the arms of France, Scotland, and England; of which John Knox, a passenger in the ship which bore these symbols of ambitious claims, obtained a sight under injunctions of profound secrecy. We are assured by Castelnau, that though the English ambassador was amused by promises, the French ministers did not desist from the use of the arms of England; "because," says that minister," they were fearful of doing irreparable injury to Mary, by impairing her title to the crowns of England and Ireland." +

The treaty of Edinburgh was ratified by Elizabeth within two months of its completion ; but the Guises prevented their ill-fated niece from ceasing to provoke and alarm England. For nearly a year she refused, deferred, or evaded the ratification demanded repeatedly by Elizabeth, by resident ministers at Paris, and even by solemn embassies expressly charged to obtain it, as well after the death of Francis, in December, 1560, as before; and such was the pertinacity of her guides, that she would not consent to an act which renounced a present claim to the English crown, in order to obtain a safe return to Scotland.

It is here necessary to inform the reader, that the states of Scotland had assembled on the 1st of August, 1560, which was the prescribed day. The attendance, especially of the more popular estates, the untitled gentry, and the burgesses, was greater than in any former parliament. The session began with a debate on the legality of the assembly, which was questioned on account of the absence of any representative of the sovereigns, and of any commission from them. The express words of the concession justified the majority in over-ruling the objection. A statute was passed to abolish the papal authority in Scotland. A confession of faith, founded on the doctrine of Calvin, and a book of discipline, on the worship and government of the church according to the republican equality of the Genevese clergy, were

M'Crie's Life of Knox, i. 243.

* September 2. 1560. Rymer, xv. 602.

+ Castelnau, liv. ii. c. 4.

established by the assembly. They passed one remarkable act in civil matters, in which they offered the hand of the earl of Arran, the presumptive heir to their kingdom, in marriage to queen Elizabeth, and agreed to settle the Scottish crown upon them and their heirs, in failure of queen Mary and her posterity.*

From circumstances related by a writer nearly contemporary, it should seem that these great measures were almost unanimously assented to. The catholic prelates were silent only three lay peers, the earl of Athol, the lords Somerville and Borthwick, muttered their dissent, saying, "We shall continue to believe as our fathers before us have believed." + Sir James Sandilands, a knight of Rhodes, was despatched to lay these proceedings before the queen, but he was rejected with scorn.

A specimen of the negotiations in one of the attempts to persuade queen Mary to ratify the treaty of Edinburgh, is preserved in a despatch from sir Nicholas Throgmorton to Elizabeth ‡, in which that able minister relates his conversation with the cardinal of Lorrain, who joined the arts and manners of Rome with the aspiring spirit of his family. The cardinal's main plea against ratification was, that the Scots had not performed their part, by a complete return to their obedience. "The Scots, I will tell you frankly," said he to Throgmorton, "perform no point of their duties: the king and the queen have the name of their sovereigns, and your mistress hath the obedience. They would bring the realm to a republic. Though you say your mistress has in all things performed the treaty; we say the Scots, by her countenance, perform no point of the treaty." The same argument was repeated by Francis II., Catherine de Medicis, and queen Mary, at the audiences which they gave to Throgmorton. "To tell you of the particular disorders," said the cardi

*Acta Parl. Scot. ii. 525.; and for the statute relating to Arran, same vol. Appendix, 605. The records of Scotland appear to be peculiarly deficient in this turbulent period. + Archbishop Spotswood's History of the Church of Scotland, 151. Throgmorton to Elizabeth, 17th Nov. 1560. 1 Hard, State Papers 125

146.

nal,

66

If

were too long;" which is his only apology for not specifying any. Throgmorton, in his private audience of queen Mary, assured that princess that if she would be graciously pleased to observe all that Randan and the bishop of Valence had promised, "the states of Scotland would perfect their duty to their majesties, by sending a suitable embassy to Paris; for the only grievance which the king, or the queen, or the cardinal, had deigned to specify was, that the Scottish parliament had sent a mean man to Paris to convey their prayers, though the person so described was sir James Sandilands, preceptor [head] of the order of St. John of Jerusalem (or Malta) in Scotland. The cardinal neither urged that the ambassadors had exceeded their powers, nor complained of the parliament for having overpassed the concessions by a change of religion. the temporary government had acted as a republic, he should have remembered that the legislative, and in effect the executive, power had been ceded to them by the agreement at Leith. He made no distinction between the treaty with Elizabeth and the grants to the people of Scotland. If he had objected to the latter part of the treaty as containing a promise to a foreign sovereign, that the king and queen of Scotland would observe the conditions which they had granted to their own subjects (which he never does), at least he ought to have offered to ratify the prior article *, which recognised the undisputed right of Elizabeth to her own throne; and to engage that they should never assume, nor allow to be used by others, to them or for them, the title or arms of England. To this article there was no objection on the ground either of Elizabeth's illicit interference in Scottish affairs, or of the default of the Scottish parliament. The refusal or the delay and evasion of so harmless a stipulation, which was important to England, manifested a hostile mind against Elizabeth, and an inflexible purpose to keep very formidable pretensions hanging over her head; ready, whenever she was weak or they were

* Rymer, xv. 393. Dumont, Corps Diplomat. v. part. i. 63,

strong, to crush her throne. Probably it was not considered by either party in these conferences, that the effect of a refusal of ratification was to restore the state of war. Either party might indeed forbear from actual warfare, but that forb-rance would be an abstinence from the exercise of a right; for when either party refused to complete the contract which was to close a war, the belligerent rights of the opposite party were necessarily revived.

Cecil, however, from the beginning, founded the advice which he gave his sovereign to take a part in Scottish affairs, on the more comprehensive principle of the justice and policy of self-defence.* "It is agreeable to God's law,” said he, “ for every prince and public state to defend itself not only from present peril, but from perils that may be feared to come. It is manifest that France cannot any way so readily, so puissantly offend, yea invade and put the crown of England in danger, as if they recover an absolute authority over Scotland. The long deep-rooted hatred of the house of Guise, which now occupieth the king's authority against England, is well known. What chiefly stays the execution of their purpose against England, is the resistance in Scotland, where they have lately sent a great seal with the arms of England." Maitland of Lethington, who destroyed the effect of great abilities by a capricious inconstancy, which repelled all trust, seconded with his wonted talents the reasoning of Cecil.+ "The fear of conquest," says he, "made the Scots to hate the English and love the French. The case changed,-when we see them (the French) attempt conquest, and you (the English) show us friendship,-shall we not hate them and favour you? especially now that we are come to a conformity of doctrine, and profess the same religion with you, which I take to be the straitest knot of amity that can be devised."

These reasonings on the justice and policy of armed interference for a friendly party, where the safety of a

A Brief Consideration of the Weighty Matter of Scotland. 1 Forbes's State Papers, 387.

Robertson, Hist. of Scotland, App. No. IL

state requires it, are in substance common to all ages and nations; though they were not expressed by the statesmen of the sixteenth century in the artificial language of what was afterwards called international law. Their principal defect is, that they may often be used with equal plausibility by several contending parties; though it is generally evident that one only has justice on its side. In the particular case before us, the defect does not seem to be considerable. The true question always being, which party is really influenced by self-defence, and which employs it merely as a pretext, it cannot be doubted that Elizabeth sought an ascendant in Scotland for her own safety, while the house of Guise pursued the same object for their aggrandisement. To this may be added, that the first wrong was done by the princes of Lorrain, in setting up their niece as a pretender to the English crown; and that this wrong was grievously aggravated by their perseverance in it. They obstinately persisted in using the royal arms of England as a flag round which every discontented and disaffected Englishman might rally; and this, even after their own ministers had pledged them by a solemn treaty to discontinue such an incentive to revolt. It has already been observed, that the reasonings of Cecil and of Maitland were not conveyed in the specious and subtle language of modern jurists: they were, nevertheless, conformable to the most approved principles. These ancient statesmen do not seem to have been aware of the difficulty of reconciling the rights of self-defence with the apparently conflicting duty of every community to respect the independence of every other, and to manifest their sense of justice by abstaining from interference in the internal affairs of independent countries. The solution, however, of that difficulty flows from the simple principle which is the basis of Cecil's advice. The right of defence, whether exercised to repel an attack or to prevent it, is the selfsame right, and extends to conventions with contending parties in a community, as much as to those which subsist with contending states. When a contest for supreme