by the superinduction of our direct administration. At present there is nothing to warrant a hope of the former process; and, from the latter, we are withheld by dread of the consequences. Interference in their internal administration, whether resisted or acquiesced in by the Prince, leads to the gradual introduction of our direct rule, and, consequently, to the removal of some of those grounds of disunion among the natives, on which we place the greatest reliance. When all were struck down to the same level, and no distinctions of party remained but a few foreign masters on one hand, and a hundred millions of native subjects on the other, combined efforts on the part of the latter would assuredly be more feasible and dangerous. If we do not interfere we openly connive at, and share the guilt of oppression. From this dilemma the anti-colonial party do not pretend to discover any means of escape. The latter, however, they consider the least evil of the two; and Sir John Malcolm uses arguments to show that we may not only avoid the responsibility and discredit of mal-administration, but "shall "have credit, in the general opinion, for all the

good measures which the state under our pro"tection adopts, and our reputation will be "benefited (from the comparisons that are

"drawn) even by its acts of folly and in"justice." So that whether its acts were just or unjust, wise or foolish, this double advantage may be obtained by the political agent's simply giving to the control exercised by him

a large and liberal character," that is, never interposing where the folly of the protected Prince spent itself in vexing his own subjects. But if those subjects gave the British Government credit for all good measures, must they not conclude that its influence might be applied as efficaciously in the prevention of bad measures, especially as its protection secured the Prince against the danger of insurrection? This consequence is admitted to have followed from the oppressive administration of the Nizam's Dewan Chundoo Lol. "The good name of the British "nation suffered," says Sir John Malcolm, (referring to a time when Lord Minto considered himself restrained by his instructions from making any attempt to correct the abuses which prevailed,)" for it was said, and with justice, that "our support of the actual administration freed "the minister and his executive officers from "those salutary fears which act as a restraint upon the most despotic rulers."

So unequal do we seem to feel to the task of correcting the vicious governments of Luck

now and Hydrabad, so anxious to evade the fulfilment of acknowledged duties, that the records of Indian diplomacy do not contain more remarkable instances of overstrained and unsound argumentation than have been employed to justify non-interference with each of those governments. By the 6th article of the Treaty with the Nuwaub Vizier, of November 10, 1801, "His

Excellency engages that he will establish "such a system of administration (to be carried "into effect by his own officers) as shall be con"ducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be "calculated to secure the lives and prosperity "of the inhabitants; and his Excellency will

always advise with, and act in conformity to, "the counsel of the officers of the said Honour"able Company." Many years passed without the British Government making any serious efforts to procure the execution of this article. In 1811, a tedious negotiation was entered into, in the course of which it appeared to the Resident" that the Vizier's repugnance to reform "had been chiefly to the principle, not the plan ❝or the details, of the system proposed to him, "and that the exercise of justice and moderation "in the settlement and collection of his revenues,

especially as influenced by our advice, has "been the object of His Excellency's aversion,

more than any particular system or plan." In attempting to overcome this repugnance, the Resident threatened to withhold the aid of British troops to support the exactions of the Vizier's revenue officers, whenever he should not be satisfied of the justice of the demand; but, in a despatch, dated June 28, 1811, so expressed himself as if he had menaced the refusal of such aid to coerce defaulting Zemindars in every instance; and, in a letter, dated July 6, 1811, the Chief Secretary discusses and denies the right of the British Government to use that or any other measure of compulsion, to enforce the Vizier's acceptance of propositions founded on the 6th article of the Treaty. "In the first place," he observes," stipulations such as are contained " in the Treaty cannot possibly be rendered so specific and precise as not to admit of some "latitude of construction, or to preclude an " eventual opposition between their spirit and "their letter for instance, the combination of "the two stipulations above cited (from the 6th "article of the Treaty) could not justly be inter"preted to impose on the Vizier an obligation

absolutely and implicitly to accede to whatever "plan of reform the British Government might advise, however adverse to his interests or his prejudices; nor the second of those clauses, to

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require him, in every concern of his government, to follow indiscriminately every counsel, "however injurious or repugnant to his feelings, "that either wisdom or error might suggest on "the part of the British Government, under the "penalty of his forfeiting his claim to the ful"filment of our part of the stipulations of the

treaty." Now, who is to judge, if plans “cal"culated to secure the lives and property of the "inhabitants" of Oude may be considered so adverse to the interests, prejudices, and feelings of the Vizier, as to justify his resistance to their adoption? If the Vizier is to judge, the article is nugatory; but the Vizier has expressly renounced any such pretension, and engaged" al

respon

ways to advise with, and act in conformity to, "the counsel of the officers of the said Honour"able Company." The Vizier, therefore, did bind himself to accede to whatever plan of reform the Governor General (acting under sibility to the Board of Control and the British Parliament) might advise. In former treaties with the Vizier it had been stipulated that he should pay a certain subsidy for the maintenance of a certain number of British troops for the defence of his territory; and, also, that he should

defray the expense of any augmentation of force which, on any future occasion, should be judged