is John Stuart Mill.' In the fourth chapter of his book on Utilitarianism he reasons in the following way. "And now to decide whether this is really so; whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the absence is a pain ; we have evidently arrived at a question of fact and experience, dependent, like all similar questions, upon evidence. It can only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by observation of others. I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon ; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact: that to think of an object as desirable (except for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility." This passage has been well criticised by Dr. Sidgwick in his Methods of Ethics (Book I., chap. iv.). He says "Mill explains that 'desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, are, in strict

1 Nearly all Hedonists, however, especially egoistic Hedonists, have with more or less clearness adopted this position. For a general historical exposition of the Hedonistic point of view, the student may be referred to Lecky's History of European Morals, chap. i., and Watson's Hedonistic Theories, from Aristippus to Spencer. The chief living exponent of psychological Hedonism is Professor Bain. See his Mental and Moral Science, Book IV., chap. iv., and The Emotions and the Will, "The Will," chap. viii. Dr. Bain, however, admits that it is possible, "for moments," to aim at other things than pleasure. On the general meaning of Hedonism and its chief varieties, see below, Book II., chap. iv., §§ 1-4

ness of language, two modes of naming the same psychological fact.' If this be the case, it is hard to see how the proposition we are discussing requires to be determined by 'practised self-consciousness and self-observation ;' as the denial of it would involve a contradiction in terms. The truth is that there is an ambiguity in the word Pleasure, which has always tended seriously to confuse the discussion of this question. When we speak of a man doing something at his own 'pleasure,' or as he 'pleases,' we usually signify the mere fact of choice or preference; the mere determination of the will in a certain direction. Now, if by 'pleasant' we mean that which influences choice, exercises a certain attractive force on the will, it is an assertion incontrovertible because tautological, to say that we desire what is pleasant-or even that we desire a thing in proportion as it appears pleasant." This would mean simply that we desire it in proportion as we desire it; because "appears pleasant" means simply "is desired by us." But, as Dr. Sidgwick goes on to say, if we understand "pleasure" in a more exact sense, it is not obvious that what we desire is always pleasure. If we take pleasure to mean the agreeable feeling which attends the satisfaction of our wants, it is not by any means evident that this is always what we desire. On the contrary, it seems evident rather that this is not always what we desire.

§ 7. THE OBJECT OF DESIRE. (1) The Paradox of Hedonism. In the part of the Methods of Ethics to which reference has just been made, Dr. Sidgwick goes on to argue that in fact what we desire is very frequently some objective end, and not the accompanying pleasure. He points out that even when we do desire

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pleasure, the best way to get it is often to forget it. If we think about the pleasure itself, we are almost sure to miss it; whereas if we direct our desires towards objective ends, the pleasure comes of itself. This is not true of all pleasures. It is true chiefly of the "pleasures of pursuit." "Take, for example," says Dr. Sidgwick, "the case of any game which involves as most games do—a contest for victory. No ordinary player before entering on such a contest, has any desire for victory in it: indeed he often finds it difficult to imagine himself deriving gratification from such victory, before he has actually engaged in the competition. What he deliberately, before the game begins, desires, is not victory, but the pleasant excitement of the struggle for it; only for the full development of this pleasure a transient desire to win the game is generally indispensable. This desire, which does not exist at first, is stimulated to considerable intensity by the competition itself." A certain degree of disinterestedness seems to be necessary in order to obtain full enjoyment. A man who maintains throughout an epicurean mood, fixing his aim on his own pleasure, does not catch the full spirit of the chase; his eagerness never gets just the sharpness of edge which imparts to the pleasure its highest zest. Here comes into view what we may call the fundamental paradox of Hedonism, that the impulse towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own aim. This effect is not visible, or at any rate is scarcely visible, in the case of passive sensual pleasures. But of our active enjoyments generally . . . . it may certainly be said that

1 See the Note at the end of this chapter.

we cannot attain them, at least in their highest degree, so long as we concentrate our aim on them."

Similarly, the pleasures of thought and study can only be enjoyed in the highest degree by those who have an ardour of curiosity which carries the mind temporarily away from self and its sensations. In all kinds of Art, again, the exercise of the creative faculty is attended by intense and exquisite pleasures; but in order to get them, one must forget them." This "paradox of Hedonism," that in order to get pleasure it is necessary to seek something else, was to some extent recognized even by Mill; but he does not seem to have perceived that it is inconsistent with the view that desire is always directed towards pleasure. Desire can evidently be, at least temporarily, directed not towards pleasure, but towards certain objective ends.

§ 8. THE OBJECT OF DESIRE. (2) Wants prior to Satisfactions.—We must next notice another point, which was brought out chiefly by Butler and Hutcheson, though some subsequent writers have ignored it—viz. that many kinds of pleasure would not exist at all, if they were not preceded by certain desires for objects. Take, for instance, the pleasures of the benevolent affections. No one could possibly feel these pleasures unless he were first benevolent—i. e. had a desire for the welfare of others. In such a case, therefore, the very existence of the pleasure depends on the fact that desire is first directed towards something other than pleasure. It might even be argued that this is the case

1 See Sidgwick's History of Ethics, p. 192; and cf. Green's edition of Hume, vol. ii., Introd., p. 26, Green's Prolegomena to Ethics, § 161, p. 167, Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. ii., p. 230, note.

with all pleasures. Pleasure ensues upon the satisfaction of certain wants, and the wants must be prior to the satisfactions. We have a "disinterested" desire for food, before we can have a desire for the pleasure that accompanies the taking of food. From this consideration also it appears that there are some desires which are not desires for pleasure.

sure.

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§ 9. THE OBJECT OF DESIRE. (3) Pleasures and PleaAt the same time it must be allowed that there is a certain plausibility in Mill's statements, and we must endeavour to account for this plausibility. It seems to arise from an ambiguity in the word "pleasure." Pleasure is sometimes understood to mean agreeable feeling, or the feeling of satisfaction, and sometimes it is understood to mean an object that gives satisfaction. The hearing of music is sometimes said. to be a pleasure: but of course the hearing of music is not a feeling of satisfaction; it is an object that gives satisfaction. Generally it may be observed that when we speak of "pleasures" in the plural, or rather in the concrete, we mean objects that give satisfaction; whereas when we speak of "pleasure" in the abstract we more often mean the feeling of satisfaction which such objects bring with them. But this is not always the case.

Perhaps this distinction is more obvious in the case of pain than in the case of pleasure. Pain is generally understood as the negative of pleasure, i. e. as meaning disagreeable feeling, or feeling of dissatisfaction. But

1 A second ambiguity. Another ambiguity, pointed out by Dr. Sidgwick, has been already referred to above.

2 Cf. Dr. Ward's article on "Psychology" in the Encyclopædia Britannica, p. 71.