in the summer of 1806, it seemed for a time that Armstrong was to solve the Florida problem. While Napoleon was absent in the campaign of Austerlitz, Talleyrand conducted the Foreign Office with greater independence than had lately been his wont. And it accorded with Talleyrand's own sentiments and the embarrassments of Marbois at the Treasury to further a negotiation whereby France or at any rate French officials stood to gain somewhat by the "Two Million Bill" so hotly fought by Randolph.

Armstrong was soon gratified to learn therefore that the French agent at Madrid had overcome Godoy's reluctance to a reconciliation with America, and that Florida would no longer be an obstacle. The Florida tangle seemed on the highroad to solution and Armstrong had every reason for rejoicing, when suddenly the wind veered. Napoleon was on the scene once more, and he had other plans. Talleyrand himself was mystified. The French agent at Madrid received a reprimand instead of the praise he merited and anticipated. Marbois was removed from office. Armstrong perceived that a great change in policy was projected. But he gleaned little information when those who stood nearest to the Emperor could not divine his purposes.1

11

The secret remained locked in the bosom of Napoleon until the autumn of 1806. On October 14th he crushed the Prussians at Jena. Thirteen days later he entered Berlin. His mastery of the continent was now as complete as British mastery of the seas. Land and water faced each other for a deadly combat. On November 21st, from the capital of his defeated foe, Napoleon hurled his thunderbolt. England was blockaded. Neutrals might no longer trade with her. While launching such a blow at neutrals, of whom America was chief, it is not surprising that Napoleon should have felt no interest in America's own problem of Florida. The decree affected America directly. Also indirectly it affected us by modifying British policy toward foe and neutral too. The Berlin Decree therefore came within the purview of Monroe and Pinkney.

11 Ibid. III, 370-391.

12

The liberal views of Charles James Fox, premier since the death of Pitt, augured success for the negotiations.' But in England the personal equation was less decisive than in France. There everything gave way to the inscrutable plans of Napoleon, whereas in England vested interests lent a permanence to politics which was not favorable to sudden shifts.

The influence of English merchants prevented Fox from issuing an Order in Council releasing American commerce from its previous fetters. He did, however, go so far as to substitute for the restrictions on West Indian trade a blockade of French ports. Ostensibly this blockade extended from Brest to the mouth of the Elbe. But its strict enforcement extended only from the mouth of the Seine to Ostend. The blockade was thus, in so far as it extended beyond Ostend, an affair of paper, and subject to as numerous objections, practical or theoretical, as was the Rule of 1756.13

Although the intentions of Fox were pacific, no minister in the existing temper of his countrymen could have accepted the instructions conveyed to Monroe and Pinkney as the basis for a treaty, and have retained his office or his life. Memories of the heroic Nelson, pride in Trafalgar and its fresh mandate to control the seas, were ingrained too deeply in the nation's heart to tolerate even for a moment a thought of injury to the navy. Yet Monroe and Pinkney were told to make an ultimatum of impressments, an odious practice, but one without which the line of battleships, Great Britain's wall against Napoleon, could not remain afloat. Two other ultimata followed. England must make compensation for the shipping seized under the Essex decision, a retroactive measure, when the best real hope lay in the simple discontinuance of further seizures. Finally Jefferson demanded that the trade with the Indies, only partially conceded by the Jay Treaty, and subsequently hampered, must be henceforth unrestricted.14

12 The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition, X, 168, 171, 172. 13 Adams, Henry, Op. Cit. III, 398.

14 Ibid. III, 400-409.

No one knew better than Monroe himself the impossibility of procuring such a treaty. Defeat in war could scarcely wring such terms from England, and it was fully known that Jefferson did not even dream of war. So impossible was his situation that Monroe might easily be pardoned for treating it as a conspiracy against himself. The appointment of Pinkney was bad enough; the terms demanded were still worse. Failure was inevitable and with it further impairment to a reputation already damaged by ill luck at Paris and Madrid. Even in the remote contingency of success, the credit must be shared with Pinkney. Altogether the minister's faith in his friend Jefferson was severely tested.

Hopes faint as these were not increased by the illness of the well-disposed premier. Soon diagnosed as dropsy, it presaged the end. But bent on some accommodation with America, the dying minister intrusted the negotiation to his favorite nephew, Lord Holland, who approached his task in the spirit of his uncle. Intentions the most amiable could not charm away impossibilities. No treaty could have been drawn up which took account of Jefferson's instructions. Nor is it likely that Jefferson expected one. In times so troubled, it was needful to assert one's rights even in the face of their denial. To abate these demands by compromises in a treaty, was to set a precedent for future aggressions. Better, then, no treaty. Nevertheless Monroe, failing to appreciate this circumstance, went ahead with his negotiations and did produce a treaty.

The document to which Monroe and Pinkney set their hand was unique in our diplomatic history. No other treaty was ever negotiated by Americans in such flagrant disregard of their instructions. Impressment was ignored entirely. Compensation for past seizures went by the board. On only one of Jefferson's three ultimata was some concession yielded. Minor impediments to the West India trade were withdrawn. A treaty so constructed was as unlikely of acceptance in America, as its original terms had been in England. And to make the matter worse, the British signers of the treaty appended a note of explanation that the agree

ment was of no effect and void unless America should take active measures against the aggressions of Napoleon.'

15

With what from the American point of view was indecent haste, the new government in England which followed upon the death of Fox, the "Ministry of All the Talents" as it was called from the opposing elements merged in its membership, in advance of any possible opportunity to learn American intentions, issued the Orders in Council of January 7, 1807. Intended as retaliation for the Berlin Decree, they placed French commerce under a blockade and forbade neutrals to trade from any port to another under Napoleon's jurisdiction. One breach of international law deserved another. In the midst of arms the laws are silent. America's appeal to abstract principles was not backed up by force.

Meanwhile the treaty arrived in America, and Jefferson the instant he examined it perceived its inacceptability. He rejected it then and there, not a little offending the Senate by refusing even to submit it to them. Impressment was a sine qua non. Without its abrogation, he declared, no treaty could be thought of.16

What to do next was far from clear. Jefferson did not consider the season opportune for fresh negotiations. He preferred a tacit understanding with England that the worst abuses should be abated, while he for his part postponed enforcement of the non-importation act. Madison, nevertheless, attempted to revise Monroe's instructions so as to afford the two negotiators the working basis for a treaty. The task was complicated. The closer the existing treaty was examined, the graver its mistakes appeared. Monroe himself must be propitiated. His impossible assignment and the instantaneous rejection of his work were calculated to offend not only the negotiator, but the numerous and respectable body of his fellow countrymen who favored Monroe for

15 Jefferson's objections to the treaty are stated with moderation in his Works, Federal Edition, XI, 374-377.

16 McMaster, John Bach, A History of the People of the United States, III, 252.

the Presidency in 1809.17 Jefferson did not mince words in telling Monroe the reasons for rejecting his treaty. At the same time he omitted no opportunity to assure the minister of his personal affection, and to warn him at his distant post to be wary in his dealings with those friends at home who might even yet embarrass him. Such was the situation when an incident occurred to change completely the aspect of affairs, and if Jefferson by any possibility could have been goaded into such a course, to have precipitated war.

THE "CHESAPEAKE" AFFAIR

The incident is known as the Chesapeake Affair of June, 1807. The Chesapeake was an American frigate outward bound from Hampton Roads on a three-year cruise. Among her crew were four deserters from British ships, three of whom were American citizens, however, and only one a British subject. The British ship Leopard came within signaling distance, and dispatched a lieutenant to demand of Commodore Barron, commander of the Chesapeake, inspection of his crew by British officers and surrender of the deserters. The Commodore refused. Thereupon, without giving him time to defend his ship, the Leopard opened fire and within fifteen minutes put the Chesapeake out of commission. Barron then surrendered, the deserters were removed, and the Chesapeake limped back to Norfolk.18

Here was a humiliation which even Federalists, friends of England though they were and enemies of Jefferson, could understand. Previous injuries had been an affair for merchants and their crews. America could not unite to protect her foreign commerce. But here was an insult to the flag which like nothing else since 1776 touched the patriotism. of every citizen. For a moment, the country was united, and Jefferson could have led it into war.

17 Monroe's partisans, the “Quids” as they were called, were almost a separate political party. Their strength was in the hill country of the South.

18 The incident is well described in Jefferson's own proclamation regarding it. Works, X, 441-444,