteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no ore than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of ours; for pleasure and pain are to the partilr affections, as light is to particular colours. Better travails, I suppose had the Stoics taken in argument, as far as I can gather by that which have at second hand. But yet, it is like, it was afer their manner, rather in subtilty of definitions, which, in a subject of this nature, are but curiosities, han in active and ample descriptions and observa. So likewise I find some particular writings of an eloquent nature, touching some of the affectros; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness, of countenance, and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best docors of this knowledge, where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and inted; and how pacified and refrained; and how rain contained from act, and farther degree; how y disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; how they are inwrapped one within another; and how they fight and encounter one with another; and other the like particularities. Amongst the which, this bat is of special use in moral and civil matters: Low, I say, to set affection against affection, and to ester one by another, even as we used to hunt ast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwine percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of Iremium and pœna, whereby civil states consist, mploying the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these as they have determinate use in moralities, for from these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and described, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine; of which number we will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of. The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of those things which consist by nature, nothing can be changed by custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing, we do not learn to hear or see the better. For though this principle be true in things wherein nature is peremptory, the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss, yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold, we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few. The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either too high a strain, or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you discourage; in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a farther expectation than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak of the other side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task. Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at two several times; the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst disposed ; that by the one you may give a great step, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant. Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which is, to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a wand straight, by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness. Another precept is, that the mind is brought to any thing better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but tanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom; which being so conducted, doth prove indeed another nature; but being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit. So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinum dæmonum, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, 66 That young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and experience ?" And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers, whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty; and popular opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats, fit to be scorned and derided, are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read, and revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality, lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the verse describes it? "Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic diadema :" which the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on virtue's behalf: but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for it so pleaseth Machiavel to say, "that if Cæsar had been overthrown, he would have been more odious than ever was Cataline:" as if there had been no difference, but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent spirit, his ambition reserved, of the world? Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves, some kinds of them, lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible, as Cicero saith of Cato in Marco Catone: "Hæc bona, quæ videmus, divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria: quæ nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a naturâ, sed a magistro ?" Many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manAnd so likewise is there touching the use of ners. all those other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of morality. But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground: that the minds of all men are sometimes in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose therefore of this practice is, to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to oblite rate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an inception or account de novo, for the time to come: but this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to religion. Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all other means the most compendious and summary; and, again, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it will follow, that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the works of nature, whereas the other course is like the work of the hand: for as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh, as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such time as he comes to it; but, contrariwise, when nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time: so in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man praetiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to forti tude, nor the like; but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous but divine: his words are these; "Immanitat autem consentaneum est, opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem.” And a little after, "Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Dei. Sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam a vitio." And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration; where he said, "that men needed make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good lords to them as Trajan had been;" as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these L heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow | gregate, and as he consisteth of body and spirit. of that divine state of mind, which religion and the Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth holy faith do conduct men unto, by imprinting upon to be a relation or conformity between the good of their souls charity, which is excellently called the the mind and the good of the body. For as we bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and divided the good of the body into health, beauty, fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly strength, and pleasure; so the good of the mind, said by Menander, of vain love, which is but a false inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth imitation of divine love, "Amor melior sophista to this, to make the mind sound and without perlævo ad humanam vitam," that love teacheth a man turbation; beautiful and graced with decency; and to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor, strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and rules and preceptions, he cannot form a man so commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that dexterously, nor with that facility, to prize himself many have strength of wit and courage, but have and govern himself, as love can do: so certainly if neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth decency in their doings: some again have an elework him suddenly into greater perfection than all gancy and fineness of carriage, which have neither the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a so- soundness of honesty, nor substance of sufficiency : phist in comparison of the other. Nay farther, as and some again have honest and reformed minds, Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, that can neither become themselves nor manage though they raise the mind, yet they do it by dis- business. And sometimes two of them meet, and torting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless determined that the mind ought not to be reduced at the same instant doth settle and compose it: so to stupidity, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in all other excellencies, though they advance na- in the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour ture, yet they are subject to excess. Only charity of it. admitteth no excess; for so we see by aspiring to be like God in power the angels transgressed and fell; Ascendam, et ero similis Altissimo;" by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; "Eritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum:" but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness, or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called; "Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro perse quentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris vestri, qui in cœlis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos." So in the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, "Optimus ⚫ Maximus;" and the sacred Scriptures thus, "Misericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus." Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the parts thereof, which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matters of common sense or experience, he judgeth well: but as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, You may not marvel, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I do differ, for he drinketh water, and I drink wine." And like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep, "Sunt geminæ somni pórtæ, quarum altera fertur so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find VOL. 1. F CIVIL Knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, “that the Romans were like sheep, for that a man might better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you could get but some few to go right, the rest would follow :" so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in the holy story, when the kings were good; yet it is added, "Sed adhuc populus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum." Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad; so governments for a time well grounded, do bear out errors following. But the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge. This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary actions of society, which are, Conversation, Negotiation, and Government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection: and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever; wisdom of behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state. The wisdom of Conversation ought not to be over much affected, but much less despised: for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence also into business and government. The poet saith, "Nec vultu destrue verba tuo." A man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and easy access, "Nil interest ha- | advertisements, that have no proportion to the magbere ostium apertum, vultum clausum." It is nonitude of this subject. For if books were written thing won to admit men with an open door, and to of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men, receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. with mean experience, would far excel men of long So, we see, Atticus, before the first interview be- experience, without learning, and outshoot them in tween Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending, did their own bow. seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to conversation: the true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose; "Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est alienæ libertatis obliti, alterum suæ:" "The sum of behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of others." On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass into affectation, and then "Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre," to act a man's life? But although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by saying," Amici, fures temporis;" so certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that form of urbanity, please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it, do seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost every thing becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos and compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action, than an over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Solomon saith, "Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat; et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet:" a man must make his opportunity as oft as find it. To conclude; behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind, and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait, or restrained, for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient. gerendis. Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should be so variable, as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less infinite than science of government, which, we see, is laboured, and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom, it seemeth, some of the ancient Romans, in the saddest and wisest times, were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at certain hours in the place, and to give audience to those that would use their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident to man's life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private cases, arising out of an universal insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon particular cases propounded, but is gathered by general observation of cases of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother, "De petitione consulatus," being the only book of business, that I know, written by the ancients, although it concerned a particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify, that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters; we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some number of examples. "Sed et cunctis sermonibus, qui dicuntur, ne accommodes aurem tuam, ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi." Here is recommended the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius's papers unperused. "Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, sive rideat, non inveniet requiem." Here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself, which is such an engagement, as whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways quit himself well of it. The wisdom touching Negotiation or De negotiis Business hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning, and the professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect; that there is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an inferior to virtue, and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few: but for the wisdom of business, wherein man's life is most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered | fulness. "Qui delicatè a pueritiâ nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem." Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthank |