of sanctifying grace, and purgatory supposes this grace already in the soul. Nor has the Church ever admitted any second probation after death.

5o. Fifthly, since the line must be drawn at mortal sin, the question suggests itself: how are we to determine which sins are mortal and which venial? Neither Scripture nor tradition has decided in every case. It is the business of theologians to discuss the question in all its bearings; and we may feel sure that if at any time it should be necessary in a particular case to decide whether certain actions are sinful and to what extent, the Church authorities will not hesitate to do so.

6. Finally, though this question has not been fully settled by either Scripture or tradition, we are not left without certain principles to guide us in the investigation. I shall mention some:

(1) Reason tells us that certain trivial faults do not sever friendships, that some sins are greater than others, that owing to the corruption of our nature some actions are very much opposed to the attainment of our end.

(2) There are terms often applied in the Bible to certain actions, there are certain punishments threatened, all of which leave little doubt as to the gravity of the offence. St. Paul's text is an example:1 "Know you not that the unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God. Do not err; neither fornicators, nor idolators, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liars with mankind, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor railers, nor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of God."

(3) Still there are innumerable other actions about which there may be doubt. The teachers of the Church sometimes decide, as they have a right to do, which opinion a Catholic should in all cases follow. Most frequently the question is left undecided; and then each moralist has to make up his own mind, according as the reasons for and against shall seem good to himself, but always with a due respect for the learned and holy men who have already treated the question.

I do not intend to prove these principles; I merely state them; if they be adopted, as all Catholics do adopt them, it follows that the boundary-line between hell and heaven must be drawn at the state of unrepented mortal sin. W. MCDONALD.

VOL. VI.

1 Cor. vi. 9-10.

3 F

ON THE TELEPHONE IN RELATION TO THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE-A REPLY.

N resuming the discussion with Father Livius, my first

under some misapprehension of the claims of my scientific knowledge which is in reality nothing more than what is generally known as a gentleman's, he has been good enough to extend to my argument; and to assure him and Professor Ryan, to whom, although I have not the honour of his acquaintance, I am similarly indebted, that if I fail either in courtesy of language, or otherwise in the course of this discussion, it will be rather from the eagerness of a weak disputant, than from a want of sincere deference towards my opponents, and a desire to reciprocate their kindness to myself.

I begin by observing that some admissions which Father Livius has made with real candour in his articles on "the Telephone in relation to the Sacrament of Penance" are worth noting for the purpose of fixing precisely the present position of the point in dispute.

I found a controversy going on between him and Sacerdos Dublinensis in which it was assumed that science had given or might give a verdict to the effect that the human voice was heard through the Telephone; and I interposed with a challenge of the fact that such a verdict had been given, and I was led further to maintain that it could not be given.

Father Livius admits now that my argument" seemed to himself quite conclusive against his opinion," that "two scientific men whom he consulted pronounced on the question in substantially the same terms," and that a third, Dr. O'Reilly, who he maintains is now on his side, was at first opposed to it.

He further admits that his study of scientific text-books corroborated these testimonies in my favour "for he had but to look through some of the most modern scientific treatises and encyclopedias to render his belief doubly sure," and finally Professor Ryan, whose authority he puts forward, as of great weight, advised him that it was necessary for the maintenance of his view to abandon "technical science and go by philosophy." "If you

go by technical science, the opponents will tell you

from the text-books that there is a physical difference between a sound wave and an electrical current-they will speak very positively and there will be an end to the matter."

I think that all these admissions make it abundantly evident that Father Livius's opinion is not a verdict of science, and is very far even on his own showing, both. by reason and authority, from being more than probable.

His

But his whole argument against Sacerdos Dublinensis required a certainty for its basis. It rested on the assumed fact that the human voice was heard for certain through the telephone. What becomes of that argument when his supposed certainty is replaced by a probability? contention was that "if science gave it as its verdict that through the telephone, as is claimed for it, there is immediate sensible perception of another personally, i.e. if it may be truly said that the human voice is heard through that medium, I still incline to believe that the last word has not yet been spoken on the telephone in relation to the Sacrament of Penance."

"The last word" I suppose he means spoken by THEOLOGY. Now the ground is shifted, and he set forth in the RECORD of last July the considerations which led him to think that SCIENCE had not spoken her last word on the same subject. Instead then of a scientific verdict his major proposition becomes at most a scientific probability, what becomes then of his conclusion which at best he maintained as tenuiter probabilis. The Syllogism would run thus.

If science gives as its verdict, &c, then it is at least tenuiter probabilis that there is a sufficient moral presence for the Sacrament of Penance.

Atqui science does give such a verdict, Ergo.

If you substitute in the minor for "a verdict" a probable opinion I should like to know whether you have as much of the tenus probabilitas of your conclusion remaining.as is of use for any practical purpose.

But my business is with that minor proposition exclusively. My first difficulty in dealing with it, however, arises from the inconvenience of having to meet simultaneously two opponents whose attacks came from opposite sides, and are rather inconsistent with one another.

For in June Father Livius, as I have shown by his admissions, found it impossible to defend his position with the weapons supplied by the science of Sound and Acoustics.

and Professor Ryan agreed as to the necessity of appealing to philosophy. "Rebellious thoughts arose within him (Father Livius) against the laws and principles of science in the matter of acoustics as being altogether too technical, cramped and narrow to cover the reality of recognised facts," and accordingly he discussed the question most ably and interestingly on what he calls "Philosophical grounds."

Then in the month of July he resumed the discussion in what I cannot help regarding as a manner inconsistent with his previous argument and certainly embarrassing to

me.

66

Having rebelled against the restrictions of science, and risen to philosophy both from his own convictions and Professor Ryan's advice he finds after all that philosophy will not do, that keeping to it would expose him to the charge of arbitrarily theorizing," that "science must be met by science," for that to whatever extent an opinion was philosophically true, it must also be true scientifically," and concludes, "If therefore I wrote again on the question in the RECORD, the opinion I advocated must somehow be set on a scientific basis and the objections and difficulties supported by Father O'Dwyer's article must be scientifically encountered."

And Professor Ryan undertakes this technical and scientific defence of the position.

I have then a double argument to maintain. One against Father Livius supported as he is by Lord Rayleigh and other high authorities in the view that the principles and definitions of the science of Sound and Acoustics need to be enlarged so as to include the phenomena of the telephone. The other against Father Livius and Professor Ryan who undertake to show that these phenomena are quite analogous to the well ascertained facts in the science of sound, and as Professor Ryan sums up his article:

"In all cases of communication by speech the hearer is merely cognizant of certain intelligible mechanical disturbances due to energy transmitted to him from the speaker. It is popularly known as hearing the speaker's voice, and the expression is as scientifically accurate in the case of the telephone as in the ordinary case neither more nor less."

To bring out the point at issue clearly, I may very briefly re-state it.

The Telephone consists of three parts. 1° A transmitting instrument through which a person speaks. 2o A receiving instrument which by vibrating emits an articulate sound very like the voice of the speaker, and 3° an ordinary electric wire connecting both, along which passes an electric current. And as far I understand the controversy the sole point in dispute is whether the force or energy or whatever else it is that is called the human voice ceases to be a sound by passing into the inaudible electrical stage in the wire, and whether the sound heard in the receiving instrument can be said to be the sound spoken into the transmitting instrument. Father Livius holds that it is the same voice all through. I hold that it is not. I hold that the transition into an electrical current is fatal to its existence-its continued existence as sound, and consequently that in the receiving instrument is heard not the voice of the speaker, but a well made mechanical imitation of it.

I will try then and meet in turn the two answers which Fr. Livius gives to my criticism; but in the reverse order to that in which they have been published.

I will first attempt to prove that Professor Ryan has failed to establish any analogy between the phenomena of the telephone and the accepted phenomena of Sound and Acoustics that justify their being put in the same category; and secondly, I will try to meet, both by reason and authority, Fr. Livius' view, which rather takes the form of a suggestion to enlarge our definitions of Sound and Acoustics, &c., so as to give a place within the same science to the phenomena of the telephone.

In such a discussion accuracy of definition, or at least description is necessary, if we are to avoid perpetual "ignorantia elenchi." Accordingly, in my former essay, I defined what I meant by "hearing the human voice." Professor Ryan objects to that definition, and holds that the expression, "hearing the human voice, though popular and quite admissible, is yet unscientific. Usually its meaning is obvious, but it is not easy to give an exact scientific definition of it which may decide doubtful

cases."

"Now, as the expression is distinctly a popular one, and certainly unscientific, the question should be decided in accordance with popular ideas."

I shall have something to say about the value of popular ideas later on. For the present I prefer to discuss