by demagogues, not put on trial for proposing measures contrary to the laws, not responsible to any, but simply himself master, leader, lord of all "—a sentence which condenses everything which has ever been said concerning the inefficiency of republics in time of war. But on the other hand this proceeding was a tremendous weapon against corrupt and fraudulent public men-more tremendous even than a Covode committee. Such were the barriers against hasty and inconsiderate legislation in the assembly, and so long as the spirit of patriotism animated the people, they were sufficient. And never, as we have already said, has the world seen another such assembly for legislation as the Athenian ekklesia in the days of its glory. What sacrifices were here deliberately determined upon for freedom against slavery! What generous principles were here proclaimed and carried out, of fighting for enemies even, as Demosthenes expresses it, rather than see a Grecian state cuslaved! What magnanimous sentiments of honor animated its deliberations, urging to everything that was great and elevated. Here the noble resolution was passed, proposed by Themistocles, to leave the country and all it held that was sacred and dear, rather than submit to the Persian. Here were carried on the mighty party conquests of Aristeides and Themistocles, of Pericles and Kimon. It was the ekklesia which reared the Parthenon and adorned the Acropolis; it was in this body that the walls of the city were built, and the harbor of the Piraeus fortified. It was here, too, that Pericles and Demosthenes delivered those orations, which have won the admiration of the world.

In the preceding sketch of the Athenian constitution of the state, we have intentionally omitted many points of interest, but the limits proper to an Article in our review seemed to require it, and besides our object was merely to give a birds-eye view of the whole, and this required only the prominent points. We have also aimed to show the progressive steps by which the final result was reached, and in so doing may have followed Mr. Grote in some things too implicitly, but it seemed to us better to look at the growth of the Athenian constitution in its causes, and to arrange its successive stages in accordance with

them, than to refer the whole to Solon, even if we should run the risk of misplacing some things. We conclude by drawing attention to a few points of contrast between Athenian and American democracy.

The great distinction between the two has been already mentioned. The Athenian democracy was a direct, absolute government of the people. The American democracy is a government carried on through representatives of the people. The responsibility of what was done rested directly on the Athenian citizen,-the responsibility of the American is more remote, as lying not in his immediate participation in the measures of government, but in his election of those who represent him. With the Athenian, the assembly of the people was the great object of interest, with us it is the ballotbox. This makes a great difference in the character of the people. The Athenians had more of personal equality. Each one had not only the privilege of being elected to administrative and judicial offices, but had an equal chance with any other of obtaining them;-of the assembly-the legislaturehe was a member of course. But in our representative democracy, the only place where there is personal equality is at the polls. Hence, there is as much distinction of classes in society with us as anywhere in the world; there is, in fact, more jealousy, from the inability to draw the lines with precision. Nor is it at all unnatural that those who vaunt themselves preeminently as democrats should have the most of vulgar display of rank and wealth. Yet there is a strong desire for personal equality; and expressions, such as "the masses," are popular because they represent those who are included under them as undistinguishable from each other.

We may notice another distinction, arising from the one just mentioned. The Athenian magistrate was held more strictly accountable to the people than with us. Every one who exercised any office whatever, was obliged to render a formal account of his office, and the bodies before whom it was rendered were sufficiently numerous to make the responsibility direct to the people. With us there is scarce any direct responsibility at all, except to party. It is commonly believed

that under the present administration, enormous corruption has been practiced by the President and leading members of his cabinet, but who believes any one will be brought to trial and punished? There is not an election in which there are not acknowledged frauds, but who is ever accused and tried for them? And yet, one would think that in a representative democracy, if anything ought to be pure and free from fraud, it is the election of the representatives, of those who are to stand in the place of the people-in fact, to be the people. Whether we look at it historically or philosophically, we shall find that the weak point of our representative democracy, is the practical difficulties in the way of preventing public corruption, and of shielding the ballot-box from fraud. We cannot have many more Presidents chosen by fraudulent

votes.

We may also notice a difference in the basis on which the two forms of democracy have been made to rest. The Athenian democracy was the creature of the people, because the people so willed it. The American democracy has its foundations in the natural and inalienable rights of man; the one rested on force, the other rests on right, and it is one of the dark signs of the times that the doctrine of the inalienable rights of man, as man, so peculiarly American, is held in contempt by such growing numbers.

Perhaps, from the above mentioned distinction in the bases on which the two forms of democracy rest, we may explain the fact that none but Athenians could be citizens, while with us persons of foreign birth are readily admitted to this privilege, though doubtless there were other causes. At any rate, after the citizenship was established by Kleisthenes, no foreigner, however long he may have resided in the country, could become a citizen except by a vote of six thousand citizens in his favor. This would satisfy, we presume, the most bigoted "know-nothing."

It is worthy of notice, that the Athenian democracy was of but short duration. The democracy proper may be regarded as extending from the time of Kleisthenes to the battle of Charonea, from 509 to 338 B. C., one hundred and seventy

one years. But the democracies of Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and other early settled states, have already existed from two hundred to two hundred and forty years, or even more, nor is there any appearance of degeneracy. The federal union is not a necessary part of the democracies of these states; the democracies might continue, though the Union should be destroyed, though we hold that the union of the individual democracies of the country into that peculiar, individual thing which we call the General Government is as much superior to anything that ever existed in Greece, as is our representative democracy to the pure democracy of Athens. It is a little remarkable that the ingenious Greek mind never attained to the notion of a representative democracy or of a confederation of democracies under a general government, unless in respect to the latter point we except the Achean league.

ARTICLE VIII.-ORIGINAL SIN: THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

The Southern Presbyterian Review for April, 1850.

Dr.

Baird's Elohim Revealed. A Review by the Rev. J. THORNWELL, D. D.

The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review. April, 1860. Article V. The First and Second Adam; a Review of Dr. Baird's Elohim Revealed.

Ir has been a received and largely prevailing view in the Christian Church, that the descendants of Adam, at the beginning of their existence in this world, and before the exercise of personal agency, are ill-deserving. It has always been felt that, considering the nature of sin and responsibility, this fact presents a difficult problem for solution. In respect to everything congenital, are not men passive and involuntary? How, then, can they be culpable? If they have sin in them at birth, how shall the inference be avoided that God is the author of it?

We design, in the briefest manner possible, to describe the various opinions entertained on this subject, in order to exhibit to our readers the present state of the discussion. They who assume the fact of innate guilt, in the strict sense of the term, involving ill-desert, are divided as follows:

1. Those who adopt the theory of individual preëxistence. The ancient representative of this doctrine was Origen, who held that every soul fell from rectitude by an act of free-will, in an earlier state of existence; that Adam and all his posterity are incarnate souls who thus come into this world, tainted with guilt. This view is advocated by Dr. Edward Beecher, in "The Conflict of Ages." In a modified form it is held by Dr. Julius Müller, who in his work on the Doctrine of Sin— perhaps the most learned and thorough treatise upon the general subject that has ever been written-defends the notion of a "timeless" preëxistence of the individual, prior (if we may use a word that expresses time, where the relation of time is dropped