possible to prove, either deductively or inductively, either à priori, or à posteriori, that the same conditions can never anywhere return. If we ignore this fact, and accept the statement, still it is of little or no help to the axiom which it seeks to support. But if the (so-called) "circumstances" or "conditions" contribute anything to the working forces--and they must do it, if the beginning of action depends upon themthen they must in some way coöperate toward the result, and thus become working powers, or, at least, manifestations of working powers. Then again the question arises: What kind of working forces are these? Do they work of their own free will, or are they impelled by necessity? That they should always be of the latter kind, natural science can never prove. It can only be stated as an hypothesis. On the other hand, this following proposition needs no proof, but follows undeniably from the law of causality!--If the same conditions never anywhere return, many other conditions more or less varying are found, on every occasion; and thus this beginning, this recurring change so contradictory to the regular conformity of natural phenomena, demands a sufficient cause as arbitrarily as any other phenomena. Forces that possess necessary, closely defined and unchangeable development and methods of development cannot possibly cause this constant change of condition. It is a manifest "contradictio in adjecto" that the change should be the result of an unchangeable thing. Since the same causes can only produce the same effects, so of course unchangeable causes can only produce unchangeable effects. Just so varying results can only flow from a variable force, and are therefore only manifestations of forces which can vary spontaneously their action and methods of action, and which are therefore spontaneously acting forces. And so we reach, as it seems to me, the unavoidable alternative. Either the powers of nature, which determine and limit natural phenomena are free (self-acting), or there must be, ruling all natural phenomena, a simply unvarying uniformity, which in all times and places, machine-like, reels off identical results. But since this last is proven by experience to be untrue to fact, there is no occasion to refer any further to unchangeable uniformity of natural phenomena. Whoever recognizes the logical laws

of identity and contradiction must recognize this dilemma. Natural science, like every purely positive philosophy of the universe, must forsake it, even if she is compelled to take refuge in the asylum of ignorance. Natural science can attempt an explanation. She can say: The apparent variety of phenomena, and the constant change of conditions that causes this variety are caused by the innumerable multitude and variety of forces which work with, against, and upon each other, so that the final results, although necessary, were from the beginning so various, and tended to such constant manifoldness that similar phenomena only return at periods too long for review. But as to all that transpires within these periods, all existing things, and all their changes and resultants must necessarily seem variant. And besides a machine may be so complicated and immense, that it can produce varying results in great numbers, not only at the same time, but also for a long succession of results. Indeed, this uninterrupted succession of varying results may continue even until the machine runs down, so that no eye placed within the machine is able to supervise it, or recognize its necessity. We will agree to this. The statement may be true. Yet, I submit, the statement is only a hypothesis. And so it is a fair question to ask, whether there are not other hypotheses that are more probable. The value of every hypothesis depends entirely upon its degree of probability. This proposition everybody must accept, who is not willing to give up all science.

But, then, consider that the hypothesis just stated stands in open contradiction with the permanent conclusions of geological and palæontological investigation. For every machine, no matter how good soever, or well-constructed it may be, can only run until its mechanism is run down. Then total rest must supervene until it is set agoing again. Investigations teach us that the earth and with it the vegetable and animal kingdoms have passed through several epochs of development before they have reached their present condition, which seems to be more permanent and durable, for the present condition of things has remained unchanged for many thousand years. The completed circle of phenomena which would be accomplished whenever a new impulse of activity was given to the Nature

machine, would involve the assumption that the earth has gained nothing from these steps of development, except to reach the beginning once more. This hypothesis would include our whole solar system, and, indeed, the whole universe, if we accept, as the science of nature is now generally understood to do, the Kant-LaPlace development theory as the probable order of creation. That such a general return to chaos-such a breaking up of all things-should occur, seems to me so incredible and unreasonable, that the very hypothesis of such an occurrence must (I trust) seem absurd. even to the most strenuous advocate of necessity and the machine theory. Moreover if we pass by these absurdities, still other indisputable facts contradict this cycle theory-this machine-like running down theory-so decidedly that the hypothesis seems to me to be quite untenable. Under the laws which natural science has established, the law of the equilibrium of impelling forces, for instance, takes an important place. This law declares, according to the interpretation of it in natural science, that the physical, chemical, and organic processes, on which natural phenomena depend, rest back, without exception, upon the combined activity of opposing forces. And these forces, while they in the end exactly counterpoise each other, are the impelling causes which produce rise, development, and change in all things. This law only avails to accomplish the result when every power puts forth its activity in a definite measure, corresponding to the measure of every other power; so that by their mutual combination, a compromise between the two shall be effected that will produce rest-equilibrium. But this equilibrium, as the law is interpreted, does not consist in a fixed permanence from that time. It is not established once for all, but it must be continually liable to disturbance so long as those processes which bring about natural phenomena continue in force. It is to be accepted as an established fact that through this perpetually increasing and diminishing condition of natural forcestake heat as an example-all the geological processes, and the changes in the earth's crust, as well as the rise and continuance of the organic creation are so conditioned, that without this constant oscillation absolute rest in organic nature would

supervene, and the consequent death of every living thing. There must be then certain forces existing in nature, which are not indissolubly joined to definite bodies of matter, or else they must be able to exert their influence beyond those bodies, or else they must be able to vary their modes of activity. Only such forces as these could break up the equilibrium, and then by restoring it keep up this oscillation. But this power to reach beyond their own definite body of matter, or to change their method of activity, notwithstanding the theory of a general or permanent equilibrium, simply contradicts the possibility of a machine-like running down of the course of nature. This last would demand an absolutely precise limitation of matter, and the forces of nature acting upon it.

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On the other hand, it is possible that there may be unconditioned forces (using the term in the same sense as above); and also that the variety in phenomena, and the changes in condition may depend on these; the activity of the unconditioned (psychical) forces having seized hold upon and modified the activity of the conditioned (physical) causes. course this proposition is only an hypothesis. But while the fatalistic, mechanical theory is so complicated that it is hardly possible to give an intelligible explanation of it, this last hypothesis at once attracts by its very simplicity. It supposes an immeasurable quantity and variety of working forces, outreaching all human conception; and it contradicts at once the dictum of scientific investigation, that the number of working forces in nature is very small. On the other hand, it coincides with the theory which grants as many working forces as you please, and it harmonizes with the above mentioned law of materialistic equilibrium; and, still further, it shows an analogy in these outward things to the working of the free psychical powers, and a method of working quite inconsistent with the pure mechanical scheme. And we notice that the mechanical theory cannot explain why the same conditions are not repeated "with absolute exactness" (to use Fechner's expression); but only return measurably-or as it might be more clearly expressed-while there is in the world at large a permanent and general uniformity in all phenomena, and while there is in nature a general conformity to law and order, still individual

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cases show the greatest variety and manifoldness. hypotheses, however, these facts are readily explained. To this end we need only make the plain statement that the free (unconditioned) forces do not overthrow the innate powers of natural forces, but they simply modify them. The free (unconditioned) forces coming in change the direction of the natural (conditioned) forces in individual cases. Indeed the powers of men do not go very far in their influence upon material things (and the same is true with spiritistic manifestations) towards overthrowing the general power of gravitation, or the mechanical, physical, chemical, or organic laws. They are simply able to divert, strengthen, or counteract in special cases the forces subject to these laws. So it seems to me that the reality of spiritistic manifestations by no means involves. the alternative that by them "the laws of gravity, electricity, light, and heat shall be overthrown," or that "the hypothesis of a general law of causality in natural science must be given up."

You see, my honored sir, the result to which my argument tends. I would express my opinion, that the further consideration of spiritistic phenomena, if we accept them as genuine, does not properly belong to natural science, but to the realm of philosophy. For these phenomena offer a new testimony for the (to-day so much contested) truth and validity of ethics and ethical requirements. Although these phenomena do not absolutely teach the immortality of the soul; yet when they bear witness that there are free self-impelling powers that can lay hold of the course of nature, they do by this means strengthen the hypothesis of man's free will, an hypothesis with which ethics stands or falls. But you may object, that even if a person should explain the phenomena by the theory which I hold, still there is a very great difference between those phenomena and the spiritistic manifestations: so great that an unprejudiced mind might not unreasonably suspect trickery, at least in those phenomena which you yourself saw. I wish you had made your statement a little more precise, and told us just how far and just why you suspected this jugglery. For in spite of the clearness and precision of your description it failed to give me any such impression; and the same thing is