allow that he is sincere in this-that he really believes what he affirms. But when he proceeds to connect his consciousness of these things with a certain system of astronomy, and calls upon me, because of his alleged consciousness, to give my assent to that system, is that demand to be accounted reasonable, and must it be granted? Although his sincerity may not be questioned, must his alleged facts, on the simple ground of his assumed consciousness, be admitted, or the conclusions drawn from them allowed? Because no veritable perception of these things could ever have been had, and consequently no real consciousness of them, must not the matter rather be dismissed at once as an amiable delusion? What else can I say, but that the man has evidently mistaken the vagaries of his own mind for actual realities? And so his argument, thus based, goes for naught; becomes to me of absolutely no value.

On this point we beg leave to quote a few sentences from an article by Prof. Francis L. Patton, in a recent number of the Princeton Review. "It is impossible," says Prof. Patton, "to make our certitude the basis of argument with others. The strongest reasons for our convictions are not always those of which we can make the most use in dealing with other minds.... It is difficult, apparently, for some to realize that fair debate between believers and unbelievers must proceed on the basis of common intellectual conditions. . . . . To support a position by a subjectivity that begs the whole question in dispute, is simply to argue unfairly. . . . . For himself, and in foro conscientia, the individual Christian may and does decide, in addition to external evidence, by the witness of the Spirit; but when he appears in debate, and aims at convincing another mind, he must make use of the canons of certitude that other men employ."

And of very much the same import are the words of Dr. Ebrard in the introduction to his recent able work on Apologetics, as quoted by Prof. H. B. Smith.t "It is a matter of course," says Dr. Ebrard, "that Apologetics cannot bring to these investigations any axioms borrowed from revelation, and theology, but can only appeal to the facts of self-consciousness and of native rational knowledge belonging to man as man. We do not prove idem per idem; this were illogical and objec* Jan. 1882, p. 108.

Lectures on Apologetics, Appendix, pp. 156-7.

tionable. To take for granted a knowledge of Christian truth, to pre-suppose a consciousness shaped by Christianity, and then to analyze that consciousness, this is not Apologetics." And again: "In dealing with objectors, it is necessary to come down to their ground, to their arena; to ignore all axioms borrowed from Christianity itself, so as to lead them e concessis ad absurdum; to make it evident that their own assumptions and inferences are false and perverse even on the ground of their own premises."

This evidently is wise and to the point. The Christian consciousness, whatever it may be allowed to be, or of whatever value to the person possessing it, can evidently never be made of any practical avail in convincing unbelievers of the truth of Christianity. It is too recondite for that. It presents no common ground on which the disputants may meet, and on which the argument may proceed, and therefore must be ruled out.

Conclusive as this argument must be confessed to be, there is still another which, just because it is more practical, is to the average mind far more convincing. The great mass of men are not much given to reflection; and therefore arguments which make their appeal to this faculty are not very effective with them. They reason rather, for the most part, from facts which fall directly under their own observation, and which, therefore, are easily comprehended. Principles they do not, indeed, wholly ignore; but it is from palpable perceived results as they occur in actual life, that their conclusions are mostly drawn. Christianity itself forms no exception. By this short practical test is it invariably judged. The very best apology for the Christian faith during all these centuries has been acknowledged to be its benign and salutary influence upon those who have embraced it. Its obvious tendency has been, not only to improve and elevate the individual, but also to raise the tone of society; to transform the lowest barbarism into the highest patterns of civilization and refinement. And this has been its recommendation; this an important element of its power over the popular mind. Had it been otherwise, had it brought with it wherever it came an evident blight and a curse, few would have been found to do it reverence; few to give it even a passing examination. And what is true of Christianity as a whole, is also true of each of its cardinal doctrines. Their general reception

depends largely upon their perceived bearing upon human character and human destiny.

On this plain, practical ground, then, let the apologetical value of this alleged Christian consciousness be determined. It has been claimed by some as a personal experience. Has its obvious effect upon their character and conduct been such as to commend Christianity to the average mind? Or has it, on the other hand, been so disastrous, and sometimes so shocking, as to create decidedly the opposite impression? The first thing about it is its obvious tendency to create and foster an overweening self-confidence and self-conceit. Its own findings are supposed to be ultimate. Outside of itself it admits of no corroboration, no verification, but is content with simple assertion. It affirms that it knows that communications have been received directly from God, and that is the end of it. Now since "to err is human," common to even the best; common to them, not only as to outward facts, but quite as much as to the hidden promptings of their mental operations, it certainly is not difficult to see, that such a claim for even the Christian consciousness must be not a little dangerous. It obviously contains the possibility of delusion. How are we to be certified against such a result? how assured that the person's own wayward fancy or mental hallucinations, honest or pious as he may be allowed to be, have not been mistaken for the divine communications alleged? And in the absence of any such certification, who can rationally be expected to admit the truth or reality of the allegation? Its value, under these circumstances, for any purpose, must certainly be confessed to be not very appreciable.

But we need not be confined to possibilities. Possibility, in this matter, is not unfrequently turned into reality. The thing feared actually comes to pass. Under the confident persuasion of a conscious divine impulse or command all sorts of religious extravagance are perpetrated. It is, as everybody knows, the very Pandora's box of fanaticism; and the shapes of evil that are seen to issue from it are most hideous. pages of Christian history are all black with the recital of the foul deeds that have been wrought in its name. Scarcely a crime in the dark catalogue of wrong doing is there, assassination not excepted, which has not been instigated by it, and

The

sought to be shielded under it. Every command of the decalogue has it boldly set aside; thus making the Infinite One contradict himself and belie his own clearly revealed character. And can that which is fruitful in such results be expected to command the confidence and homage of rational men? Will it be likely to propitiate Pagans and unbelievers towards the Christian faith, when made an essential part of it? The answer to that question does not certainly require the wisdom of a Solomon.

Is it alleged that these results are exceptional? As much as that may be allowed: since by no means every one has the courage of his opinions; the courage to carry out his theories to their logical conclusions. In most persons, when their theories are erratic, the moral forces within and around them are too strong to admit of that. And so it comes to pass, that a direct conscious personal communication with the invisible God may be believed in without any serious shock to the interests of practical morality. In the case of very many good Christians, it doubtless remains a comparatively harmless delusion. But does it therefore follow that it is to be thrust forward into the very front rank of the Christian evidences? as the one great argument "for bringing Pagans and unbelievers to the acknowledgment of the Christian faith?" Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis. The Christian religion, we cannot but think, is far more honored in the neglect, than in the employment of such arguments.

A certain German philosopher, it is said, once claimed to have evolved from his inner consciousness a hippopotamus; and so became the laughing stock of all his acquaintances. Scarcely less ridiculous, we cannot but think, must any one become, who should seriously undertake, for the enlightenment of a benighted and unbelieving world, to evolve from the same hidden source, the momentous scheme of the Christian religion or even the evidences by which it is commended to other minds. However conducive to his own edification such an operation might be allowed to be, it could hardly prove available for that high end to anybody else. The attempt, therefore, is not to be encouraged.

ARTICLE VI.-A STUDY OF COGNITION.

THE problem of cognition is the primary problem in philos ophy; not only because what we know with absolute certainty must furnish the basis for all speculative thinking concerning mind, by means of which a philosophy is constructed, but also because cognition is the primary manifestation of the mind's

energy.

The solution of the problem requires a careful examination of cognition in general, in order to determine what is essential to a cognitive act; and a careful discrimination between cognitions a priori and a posteriori, that we may know what adventitions to either or both, makes them to differ. Such a discrimination demands an accurate determination of the necessary antecedents and conditions, together with the objects of both a priori and a posteriori cognitions.

In making an examination of any mental phenomena we are dependent upon the revelations of consciousness; it is desirable, therefore, at the outset, to determine what consciousness is, and what is the object of its activity. Since consciousness is in no way dependent upon sensation and sense-perception, it is a power of immediate knowing; since there is no recognition of the act of consciousness, it is, necessarily, a faculty of unconscious knowing; since it is the condition of experience, it must itself transcend experience. Sir William Hamilton denies that consciousness is a cognitive power, but he denies this solely because making it a cognitive faculty, is to suppose that there is knowledge of which we are unconscious; and while he denies, he finds himself always compelled to speak of consciousness in cognitive terms; and this for the reason, that having separated from consciousness the idea of cognition, he found himself unable to attach any idea whatever to the word, save as it relates to the object of the mental act and not to the act itself. We find then that consciousness is a power of immediate unconscious knowing; it remains to enquire concerning the object of its activity. If we make the object the ego, a serious difficulty