men, and exhorted Timothy "to preach the word," and to be instant and constant in preaching it, notwithstanding the time would come when men "will not endure sound doctrine, but having itching ears, will turn away their ears from the truth and follow after fables." The charge of the apostle to Titus is therefore a standing injunction to the Christian ministry, that they shall rely upon sound doctrine under God, as the means both of establishing believers and of convincing gainsayers. The apostolic injunctions to Christians are still in force-that they shall be vigilant for the truth, and shall test man's teaching by the word of God. Neither ministers nor private Christians can rid themselves of this obligation to care for and maintain the integrity of Christian doctrine.

No good feeling among Christians, no favorable consideration from the world, should be sought at the expense of that sound doctrine wherein we are instructed by the Scriptures. We say of the studied excitation of feeling, and the whole sensation style of preaching, as Hooker said of a pretentious rhetoric, "They who covet more sauce than meat, must provide cooks to their mind." We are told that people do not care to hear the pulpit discuss "theories of doctrine and duty," but wish it to deal with things that interest them personally. The "Westminster Review" would even persuade us that for Christian revivals "a condition of the first importance is ignorance." But the profounder questions of doctrine and duty are just those about which the common mind is most deeply exercised. To reason is not the prerogative of philosophers, but the province of the masses. Thought, argument, doctrine, clearly, freshly, forcibly presented, with apt illustration and vivid application to existing realities of human experience these are the highest and most enduring excitements that the pulpit can offer, even in this over stimulated age. The pulpit can live as a power, in Congregational churches, only as it holds forth the doctrines of the Bible with strong and earnest thinking, in strong and earnest words. These doctrines must be treated in the light of new objections, and in reference to existing wants. The grand doctrines of God, as a personal, spiritual Being, above all law or fate; of

His constant providential and moral government over this world; of His holiness and love, His justice and mercy, His paternal goodness to the penitent and believing, His judicial severity upon the perverse and ungodly; of man, as a voluntary, responsible agent, sinning and condemned; of sin, as voluntary, and therefore guilty; as no accident, or creature of circumstances but willful alienation from God, which love must reject and punish, when it cannot reclaim; of the atoning sacrifice of Christ for pardon and justification; the mission of the Spirit for regeneration and sanctification through the truth; the efficacy of prayer; the duty of holy living; the obligation, privilege, and blessedness of purity of heart; the necessity of repentance and faith in order to salvation; the resurrection of the dead; the final judgment; the eternal glory of the righteous; the eternal punishment of the wicked; truths such as these, presented not as dry formulas of doctrine, nor as a museum of fossils labeled at Geneva, Westminster, Dort, or Savoy; not to make or prove a system, or to define the position of the preacher; but as living truths, brought forth from the living Word by a mind that believes, and trembles, and rejoices-these must be the power of the pulpit in our churches and our times. Without these, there may be energy, rhetoric, zeal, and popular excitement, but no power of God unto salvation. We who have such a polity and such a history, are bound before God and man to vindicate the power of a Biblical theology. The charge comes anew to such a ministry, "Hold fast the faithful word of God's own teaching, that ye may be able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and convince the gainsayers."

ARTICLE VII.-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ATHENIAN

DEMOCRACY.

History of Greece. By GEORGE GROTE, Esq. Vols. III, IV, V.

FEW political subjects are so much misapprehended, even by well informed men, as Grecian Democracy. Notwithstanding Greece was divided into numerous states, and these, for the most part, were independent of each other, we are accustomed to speak as if there were but a single state, and whatever might be said of Greece would apply to any portion of it. So, too, though there were two distinct forms of government, oligarchy and democracy, and these were in constant hostility, the mutual fears and ambition of the respective parties having been the underlying cause of the Peloponnesian war, and having controlled all the subsequent political movements of the dif ferent states, we yet utterly confound the two under the common name of Grecian freedom, as if the iron oligarchy of Sparta were nearly the same thing as the free democracy of Athens. Besides both democracy and oligarchy had a natural develop. ment from a previously existing government, and a marked progress within themselves, and yet we speak of Grecian freedom as if it were always the same, unchanged from beginning to end; as if the constitutional history of Greece underwent no changes during the several centuries in which the events of her political history were taking place, and her literature and philosophy were advancing to maturity. Moreover, and worst of all, men prate of ancient democracy as if it were the same as ours, whereas in several most important respects, it was antagonistic and inferior. Athenian democracy, for example, was founded on the basis of force, the law of the strongest, American democracy on the basis of the natural and inalienable rights of man. Athenian democracy was a government carried on directly by the people; American democracy a government carried on by the representatives of the people, and finally,

unlike ours, the Athenian democracy admitted of no chief magistrate.

We propose to give a sketch of what we will venture to call the constitutional history of Athenian democracy, at the same time comparing and contrasting with it our own democracy. But before entering upon the discussion, we acknowledge our indebtedness to Mr. Grote for most of the materials out of which this essay has been constructed. The great difficulty in tracing the history of the constitution and government of Athens lies in the fact that the ancient writers themselves have made no discrimination of epochs, but have referred all the institutions of their own time, in a body, to Solon. Even Demosthenes ascribes the Heliastic oath to him, though its first clause is, 'I will vote according to the laws, and according to the decrees of the Athenian people and of the Senate of Five Hundred." But the Senate of Five Hundred was not established till the time of Kleisthenes,eighty-five years after Solon. Mr. Grote, with rare sagacity, has traced out the progress through which the constitution was established as it stood in the days of Demosthenes. He has separated from the Solonian constitution the additions which later ages had made to it, and shown with precision the real and important changes which were introduced by Pericles. Mr. Grote may not be entirely satisfactory on individual points, but the views which he has taken in this department of his history will, as a whole, we think, continue to receive the assent of scholars. Other authors to whom we have been indebted, it is unnecessary to mention.

The original government of Athens was a monarchy; next, the monarchy passed into oligarchy; and finally, the oligarchy became a democracy.

The steps by which the monarchy passed into oligarchy were, first, the adoption of the title of Ruler, or Archon, for that of King. Kodrus was the last king. This change, however, is important only as indicating the growing power of the noble families, who would prefer the general name of ruler to the specific and more invidious one of king. The next step was the limita tion of the archonship to ten years' duration; it had been heretofore for life, and there were thirteen such archons. This step

was taken in 752, B. C., and manifestly enlarged the field of ambition to the aspiring nobles. This was followed in 714, B. C., by a still greater change in their favor. Hitherto the archonship had been confined to the Medontidæ, or descendants of Kodrus; henceforth, it was made accessible to the whole nobility.

One generation later, and the change takes place which converts the monarchy into an oligarchy. The archonship was now made annual instead of decennial, and nine archons were substituted in place of the one. This was a revolution. The headship of the state was no longer in the hands of a monarch but of oligarchs, not of one ruler but of several. And it is a remarkable fact that from this time onward to the end of the free democracy, Athens never had a Chief Magistrate-nothing corresponding to the Governor of a state, or the President of the United States, with us. This increase in the number of archons, and the establishment of annual election were made in the archonship of Kreon in 683, B. C., and never afterwards underwent any change. We add that this distribution of powers among the nine archons, and their annual election were equally consistent with a democracy or an oligarchy; we call the present form of government an oligarchy, because the archonship was entirely in the hands of a few noble families and not of the commonalty.

With the revolution of 683, B. C., the authentic history of Athens commences, and we pause to examine the state of things at this period.

This examination will embrace two points: the divisions and aggregations of the people, for facilitating the administration. of government, and the distribution of rulers, by whom this administration is to be carried on. Ultimately, government must come into personal contact with individuals, and this can only be done through individual rulers. But the number of individuals with whom any given ruler can come into contact is limited. Indeed, it is remarkable how very few one man can govern by himself,-hardly more, in general, than a single family, and some men not even that. Hence arises the necessity of divisions and subdivisions among the people, with a