II. Sermon eminently, of the Effects which we feel in our felves, which is the 3d Point. By formally, or eminently, I understand, That the true Cause of any Thing must contain in it self all the Perfections, which the Effect poffeffes, either in the fame, or in a higher, or more noble Kind, and Degree. Otherwise it would communicate or confer on another That which it had not it self, which is impoffible. To the Purpose. Admitting the Conceit, That an Effect can have greater Perfections than its Caufe. The Advantage or Perfection, which the Effect has beyond its Cause, Whence did it come derived? Not from its Caufe (for that is fuppofed to be without it) but from fome other Thing. And this again implies a Contradiction; for it imports, or rather makes it a Cause, and no Cause, If thefe Maxims, and felf-evident Propofitions fail us not (and if they fail us, human Reasoning is, in vain, urged about any Thing) it is fure that our own Beings yield a clear Demonftration of the Being of a God. For have we not Bodies of a moft admirable Make and Contrivance? How much Wisdom is beftowed upon them? indeed, vaftly more than we can comprehend. And again: As to our Souls, Are they not endowed with Understanding; with divers fpiritual Faculties? and, Muft not the Caufé Cause of these be a marvellously spiritual, Sermon and wife, and powerful Agent? and, What II. can this be but God? Although I take this to be as evident as any Reasoning can be, and to require no farther Profecution, yet, to raise in us a greater Scorn of atheistical Principles, I will briefly compare them with what hath been before faid. Contraries beft illuftrate one another, and the utmoft Stupidity and Nonsense sets forth Truth, and makes the cleareft Demonstration. Inftead of imputing their Beings and Endowments to a God, atheistical Men have devised three principal Things, either Chance, Nature, or the Eternity of human Generations for their Original. Some have fancied they fprung (Body and Mind) from Chance. But, What is this Thing called Chance? Has it Life, or Knowledge, or Wisdom in it? None of these. It is a blind accidental Concurrence of Caufes. What? and, Can fuch a Thing as this make the Eye, make the Ear? In fhort, make an human Body, with all its Parts, and Dependencies, and Operations? How many Things are confulted in a human Body? How many Things are fubordinated, and confpire to the fame End? and, Does Chance all this? Can That, which has no Underftanding, produce moft wife and regular Effects? Sermon Effects? Can That, which has no Life, proII. duce fuch innumerable living Things? That, which has no Reafon, produce Things endowed with fuch fublime Faculties and Talents of Reafon? It is furely a grand Shame to human Reafon, That ever fuch Stuff fhould be uttered by Creatures profeffing it, and much more, That it fhould be admired and called Philofophy, by others. The Inventers of this Talk, much better deferved Confinement, than Names, and Places of Honour, and Diftinction in the Schools. Should common Men talk at this Rate, reafon fo wildly and extravagantly in the common Affairs and Concernments of this Life; Who doubts what they would be deemed? And if this be Philofophy, Bedlam abounds with it. Let no Man think this haftily fpoken. For if meer Chance can produce fuch marvellous Things, can produce the nobleft Order and Regularity; if hence can spring human Bodies, and human Souls, rational Creatures, and Worlds; any Thing can arife out of any Thing, or, indeed, out of Nothing And it is no matter How, or What we talk, for all Difference between Senfe and Nonfenfe ceases. The Idea of Nature, which is the Atheist's fecond Refuge, is as vain and idle. For, if Nature be a Thing void of Understanding, ftanding, How can it produce the moft Sermon regular, the moft wife Effects? How, II. from it, can refult living, and rational Creatures, from a Principle void of Life, void of Reafon? It is as unequal to fuch a Work as Chance, and but another blind, and obfcure Term, introduced to make the World, and all Things in it, of which the Afferter has no precife Meaning, or Underftanding. For let him fay, that his Nature has Understanding, or not. If no Underftanding, he hath dictated a notable Principle of the Original of Mankind: If it has Understanding, his Nature is but another Word for God. Modern Atheifts are ashamed of both these, and therefore a third Way better pleases them. And that is, Seeing it is fo difficult to account for the Beginning and Original of Mankind without a God, they boldly affirm it had no Beginning, no Original at all. Or, in other Words, they would fain fancy that one Man hath proceeded from another everlaftingly, and that there was never any firft Man, never any Man that came into the World in an extraordinary Way, but one Man from another, as we fee they do now, and that from Eternity. But the Abfurdity and Contradiction of this is no less evident: For, 1. There Sermon II. 1. There is no adequate and proper Caufe of Mankind affigned. One Man proceeded from another. It is true. And fo does one Brute from another. But, How is this? Did my Father, for Example, defign, arange the feveral Parts of my Body? Did he contrive the Organs of my Senfes, of my Sight, and Hearing, &c? nothing lefs. Inftead of it, perhaps he knew little of this, very little of my Compofition and Frame. How could he then be the Cause of it? An inftrumental Caufe he might be, that is, fuch a Cause, as a Tool is in the Hand of an Artist; he might be ufed and guided to wife Purposes, of which he knew nothing himself, but a proper, a principal, and adequate Caufe he could never be, because he defigned not, framed not, yea, knew not his own Work; which fhews, that he had a Supervisor, a Director, which defigned, laid out the Parts of Man's Body, and in the Virtue of which it was made and framed. 2. The Afferters of an endless, and infinite Succeffion of Men, like not the other Hypothefis, that noble Philofophy, of Men's Springing at firft up out of the Ground, without any wife or fuper-intending Caufe; and, indeed, Who can blame them? For this is ftrange Philofophy indeed; there fore |