cope even with their armed merchantmen, and the larger privateers were taken. Our mercantile shipping fell, at the same time, a sacrifice to the vigilant operations of the British navy. At the present moment her naval power is extended beyond all former examples; while that of her enemies is at least not increased.

Second, Our landed as well as commercial interests would suffer beyond all calculation. Agriculture, above the supply of our own wants, would be suspended, or its produce perish on our hands. The value of our lands and every species of domestick property would sink.

Third, The sources of revenue failing, publick credit. would be destroyed and multitudes of our citizens now depending on its preservation, be involved in ruin. The people at large, from the summit of prosperity would be plunged into an abyss of misery too sudden and too severe patiently to be borne. To increase their calamities, or make them felt more sensibly, direct taxes must be levied to support the war, and it would be happy for us if we could contemplate only a foreign war in which all hearts and hands might be united.

Fourth, Under the circumstances mentioned, a war with Great Britain would be essentially injurious to France. With our own principal ports blocked up, and her sea coast lined (as at present) with British cruisers, there would be an end to our intercourse with France and it is by our commerce only that we can give her any valuable aid. Men she wants not; and if she did want we could not transport them. But while we continue our neutrality, the benefits we may render to France and her colonies are immense. And though the renewal of the order for capturing neutral vessels laden with provisions, while extremely vexatious to us, adds to their distresses; yet the tenour of the 18th article of our late treaty with Great Britain, though with some a subject of clamour, will remedy in a degree the mischievous tendency of that order. For the article, far from giving a right to Great Britain to capture our provision vessels, only prescribes the course to be taken, when by the law of nations provisions become contraband. They are not to be confiscated, but paid for with a reasonable mercantile profit. What will be the operation of this provision? Will it check or encourage adventures to France? We think the latter.

For if our vessels reach the French ports, all the expected profits of the voyage will be gained. If they are taken by the British, although there may be less profit, there can be no loss. Consequently, instead of discouraging, this article will rather promote the exportation of provisions for France; for in the event of arrival or capture, the American merchant is certain of making a profitable voyage.

That this article in the treaty respecting provisions has had no influence in the measures of the British cabinet is clear to a demonstration: for the order, so far as we are informed, extends to other neutral nations with whom there is no similar stipulation. And before the article existed, we too well know the conduct of that court was the same. And claiming as an independent nation the right of judging in such case, it was evidently expedient for the United States to obtain from her some stipulation, which, without admitting her claim, would not leave our commerce to future spoliations without any definite means of liquidation or redress.

Some men, forgetting their own professed principles, when they advert only to our relation to Great Britain, forgetting that they are the citizens of an independent state, have said, that while France, with whom we have a treaty of amity and commerce, was at war, we ought not to form with her enemy a similar treaty, by which our situation would be changed. But where is the principle to support this rule? and where will it find any limits? We have treaties with many other powers, one or the other of whom, may be always at war: are we never then to make another treaty?

Others have said, France will be displeased. This we should regret for two reasons: one because we really wish to please our old and friendly allies: the other, because we desire to see, and doubt not we shall see, her deportment towards us correspond with her own fundamental principle, that every independent nation has an exclusive right to manage its own affairs. All our external duties centre here-that in our new engagements we violate no prior obligatior.

That France should manifest a watchful jealousy of any connections we might form with her ancient and inveterate enemy, is perfectly natural. It is the same spirit which

prompted her to afford us that efficient aid which was so important to the achieving of our independence. By breaking off so large a portion of the British empire, the power of a formidable rival was essentially diminished. No wonder she should now be alive to the remotest prospect of reunion; not of government, but of interests and good will. But to the following positions you may give all the solemnity of truths.

First, That the late negotiation has not proceeded from any predilection in our government towards Great Britain. We abide by our original declaration respecting the British: "We hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends."

Second, That from the remembrance of a long, bloody and distressing war, from which we were just beginning to recover, and to taste the blessings of peace; whatever even seemed to tend to a renewal of it, was seriously deprecated.

Third, That there were many causes of difference between us and Great Britain, the adjustment of which admitted of no longer delay. One was the detention of the western posts, under a real or affected belief that the United States were the first to infringe the peace of 1783. From this detention resulted a bloody and expensive Indian war; a loss of revenue by a suspension of the sale of lands; and a deprivation of the fur trade. To these were added fresh. excitements to a more extended Indian war, and the vexations and ruinous spoliations of our commerce. Our differences on these and other grounds had risen to a height that required an immediate remedy. War or negotiation were the alternatives. We chose the latter. Had this failed, war seemed scarcely avoidable. But in that case, these good effects were counted upon. The consciousness of using the proper means of averting so great a calamity; union among ourselves, when war should have appeared inevitable; and division among our enemies who should have refused an amicable settlement of our just demands; besides which we gained time for preparation.

Fourth, That the commercial part of the treaty though not unimportant, was but a subordinate object, and at the same time not a new measure. This is well known to every well informed citizen of the United States. It is a fact, that a commercial treaty has been sought after ever since

the peace; under the old government, and since the establishment of the new one. It is a fact, that upon the arrival of Mr. Hammond the British minister, and an intimation that he was empowered to enter into commercial arrangements, he was met with avidity by Mr. Jefferson, the Secretary of State: and when it was discovered that his powers extended only to an inconclusive discussion of this subject, disappointment and chagrin were the result. It may be added that measures have been proposed and powerfully supported in the legislature, the sole object of which was to force Great Britain into a commercial treaty.

Fifth, That the government of the United States is sincerely friendly to the French nation. The latter doubtless believe that the body of American citizens are well affected towards them. The belief is well founded. But it is equally applicable to those in the administration of the government. If any thing could weaken this general attachment, it would be a recurrence to such disorganizing projects, and outrages on the sovereignty and dignity of the United States, as marked and disgraced the ministry of Genet. The precipitate, and in the main, illfounded resolutions of a few small popular meetings, are not to be taken as true indications of the American sentiment: very different is the opinion of the great body of the people. These are beyond example prosperous, contented and happy. Where any symptoms of another nature have appeared, they are to be traced to ignorant or perverse misrepresentations of the treaty. This, as it becomes better understood, is more and more approved.

That the treaty would settle every point in dispute entirely to our satisfaction, and secure to us all the commercial advantages we could wish for, no reasonable man could expect. Our antagonists too had claims, opinions and wishes. And where there are opposing interests, nations as well as individuals are likely to make erroneous estimates of their respective rights. When therefore every argument was exhausted, and found unavailing to settle the disputed points more to our advantage, the terms as we see them were adopted. The Senate after a very deliberate discussion and consideration of the treaty, in all its relations, advised its ratification, on the condition stated in their resolution: and on that condition it has

received the President's sanction. It now rests with the king of Great Britain to give or withhold his assent. We are disposed to think that his assent will be given: for it is the interest of Great Britain not to increase the number of her enemies, or to deprive herself of the benefits of a commercial intercourse with the United States. It is not less our interest to remain at peace. And the President as the first minister of good to the people, is bound to take all reasonable and prudent means to preserve it. Peace is the ordinary and eligible state of our nation; and your duties as its agent abroad result from this condition of our country. And as nothing has yet happened which renders it in any degree probable that the United States will become a party in the existing war, every intimation which may invite the expectations and enterprises of the French government, calculating on such an event, is therefore carefully to be avoided.

With great respect, I am, sir, &c.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

No. 29.

TRANSLATION.

Joseph Fauchet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republick, near the United States, to Mr. Randolph, Secretary of State of the United States. New York, the 2d Vindemiaire, 2d year of the French Republick, one and indivisible, (Sept. 23, 1794, O. S.)

SIR, A recent violation both of the sovereignty of the French Republick and of the treaties you have contracted with her, has just taken place at New York. Some men, in the employment of the customhouse I suppose, went on board the Favourite, a French ship of war, and carried off effects belonging to the Republick: one of the persons who executed this order insulting to the nation I repre sent, dared to threaten the officer instructed to hoist our flag for the féte of the 21st September with a stroke of his sword. His threats terminated by hoisting the flag of the customs. This was respected by the French: but ours was insulted in an outrageous manner. I request justice against the authors of this infraction of the law of nations.