scribed, so utterly disgraceful to a Christian country, the remedy seems to be twofold-legislative and social.

It is the fashion now to admit the existence of what are called necessary evils, of which pawnbroking has come to be regarded as one. We have got into the way of thinking so, and once in the groove of this habit of thought, it requires some exertion to quit it, and to ascertain how much of careless indifferentism and moral obtuseness, how much practical and injurious untruth, accumulates in this verbiage. Undoubtedly to remove an evil, be it ever so offensive, in a mode which would create another and a worse, would not be a true social reform. To repress the one and to prevent the other we take to be the actual problem for our statesmen and philanthropists to solve in their respective spheres. To discourage the habit of pawning at all, and to render impracticable the system of pawning, selling, or disposing of stolen goods is what should be aimed at, and what is very possible to effect. The Bill proposed in 1856 by the justices of the eastern district of Renfrewshire having these objects in view appears so far adapted to the purpose that we think it well to give a short analysis of the principal provisions. We ought to remark that ir was proposed to apply it only to Scotland, where the evil is found to be growing intolerable.

Clause 1 provides that no broker or dealer in second-hand wares should trade without a certificate of good character from a householder and justice of the peace, and a license obtained from the magistrates.

Clause 7, that no smelting-pot be kept on the premises.

Clauses 10, 11, 12, that no business be transacted between the hours of 8 P.M. and 8 A.M., nor on a Sunday, nor with any person under fourteen years of age, nor with any person intoxicated, or any married woman known to be such by the broker unless with her husband's consent or in his presence. (The last clause would, we fear, be practically useless.)

Clauses 13, 14, 15, provide for a correct register to be kept of all transactions, that no article shall be altered, sold, or melted, for sixteen days after purchase, and that the register be at all times open to the police. If deception or evasion be practised in the case of stolen goods, the dealer to be proceeded against as receiver or resetter of stolen goods.

Clause 18. No broker to be also a publican, nor is any pawnticket to be taken in lieu of goods by a broker without a written transfer and endorsement of name.

Clause 19. In case of reasonable suspicion either broker or pawnbroker may detain the vendor.

Clause 20. License to be suspended on conviction under this Act.

Clause

Analysis of proposed Bill.

251

Clause 21 provides penalty in case of non-payment of fine in imprisonment for periods not exceeding three months.

Clause 25 provides as to the mode of prosecution which is to be at the instance of the procurator fiscal before the magistrates.

The fines for these various offences vary from 57. to 107. Each broker is to pay a fee of 2s. 6d. on obtaining his annual license. This being an almost nominal sum is evidently intended rather to bring the class effectually under the law than as a repression to the trade or award to the revenue. If these provisions did not prevent dealing in stolen goods, it is clear they would apply a very great check to the system, and it is also obvious that they have no tendency to harass or intimidate the honest dealer, or deprive him of the legitimate profits of his calling.

Another proposition is made by Mr. Macrae, which is so sensible that we recommend it to the consideration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, namely, that the tax on the pawnbroker's license should be considerably raised, and a new one of a proper proportion be imposed upon a broker's license, no broker or second-hand dealer being permitted in future to trade in Great Britain without such license. At present the pawnbroker's annual license pays in London 157., and elsewhere 77. 10s., while that for bankers is everywhere alike 307. Since the profits of the former are, as we have shown, both larger in proportion and quicker in return than the latter (ranging from 20 to 1300 per cent.), it is difficult to perceive why the inequality should any longer be allowed to exist, neither can there be alleged any good reason why pawnshops in such large and opulent places as Glasgow, population, 333,000; Manchester, population, 320,000; Liverpool, population, 375,955; Birmingham, population over 233,000, should be favoured so much more than London. To raise the tax to 257. or 30l. for pawnbrokers' licenses in all places whose population numbered 200,000, and to 127. or 157. elsewhere would make a large addition to the exchequer. A second-hand dealer similarly situated as respects abode, should pay annually 107. or 157. for his license, that license being obtained only on production of a certificate of respectability, and to be forfeited after two convictions for dealing in stolen goods. A stamp on all pawn-tickets and renewals of such tickets commencing at id. and rising to 6d. is also suggested. We think the amount here proposed so high as to defeat its own purpose. A tax of 1d. out of 6d. to Government is out of all proportion. A better plan would be that pawnbrokers should issue stamped tickets only, which should pay 1d. per dozen for all sums under 18., and increase in the same proportion for the larger sums. A pawnbroker giving an unstamped or insufficiently stamped ticket. should be liable to return the goods in question without payment. By this means the regulation would enforce itself, and we should, through

s 2

through the Government returns, gain a far more accurate knowledge of the extent of business transacted than is now possible.*

Supposing legislation were attempted in this direction there remains a large margin of work for private individuals. Government does not exist merely to bear the burden of our idleness, nor ought we to lay on the broad back of Cabinet ministers or Members of Parliament that responsibility which we are afraid or unwilling to undertake ourselves. No English Government can legislate in the teeth of the popular desire of the nation; and when it meets with, if not positive hostility, still with lukewarmness or an insincere and inconstant support, its members would be more than men if they commenced a reform for which there was no obvious desire.

Those who aim at social reform ought to urge the introduction of remedial measures, and to accord a firm and distinct expression of support to those who undertake the somewhat difficult task of repressive legislation. Space does not admit of our specifying in detail the various social remedies which are the best adapted to combat the evils of the system of pawnbroking, both in its legal and illegal branches, but we may remark, in conclusion, that the recently-proposed Post-office penny banks appear one eminently well qualified to do so.

ART. VI.-1. Statutes at Large. 2. 24 & 25 Vict. cap. 134.

An Act to amend the Law relating to Bankruptcy and Insolvency in England. 6th August, 1861.

THE

HE regulation of the conflicting interests of debtors and creditors, with justice to both parties, has perplexed the legislators of every age. In the history of Rome we find numerous illustrations of the truth of this observation. The law of Rome in ancient times gave arbitrary powers to creditors over debtors. Bonds, stripes, and imprisonment were the methods employed by creditors to enforce payment of their debts. These measures, as may be supposed, failed in their object. The debtors resented by every possible means the enforcement of the powers given by law to their creditors. Tumults frequently arose from

* In France the pawnshops or Monts de Piété are all under the direct control and care of the Legislature. A government officer is chief of the department, and exercises a decisive authority in all matters pertaining to it. In 1849 a society was formed in Paris, Œuvre du Mont de Piete, for the purpose of aiding the industrious classes by redeeming objects of pressing necessity pledged from want. But, as far as we can ascertain, the amount of good effected by its aid has been small, inasmuch as by this mode of charity, distress is relieved for the moment, but the habit of improvidence is perpetuated.

the

Roman, Anglo-Saxon, and Norman Laws.

253 the differences between debtors and creditors. The debtors complained of the harshness of their creditors, and repeatedly demanded that a law should be passed to wholly release them from their obligations. Compliance with this request, however, was never granted. On two occasions debtors were allowed to pay 'brass for silver,' or, in other words, pay only one-fourth of their debts to obtain release from their obligations. At length, by the law of cession, introduced by the Christian emperors, debtors were secured from imprisonment, and bodily punishment, on delivery of all their property to their creditors; and at a later period, debtors were even relieved from this obligation where their inability to pay their creditors was caused by accident.

Leaving, however, the laws of Rome regarding debtors and creditors, we shall now proceed to consider those of our own country. The Anglo-Saxon laws were in many respects similar to those of Rome, though there can be no doubt but that debtors were liable, in certain cases, to be reduced to a state of bondage. A well-known writer on the Anglo-Saxons, Mr. Kemble, on this subject, says: I have not found among the Anglo-Saxons any instance of slavery voluntarily incurred by the insolvent debtor, but the whole course of analogy is in favour of its existence, and Marculf supplies us with the formulary by which, among the Franks, the debtor surrendered his freedom to the creditor. It may be presumed that this servitude had a term, and that a certain period of servile labour was considered equivalent to the debt.'

The Normans did not introduce any great alteration in the relations of debtor and creditor. At length, in the reign of Edward I., a considerable change was made on the subject. By the common law no debtor could be arrested until final judgment, but by an Act passed in this reign accountants were made subject to arrest before judgment. The same provision was subsequently extended to debtors generally by a statute of Edward III. When arrested, the debtor was liable to be kept in custody unless he could give security to appear to the action. If the debtor could give no security to appear, he had to remain in custody until he appeared on the day for appearance. On appearance fresh security had to be given by the debtor to abide the judgment of the court, and if unable to do so, he was kept in custody until judgment. If the creditor obtained a verdict the debtor had to pay the amount of the judgment and costs, and if unable to do so was lodged in gaol, where he had to remain until released by the creditor unless the judgment was sooner satisfied. Such is a short outline of the mode of arrest by mesne process, which was only abolished when her present Majesty ascended the throne. Although debtors were mostly lodged in gaols, they were in many instances confined in the houses of sheriffs' officers. To these persons the detention of debtors

debtors was a mine of gold; the charges for board and lodging being most exorbitant. The position of debtors lodged in gaols was still more deplorable.

Words are insufficient to portray the abuses to which that class of debtors was subject. They had to associate in a common room with the criminals in the gaol for several hours of the day, had straw for their bedding, and the floor for a bedstead. To procure food the debtors had to depend on their own resources, those of their friends, or, in more modern times, on an allowance either from the county funds, or the detaining creditor. To the ravages of gaol fever debtors were also exposed, and of those who were attacked by the disease few survived. At length the attention of the Legislature was called to the state of the gaols, and a separation of criminals and debtors took place, the extortion of gaolers was prevented, while peace took the place of discord by gaolers being prohibited from selling strong drink to the prisoners and debtors.

In the reign of Henry VIII. we find the first instance in this country of a bankrupt law. The Act is the 34 & 35 Henry VIII., c. 4, and is entitled, An Act against such Persons as do make Bankrupts,' and applies to those who craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men's goods do suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any of their creditors their debts and duties, but at their own will and pleasures consume the substance obtained by credit of other men for their own pleasure and delicate living, against all reason, equity, and good conscience.' The chancellor, and two of the members of the privy council, or the chief justices of both benches, upon complaint in writing from the party grieved, were to take order concerning the goods of such offender, and to sell or distribute his effects, so that each creditor had a rateable portion according to his demands. Witnesses might be examined, concealment of property by the bankrupt was to be punished, while outlawry was the result of non-surrender by a bankrupt. The debtor, however, was liable, as before the Act, for all claims of the creditors which might remain unpaid after distribution of his property.

In the reign of Elizabeth traders alone became subject to the bankrupt laws. By an Act passed in the 13th year of that reign, cap. 7, Any merchant or other person using or exercising the trade of merchandise by way of bargaining, exchange, barratry, chévisance, or otherwise in gross or retail, or seeking his trade by buying and selling, and being a subject born or a denizen who shall depart the realm, begin to keep his house or otherwise absent himself or take sanctuary, or suffer himself willingly to

* This privilege has long been abolished.

be