ORDINARY MEETING, JUNE 17, 1867. THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, K.G., PRESIDENT, IN THE CHAIR. The Minutes of the previous Meeting were read and confirmed. The HONORARY SECRETARY then announced that the following members and associates had been elected, viz. :— FOUNDATION LIFE MEMBER :-Joseph Ince, Esq., Assoc. K.C.L., F.L.S., &c. &c., 26, St. George's Place, Hyde Park Corner. MEMBERS for 1867-The Rev. Charles Graham, Shepherd's Bush; The Rev. John Jennings, M.A., Canon of Westminster, Rector of St. John's, Westminster; Samuel Morley, Esq., Craven Lodge, Stamford Hill; E. B. Savile, Esq., 305, St. George's Road, S.W.; John Vanner, Esq., Eliot Vale, Blackheath; T. H. M. Walrond, Esq., H.M.C.S., 37, St. George's Road, Eccleston Square. ASSOCIATES, 2ND CLASS.-Hunter Alex. Coghlan, Esq., M.R.C.S. Lond., Army Medical Staff, Castle Hill Fort, Dover; the Rev. J. R. Pursell, M.A. Oxon, Angersholme, Fleetwood; Rev. Henry Sharpe, 31, Belsize Road, St. John's Wood. It was also announced that the following books had been presented to the Institute, viz. :— "The Inspiration of Scripture: Its Limits and Effects." By George Warington, Esq., author of "The Historic Character of the Pentateuch Vindicated," &c. &c. From the Author. "Actonian Prize Essay on the Phenomena of Radiation." By the same. From the Author. Mr. REDDIE.-I regret to say, my Lord, that I have a communication to make which will no doubt cause some disappointment to all present. Professor Kirk had fully intended to be here this evening to read his paper. He had come up from Scotland, and had been several days in England with this view. But while on a visit in Kent he was informed of the death of a very dear friend, Sir Wilfrid Lawson, and was also requested to attend the funeral, which took place to-day in a northern county. Under these unavoidable circumstances I have arranged with the learned Professor to do my best to read his paper for him, so far as time will admit of its being read, and to explain the main drift of the passages which, on account of its length, it will be necessary to leave unread. I shall endeavour to do justice to Professor Kirk's thoughtful essay, which I have carefully read through; and I have only further to express his extreme regret that he could not be with us this evening, and I beg leave to add my own regret at the cause of that absence. The following is Professor Kirk's paper, which was then partially read by the Honorary Secretary : ON THE RELATION OF METAPHYSICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE TO THE CHRISTIAN DOC- HEN we speak of Physics and of Metaphysics to ordinary men, we have reason to fear that they are sensible only of certain unintelligible sounds. If their thinking capabilities are at all brought into use, it is merely in the perception of a mist which has risen before the mind's eye. Should we expatiate technically on Psychology, or Biology, or Anthropology, launching off perhaps into ever so many other "ologies," the fog only becomes more dense and murky, till the baffled hearer becomes hopeless as to all understanding of that which is addressed to him. The simple-hearted no doubt imagine that we who use these very learned words must understand ourselves, and see all beyond the clouds and darkness which limit their view; but they often admire when, if they only knew the real state of the case, their estimate would be very seriously modified. It is in this state of ignorance and simplicity that the common mind is especially in danger from popular philosophy. There is nothing in the nature of the highest knowledge which renders such ignorance necessary, even in the most lowly of ordinary men. The facts and findings, which go to make up the Science of mind itself, are not so mysterious or incomprehensible in themselves that the intellect of the many may not embrace them. Neither are the facts and inferences, which constitute the knowledge of matter and its laws, so much beyond the common range of thought that they may not be reached by any one who can understand good plain English. It is required, we think, only that both these kinds of knowledge shall be expressed in such language. And we are strongly disposed to believe that such an embodiment of truth, in easily intelligible words, is as necessary to the real knowledge of the Philosopher as it is to those whom he would teach. As the modern mathematician makes his symbols" think for him," so we fear do some of the most noted men in other departments of Science, allow mere phrases to do the work which belongs to clear and careful thinking. By this they deceive themselves as much as they mislead others, and perhaps even more. Mr. Stuart Mill well says that "the inere forms of logic and metaphysics can blind mankind to the total absence of their substance."* This is strong language, written too by a philosopher of philosophers, and not of common men; but it is sadly true. In endeavouring, therefore, to make our consideration of this great subject really useful, I will do my best to make my meaning clear and accessible to the common mind. Not that I think this possible without some degree of earnest industry on the part of those who read that which is written, but that all who are willing to give a moderate measure of effort on their part shall enjoy the fruit of that effort in a somewhat increased possession of the truth. By Physical Science I understand that thought by which material objects are truly represented in the mind. Not, however, such thought as merely agrees with these objects as they exist in nature, but such as is known thus to agree. What are called "hypotheses" are thoughts which in some cases agree with the objects to which they are related, but so long as they are "hypothetical" they do not belong to science, properly so called, inasmuch as they are not knowledge. Reason has as yet failed to lay hold on them-they live only as conjectural notions in the imagination. I cannot help thinking that all such thoughts should be considered as alien to really scientific investigation. By Metaphysical Science I understand that true thought which represents all such objects as lie above and beyond the material. The student of pure Physics has strictly speaking no thought of mind. The student of pure Metaphysics has no thought of matter-all his reasonings are of thought itself. The student of truth takes equally earnest care to deal with all thought which stands to reason, whatever the object of * Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 61. Ed. 1866. that thought may be. His grand aim is to make sure of all thought which corresponds with that which is real, and he finds that he cannot do this without learning of matter as well as of mind, and of mind as well as of matter. To trace, then, the relations to which, in this paper, our attention is directed, we must look candidly and with deep earnestness into all thought of realities which bears upon the doctrine in question. By the Christian doctrine of prayer I mean neither more nor less in this paper than man's asking-God's giving as the consequence of that asking-and man's receiving as the consequence of that giving. The point of thought specially in view is that of GOD'S GIVING, in consequence of man's asking. Our inquiry will virtually be as to whether Metaphysical and Physical Science, in their grand results, are consistent with this idea of God's acting in direct and real consequence of man's asking. No one who knows the influence of Science on the one hand, and of real prayer on the other, will fail to see the vast importance of such a subject. It is philosophical, yet eminently practical, and even, as "divines "would say, experimental." I mean to treat it as almost, if not altogether, a subject in philosophy; yet as one of those many subjects in philosophy which necessarily thrust themselves into the domain of religion. My aim is to show, how perfectly true Science ever bears out true theology and also true life in man. In an inquiry like that on which we thus enter, it seems necessary to make as sure as may be that we understand the true nature of knowledge itself. Science is knowledge, but we need to ask what it is "to know." This is in itself a vital point in metaphysical investigation, and so forms an appropriate introduction to all that follows. The philosophical writer whom I have quoted above gives us incidentally one of his ideas on this point. Speaking of the inmost nature or essence of a thing which he argues "we cannot know," he says-" If there were such a central property, it would not answer to the idea of an 'inmost nature,' for, if knowable by any intelligence, it must, like other properties, be relative to the intelligence that knows it-that is, it must consist in impressing that intelligence in some specific way, for this is the only idea we have of knowing; the only sense in which the verb 'to know' means anything."* I must remark, with great humility, that this is far from tolerable English. "A property," we are told, "must consist" * Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 14. Ed. 1866. not in an impression, nor in a capability of impressing, but in "impressing" itself! A noun must be a verb! A quality must be an act, if not a process! And this strange property, or stranger act, is our only idea of knowing! This unmasterable confusion of words must express the only sense by which the familiar verb "to know" has any meaning! We can only guess that Mr. Mill meant to say, that an impression on the intelligence, made in some specific way, is the only meaning of knowledge. But is it so? Would not this notion of knowledge, by taking personal activity out of the idea of knowing, invert the verb "to know?" If that verb does not mean something which is mentally done by the person who is called an "intelligence," but only an impression which is made upon that person, is it not then absurd to say, as every man does when he has satisfied his reason on any point, " I know?" Warmth from an external object is simply an impression which that heated object makes upon me; speaking of that impression would it do to say "I warm" when the whole truth is that I am warmed? Or, to take a stronger instance, if pain is produced in me, that is an impression made on me as a sentient being would it do to say in such a case "I pain," when the truth is I am pained? So, if knowledge is only an impression made on me as an "intelligence," or as an intelligent being, can it be right for me to say "I know," when the truth is I am impressed? If I am only impressed, I am passive; and it must be absurd as we shall yet more fully see, to say I am active, as I doubtless do say, when I use the words "I know." This is a very important point of truth, and worthy of our best attention, when careful to see the relations both of Metaphysical and of Physical Science. We must, therefore, make as sure of it as we can. An intelligence, as already indicated, is a person. There is no such thing in being, by itself, as an intelligence which is not a person. Intelligence by itself has no existence. It is only the capability of knowledge, belonging to a being who is thus capable. An impression on such an intelligence, therefore, is an impression on such a being or person. We are acquainted with at least three kinds of impressions that are made on such a person, in regard to which we should think all are agreed. According to Locke's system of philosophy, which Mr. Mill follows closely, only two of these kinds of impressions are possible as coming directly from the external world, and neither of them is knowledge, nor are both combined that which is properly called by that name. There is one kind of impressions that are made upon the body without their affecting the senses. The patient, for |