Louis's violent letter.

of Lavardin, who proceeded to Rome as French ambassador in November, 1687, was instructed to disregard the Pope's abrogation of the ambassadorial franchise, although a bull of excommunication had been launched against all who should neglect it. Lavardin entered Rome at the head of near a thousand armed men; but Innocent refused to receive him, and placed the French church of St. Louis, which the ambassador was accustomed to attend, under an interdict. The matter was taken up by the Parliament of Paris. Several members, and especially De Harlai, the Procureur-général, and Talon, the Avocat-général, inveighed vehemently against the Pope, and appealed to a future Council. The Parliament passed an Arrêt (January, 1688), that the King should be supplicated to assemble Provincial Councils, or a National Council, in order to put an end to the disorder created by the vacancy of bishoprics (through the Régale); and that all commerce with Rome, and the remitting of money thither, should be forbidden.

These quarrels show how near France was to an absolute separation from Rome. Louis's rage and disappointment are shown in a violent letter which he addressed to the Pope (September 6th), through the Cardinal d'Estrées, with orders to communicate it to Innocent and the Consistory. In this letter, which may almost be regarded as a declaration of the war he was meditating, he declared that he had lost all hope of reawakening in Innocent the feelings of the common father of Christendom, or to obtain any justice at his hands; and he intimated that the Pope's conduct would probably cause a general war in Europe. He declared that he could no longer recognize Innocent as mediator in the affair of the Palatine succession, and that he should take care to obtain justice by the means which God had placed in his hands. He further announced that he should continue to assist the Cardinal Von Fürstenberg; and that if his ally, the Duke of Parma, was not immediately put in possession of the Duchies of Castro and Ronciglione, withheld from him by the Holy See since the Treaty of Pisa, the French troops would enter Italy and Avignon would be seized.' This last threat was carried into execution in October.

1 Lettre de Louis XIV. au Cardinal d'Estrées, in Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 167; Burnet, Own Times, vol. i. p. 759.

excommu

Innocent XI. replied by proclaiming Clement of Bavaria French Archbishop of Cologne, and by excommunicating the Parlia- Parliament ment of Paris and the Advocate-General Talon. Louis, on nicated. his side, followed up his philippic against the Pope by the declaration of war against the Emperor already mentioned. For some weeks the French troops had been marching from Flanders towards the eastern frontier. One division, ostensibly commanded by the Dauphin, but in reality by Marshal de Duras and Vauban, laid siege to Philippsburg early in October; another smaller corps, under Boufflers, occupied, almost without resistance, Kaiserslautern, Neustadt, Kreutznach, Worms, Oppenheim, Bingen, Bacharach-in short, almost all the possessions of the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Mainz on the left bank of the Rhine. The latter admitted the French into his capital on condition that the neutrality of his dominions beyond the Rhine should be respected.

blunder.

The joy of the Dutch Stadholder was boundless when he Louis's learnt that the French King had irrevocably committed himself to a policy which insured the success of the Stadholder's designs upon England, and would enable him at no distant period to add the might of that country to the already formidable coalition against France. Louis, unfortunately for himself, listened to the counsels of Louvois instead of those of D'Avaux. The latter had advised him to menace the Dutch frontier, and thus keep William at home. Louvois, on the other hand, represented that unless a diversion were made by an attack upon the Empire, the Turks, humiliated by their defeats, and threatened with the loss even of Belgrade, their frontier town, would be compelled to submit to whatsoever conditions the Emperor might be pleased to impose upon them, and would thus enable him to concentrate all his forces against France. This advice coincided with the policy, long pursued by Louis, of enriching himself at the expense of the Empire; whose frontiers, but slightly guarded, seemed to offer an easy conquest. Considerations of a personal nature had also, perhaps, some influence on the decision of the French King. He had to gratify his own pride, which had received a wound in the affair of Cologne; and he was, perhaps, also not unwilling to mortify the pride of the King of England. The blindness and infatuation of James II. in this crisis of his fortunes almost surpasses belief. Ever since

Pride and

James II.

the end of May Louis had been warning James that his sonstupidity of in-law was meditating a descent upon England. William had formed, near Nimeguen, a camp of 20,000 men; he was notoriously preparing large quantities of arms and warlike stores; the Dutch fleet had been put in preparation to sail at a few days' notice. James, however, refused to believe that these preparations were directed against himself, and listened to the assurances of William that they were occasioned by the state of affairs on the Continent. Another notion, that the States-General would not permit the departure of a force which was necessary for the defence of the Republic, was better founded. William himself had assured the States that such was the motive for his preparations. Nevertheless, had James had the least discernment, he must have perceived, from the state of feeling among his subjects, that it was not a moment to reject the aid of France. Louis, who wished to save James in spite of himself, instructed D'Avaux, his minister at the Hague, to signify to the States-General, early in September, that he should consider any act of hostility against his ally, the King of England, as a declaration of war against himself; at the same time preparations were made to march a force to the Dutch frontier, and Bonrepaux was despatched to England with offers of naval aid. But James, who had formerly been the pensioner of Louis, now indignantly disclaimed any alliance with him, thus giving him the lie in the face of Europe; and Skelton, the English ambassador at Paris, who had been privy to these steps on the part of the French Court, was recalled and committed to the Tower. James was seized with an unseasonable fit of pride, and exclaimed that a King of England needed not, like an Archbishop of Cologne, the patronage of any sovereign. The French King would have acted more wisely by overlooking James's folly, and listening only to the dictates of policy. Probably, however, Louis did not anticipate that the Stadholder would have achieved so speedy and triumphant a success. He might reasonably have expected that James would have been able to make a better stand; that a civil war would have ensued, which, for a year or two at least, might have found employment for all William's resources, and in which he might have been ultimately baffled by the help of a moderate French force. But when the crisis actually came, James himself took a juster view of his

position. No sooner were the French troops withdrawn from Flanders than his desolate situation at once stared him in the face; and especially when Louis, in his declaration of war against the Emperor, intimated that he meant to observe the peace with Holland, as well as the twenty years' truce with Spain. James, in his despair, now almost went the length of declaring war against France. He assured the States that he had no alliance with that nation; that he regarded the siege of Philippsburg as a breach of the Truce of Ratisbon; that he was ready to join Spain and the States in maintaining the peace of Europe. But the States listened in preference to William, who opened to them his intended expedition, and persuaded them that the safety and independence of their religion and country were involved in its success; and, in their answer to James, instead of entering into his proposal concerning the peace of Europe, they intimated their desire to restore peace and confidence in England, by securing the civil and religious rights of his subjects. William hastened on his preparations, and on November 1st, 1688, he finally sailed with his fleet to seize the Crown of England. The Spanish ambassador at the Hague caused a grand mass to be performed for his success. In the same year of the preceding century Spain had fitted out the Armada, in order to wrest the English sceptre from the hands of a heretic sovereign and compel the nation to accept the Papal authority. Now she was favouring and abetting the attempt of a Calvinist Prince to expel a Roman Catholic King, and thus to consolidate the civil and religious liberties of England.

2

1

becomes

1688-89.

William landed at Torbay on November 5th, the anni- WilliamIII. versary of the Popish plot; on December 18th he was at St. King of James's, his march having been interrupted only by one or England, two trifling skirmishes. Meanwhile James had fled. On December 28th the fugitive monarch arrived at St. Germains, and found in Louis XIV., whom he had rejected as an ally, a generous protector. On February 13th, 1689, William and his wife Mary solemnly accepted the English Crown, the Parliament having previously voted (January 23rd) that James, by withdrawing himself out of the kingdom, had abdicated

1

Kennet, Hist. of Engl., vol. iii. p. 489 sq.; Macaulay, vol. ii. ch. 9.
D'Avaux, ap. Lingard, vol. x. p. 337, note.

William de clares War against France.

the government, and that the throne was thereby vacant. In Scotland the authority of the new King was established after a slight attempt at resistance; Ireland, from the religion of the people, was naturally more favourable to James's cause, and it was here that, with French aid, he was enabled for a year or two to dispute the ground with William. On March 12th, 1689, James, escorted by a large French fleet, and accompanied by some 1,200 of his own soldiers, paid by France, landed at Kinsale; the Irish flocked to his standards, and he soon found himself at the head of a large, but illarmed and ill-disciplined force. This hostile act on the part of Louis caused William, as King of England, to declare war against France, May 17th, 1689.' The Irish campaign of that year was indecisive. James was held in check by the Irish Protestants, and particularly by the heroic defence of Londonderry; and by the landing of Marshal Schomberg, at the head of 10,000 men (August), he was compelled to retire into winter quarters. That celebrated general, who was a Protestant, had renounced the service of Louis upon the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and, after a short residence in Brandenburg, had entered that of William, along with many other French refugees. In the campaign of the following year (1690) William opposed his father-in-law in person, and completely defeated him at the battle of the Boyne (July 1st). Schomberg fell in this engagement, while animating his Huguenot troops to avenge themselves on their persecutors. James again escaped to France, and became a pensioner on Louis's bounty. In the same year a naval engagement took place off Beachy Head, between the French fleet, under Tourville, and the combined English and Dutch fleets, under the Earl of Torrington (June 30th). Victory remained with the French, who, however, neglected to pursue their advantage, except by the burning of Teignmouth. In 1691 William proceeded into Holland, to take part in the campaign against the French; but the Irish were reduced to obedience by his forces under General Ginkell. They obtained a favourable peace by the treaty called the Pacification of Limerick (October 3rd), and William was thus enabled to devote his whole attention to the affairs of the Continent, to which we must now return.

1 Dumont, t. vii. pt. ii. p. 230