method itself. He does not inform us positively of the method, but rather discovers what it is not, in order to prevent erroneous expectations.

After" postulating it of mankind" that they would not imagine he had any design to form a sect in philosophy, and declaring himself to be utterly unsolicitous "about such useless things as depend upon opinion," he says he would not be wanting in his assistance to the first beginning of great things. He laid down no one entire and general theory, nor had any hopes of living to finish his whole work, but he was determined to tender and to render this" assistance." As he was no " founder of a sect," so was he no promiser of particular works. He ingenuously admitted the imperfection of his natural history, whether "procured from books, or his own inquiry : " but while he left the hasty experimentalist to collect many particulars from his tables, and apply them to works, he endeavoured after greater things, and would wait with patience for the harvest. The 118th Aphorism is a remarkable one, as it is a confession of the probable want of verification in his history and tables, and at the same time a defence of them, which has been a good deal overlooked. "But this is nothing," and "let no one be concerned, if our history has its errors." He was also aware that there would occur many things in them, that appeared at first sight, (1.) trifling and vulgar; (2.) sordid and ignoble; and (3.) subtile, which might alienate the minds of men from considering them: and he soon disposes of these probable contempts. Then follows a fine defence of his rejection of all former sciences and authors at a stroke. It would not have been difficult for him to attribute what he produced, "either to the early ages, (when, perhaps, the knowledge of nature flourished more, though with less pomp, than after it came into the flutes and trumpets of the Greeks,) or even in certain particulars, to some of the Greeks themselves; and thence derive authority and honour to his inventions." But relying wholly upon the evidence of things, he rejected all stratagem and imposture; and judged it of no greater moment to the business in hand, whether what was then discovered was known to the ancients, and, by the vicissitude of things and ages, is made to set and rise; than to be solicitous whether America is the island Atlantis, or were first discovered by Columbus; for the discovery is to be derived from the light of nature, and not from the darkness of antiquity. He shows that his procedure of striking out all authorities at once was more rational than a bit-by-bit rejection: as the errors have been fundamental; and therefore "it is no wonder if they have not obtained what they never had in view; nor arrived at the end they never proposed; nor finished the course which they neither entered nor held:" and he thought that the method being perfected, great things would be open to all, and almost to all alike.

Then as to his not having himself proposed the true and best end and scope of the sciences,--the contemplation of truth being of greater dignity and sublimity than all utility and greatness of works, whilst the long dwelling in experience and particulars, which he recommended, fixed the mind to earth, or rather sunk it into an abyss of hopeless confusion, while it kept it from soaring in the diviner state of abstract wisdom and tranquillity. This was just the sort of argument for our author to deal with, and he allows its force. But he "would place a true model of the world in the human understanding, such as the world is found to be, and not such as any one's reason might make it "--he would have no mock models, no idols of man, for the ideas of the divine mind; no arbitrary abstractions, but the true signatures of the Creator upon the creatures, as impressed upon matter, and limited by true and exact lines. Therefore truth and utility are identified-they are the very things required—all other improvements follow the improvement of the mind; and, therefore, the works recommended should be more esteemed as they are pledges of truth, than as they are of use in life.

He then candidly states another palpable objection to his system, which is even still urged by those who are anxious to refute what no one has asserted on behalf of our author,

that he was the first to practise the inductive method. In Aphorism 125, he thus states the objection: "That we are only doing what has been done before, that the ancients proceeded in the same way that we do, and therefore that we shall probably, after all this struggling and striving, but at length come to some one or other of those philosophies which prevailed among the ancients; for that they in the beginnings of their contemplations, procured a large stock of examples and particulars, digested them into registers, common-place books, and titles, and thence composed their philosophies and their arts; thus pronouncing upon full discovery; that they added examples occasionally, by way of confirmation, and as a help to instruction, but thought it needless and burthensome to publish their notes, memoirs, and common-place books of particulars; herein following the example of builders, who, after they have erected an edifice, take down the ladders and scaffolding, and remove them out of sight." And how could the ancients have proceeded otherwise? They had a form of inquiry and discovery, but it was no other than flying from certain particular examples, with the assistance of common notions, to the most general conclusions and principles of the sciences, thence deducing inferior conclusions; and if new particulars and examples arose, or were produced to oppose their established doctrine, they either made them square by eubtle distinctions, or accommodated explanations to their own rules; or else in a gross manner, struck them out by exceptions; and at the same time wresting and fitting the more tractable particulars to their own principles.

Again, as he disallowed a liberty of pronouncing at once, and insisted upon the most strictly regulated method of coming from intermediate particulars to universal conclusions, it might be objected that he patronized such a suspension of the judgment, as would bring all to a state of scepticism. He thus replies to this objection, which was no figment, but one he had doubtless often heard: "The truth is, we intend and propose the art of doubting properly; for we do not detract from, but administer to, the sense; and do not despise, but regulate, the understanding. And it is better to know so much as is necessary, and yet not think ourselves to know all, than to think that we know all, and yet remain ignorant of that which is necessary." From the 127th Aphorism, it is plain that he intended his method to be one of universal applicability: "Our new logic, which proceeds by induction, comprehends every thing." He designed to draw up tables of induction for mental, moral, and political, as well as natural philosophies.

The grounds of hope having been laid, and unjust prejudices removed, he thinks he may speak of the excellency of the end in view. He places the inventors of arts before founders of empires, legislators, and deliverers of their countries. He refers to the power, efficacy, and consequences of three modern inventions, whose origin was obscure: the art of printing, gunpowder, and the compass; which have given the world a new face, (1.) with regard to learning, (2.) with regard to war, (3.) with regard to navigation. A man's desire to aggrandize himself, or his country, is a mere degenerate ambition, compared with his (if it deserve so bad a name as ambition) who strives to restore and enlarge the power and empire of mankind over the universe of things; which is, without dispute, more solid and majestic. Resolving all into the contemplation of things as they are in themselves, which he esteemed to be of greater dignity than even the immediate benefits of invention that might flow from it, and calling in the directing aid of rectified reason and sound religion, he proposes to consider the art itself of interpreting nature, and, in the next book, predicts that the art of invention will improve and grow up with inventions themselves.

The second book of the Novum Organum is considerably larger than the first, and consists of fifty-two aphorisms, for the "interpretation of nature," with the digested matter of particulars, designed for the work of the understanding, in a few determinate subjects, by way of example or palpable model. We are now in the house of the interpreter himself; and as he depicted the character of a true interpreter in such lively colours, it remains to

be seen whether he approaches to it. The interpreter duly qualified-the interpreter such as he has boldly sketched-was to proceed in this manner: "He must first consider the state of mankind; next remove the obstacles in the way of interpretation; and then, coming directly to the work, prepare a history and regular sets of tables of invention; show the uses thereof, their relations, dependencies, and subserviency to each other. He must represent how little real and serviceable knowledge mankind is possessed of; and how all just inquiry into nature has been neglected. He must use choice and judgment in singling out and giving the first place to such subjects of inquiry as are most fundamental or important; that is, such as have a tendency to the discovery of other things, or else to supply the necessities of life. He must likewise observe the pre-eminency of instances; which is a thing that greatly conduces to shorten the work. And when thus provided, he must again renew his inquiries, draw out fresh tables, and now with a greater ripeness of knowledge, more successfully enter upon and perfect the business of interpretation; which will thus become easy. And when he has done this, he will directly see and enumerate, in a pure and native light, the true, eternal, and most simple motions of nature; from the regular and exact progress whereof proceeds the infinite variety of the universe: and afterwards, being wholly intent upon the discovery of human uses, and the state of things then present, he will regulate and dispose all in a different manner for practice; assigning to the most secret and hidden natures, others that are explanatory thereof, and such as are superinducing to those that are the most absent."

The first ten aphorisms relate to "the discovery of forms, or causes, in nature." The tenth divides the indications for the interpretation of nature into two general parts: the first relating to the raising of axioms from experience, and the second to the deriving of new experiments from axioms. The last part was never proceeded with, or published: the former he divided into three kinds of administrations or helps; viz. the helps, (1.) for the sense; (2.) for the memory; and (3.) for the reason. The first object, therefore, was to procure" a just and adequate natural and experimental history, as the foundation of the whole thing;" which history must be "digested and ranged in proper order," in tables and subservient chains of instances, "that the understanding may commodiously work upon them; and the understanding must not enter upon the task of raising axioms by itself, but be first regulated, strengthened, and guarded by means of a genuine and real induction, as a key of interpretation. The inquiry of forms was to proceed in this manner: "First, all the known instances agreeing in the same nature, though in the most dissimilar subjects, are to be brought together, and placed before the understanding; and this collection is to be made historically, without any over-hasty indulgence of speculation, or any great subtlety for the present." He then illustrates his method of discovering forms by an inquiry into the form of heat.

In Table 1, he collects "Instantiæ convenientes in natura calidi," or, Instances agreeing in the nature of heat; which are a collection of particulars wherein heat is found, so that they agree in having the nature of heat common to them all.

In Table 2, he collects" Instantiæ in proximo quæ privantur natura calidi," or, Instances of approximation yet wanting the nature of heat.

Table 3 forms a table of " Degrees of Heat."

These three tables were intended to present a view of instances to the understanding, for the practice of induction; and its first work was, (according to Aph. 15, 16,)" to throw out or exclude such particular natures as are not found in any instance where the given nature is present, or such as are found in any instance where that nature is absent; and again, such as are found to increase in any instance when the given nature decreases, or to decrease when that nature decreases. And then after this rejection and exclusion is duly made, the affirmsolid, true, and well-defined form, will remain as the result of the operation." And as

this is easily expressed in words, but the thing itself cannot be come at without numerous turnings and windings, he next proposes an example of the exclusion or rejection, in Table 4, of those natures which are found not to be of the form of heat

The business of exclusion is not perfected till it terminates in the affirmative; or when the rejections have left but a few common principles, one of these is to be affirmed, if it account for the phenomena. He thought it would be useful, notwithstanding the imperfection of his tables, to allow the understanding, after weighing them well, to attempt the business of interpreting nature in the affirmative, on the strength of these and such others that nay be procured. The attempt he calls, permissionem intellectus, sive interpretationem inchoatam, sive vindemiationem primam; a permission to the understanding, inchoate interpretation, or the first vintage of inquiry: and, accordingly, in Table 5, we have the vindemiatio prima de forma calidi; the first vintage, or dawn of inquiry, concerning the form of heat.

The author having thus laid down tables that furnish the examples of the method of rejection or exclusion, as well as a specimen of the fruits, he proceeds to deliver the doctrine of instances, or the investigation of forms by prerogative instances, a doctrine of the first importance. The last sentence of Aph. 21, shows that the remaining parts of the Novum Organum were to have been comprised under nine general heads, and the author only lived to prosecute the first. "We, therefore, propose to treat, (1.) of prerogative instances; (2.) of the helps of induction; (3.) of the rectification of induction; (4.) of the method of varying inquiries, according to the nature of the subject; (5.) of prerogative natures for inquiry, or what subjects are to be inquired into first, what second; (6.) of the limits of inquiry, or an inventory of all the natures in the universe; (7.) of reducing inquiries to practice, or making them subservient to human uses; (8.) of the preliminaries of inquiry ; (9.) and, lastly, of the ascending and descending scale of axioms.”

The author then enumerates twenty-seven PREROGATIVE INSTANCES, and enters at length into the properties of each, with illustrations and exceptions. We intended to have described them; and to have availed ourselves of the elegant commentaries of Mr. Professor Playfair; but this preliminary account has already extended too far; and we shall content ourselves with extracting the fifty-second, or concluding aphorism.

"It must be observed, that in this our new machine for the understanding, we deliver a logic, not a philosophy: but as our logic directs the understanding, and instructs it, not like the common logic, to catch and lay hold of abstracted notions, as it were by the slender twigs, or tendrils, of the mind; but really enters, and cuts through nature, and discovers the virtues and actions of bodies, together with their laws as determined in matter; so that this knowledge flows not only from the nature of the mind, but also from the nature of things, and the universe; hence it is no wonder, that in order to give examples and illustrations of our art, we every where employ physical considerations and experiments.

"We have here laid down twenty-seven prerogative instances, under the following titles: viz. 1. Instantiæ solitariæ, or solitary instances; 2. Instantiæ migrantes, or travelling instances; 3. Instantiæ ostensivæ, or glaring instances; 4. Instantiæ clandestinæ, or clandestine instances; 5. Instantiæ constitutivæ, or constituent instances; 6. Instantiæ conformes, or conformable instances; 7. Instantiæ monodica, or singular instances; 8. Instantia deviantes, or deviating instances; 9. Instantiæ limitaneæ, or frontier instances; 10. Instantiæ potestatis, or instances of power; 11. Instantiæ comitatus et hostiles, or accompanying and hostile instances; 12. Instantiæ subjunctivæ, or subjunctive instances; 13. Instantiæ fœderis, or instances of alliance; 14. Instantiæ crucis, or crucial instances; 15. Instantiæ divortii, or instances of divorce; 16. Instantiæ januæ, or instances of entrance; 17. Instantiæ citantes, or summoning instances; 18. Instantiæ viæ, or journeying instances; 19. Instantiæ supplementi, or supplemental instances; 20. Instantiæ persecantes, or lancing instances; 21. Instantiæ f

virgæ, or instances of the staff; 22. Instantiæ curriculi, or instances of the course; 23. Doses naturæ, or doses of nature; 24. Instantiæ luctus, or instances of reluctance; 25. Instantiæ innuentes, or intimating instances; 26. Instantiæ polychrestæ, or sovereign instances; and 27. Instantiæ magicæ, or magical instances. And in point of information they assist either the sense or the understanding: the sense as the five instances of light; and the understanding, either by hastening the exclusion of the form, as the solitary instances; or by contracting, and more nearly indicating, the affirmation of the form, as the travelling, glaring, accompanying, and subjunctive instances: or by raising the understanding, and leading it to kinds, and common natures; and that either immediately, as the clandestine, and the singular instances, and instances of alliance; or in the next degree, as the constituent instances; or in the lowest degree, as the conformable instances: or again, by rectifying the understanding depraved by things whereto it is accustomed, as the deviating instances; or by conducting it to the great form or fabric of the universe, as the frontier instances; or lastly, by guarding it against false forms and causes, as the crucial instances, and instances of divorce. And as to practice, they either mark out, measure, or facilitate it. They mark it out by showing with what particulars we are to begin, to prevent labouring in vain, as the instances of power; or to what we should aspire, if it be attainable, as the intimating instances: the four mathematical ones measure and limit it; and the sovereign and magical ones facilitate it.

"And of these twenty-seven instances, a collection of some should be made at first, as was above observed, (Aph. 32,) without waiting till we come to particular inquiries; and of this kind are the conformable, the singular, the deviating, and the frontier instances; the instances of power, of entrance, intimating, sovereign, and magical instances, because these either assist and rectify the understanding or the sense, or afford instruction with regard to practice in general; and for the rest, they are to be searched out when we make tables of view for the business of the interpreter, upon any particular subject. For the instances, honoured and ennobled with these prerogatives, are like a soul among vulgar instances of view; and as we said at first, a few of them serve instead of many; and therefore when we make tables, such instances are studiously to be sought out, and set down therein. The doctrine of them was also necessary to what we design to follow; and therefore a preparatory account thereof was here requisite.

"And now we should proceed to the helps and rectification of induction, then to concretes, latent processes, concealed structures, &c. as mentioned in order, under the twenty-seven aphorisms; that at length, like faithful guardians, we might possess mankind of their fortunes, and release and free the understanding from its minority, upon which an amendment of the state and condition of mankind, and an enlargement of their power over nature, must necessarily ensue. For by the fall, man at once forfeited his innocency, and his dominion over the creatures, though both of them are in some measure recoverable, even in this life; the former by religion and faith; and the latter by arts and sciences. For the world was not made absolutely rebellious by the curse, but in virtue of that denunciation, 'In the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat thy bread,' is at length, not by disputes, or indolent magical ceremonies, but by various labours, subdued, and brought in some degree to afford the necessaries of life."

"Such," says Playfair, "were the speculations of Bacon, and the rules he laid down for the conduct of experimental inquiry, before any such inquiries had yet been instituted. The power and compass of a mind, which could form such a plan beforehand, and trace not merely the outline, but many of the most minute ramifications of sciences which did not yet exist, must be an object of admiration to all succeeding ages."

The Third Part of the Instauration has been compounded for out of different tracts; of which the Parasceve (or Saturday Evening) of a natural and experimental History-a