negotiating so favorable a treaty with Great Britain as to compel the United States to annexation in order to preserve Southern loyalty. Failing annexation-and Texan leaders saw how sharply North and South divided on the subject-it was hoped to detach the South from the Federal Union, and to create out of the Southern states, Texas, and Mexico, to be duly conquered, a new empire, "the greatest nation upon earth." At the same time realists perceived that annexation to the existing union was more to be de sired.38 With hearts so fixed upon their object, the Texans watched the play of politics in the United States with fascinated interest. The possibility that Daniel Webster might be a Presidential candidate seemed to Texans of good augury, as likely to insure for them "the warm and unanimous support of the whole south." 39 The South was the one sure friend, on every score to be conciliated, but something might perhaps be done to propitiate the North as well. In July, 1837, the Texan minister entered into negotiations looking toward joint action between his government and the United States for the suppression of the slave trade from Africa to Texas by way of Cuba.10 To this Forsyth, Jackson's fourth and last Secretary of State, whom Van Buren continued in the State Department, made favorable response, announcing the proposed establishment of a military outpost on the Sabine, and the coöperation of the navy in suppressing the nefarious traffic.* 41 When it became apparent near the outset of Van Buren's term that he no more than Jackson favored annexation, the Texans were discouraged. Foreseeing the doom of the American Union as well as that of Texas, should secession attend upon failure to annex, the Texan envoy proposed to go over Van Buren's head, and deal direct with Congress, a mad scheme, the proof and product of despair.* 42 38 "Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas," Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept., 1907, vol. II, pp. 208-211. 39 Ibid. 239. 40 Ibid. 248-249. 41 Ibid. 249. 42 Ibid. 254. Though subordinate to annexation, the boundary was a further subject of negotiation. The Texans contended for the Sabine as expressly guaranteed by the Treaty of 1819; Forsyth claimed to the Neches. Control of Indian tribes was another object of diplomacy. Moreover, Texas had as great an interest in our Mexican relations as though she were a member of the Union. So long as there was hope of friendly settlement on these points, particularly on annexation, the minister to Washington thought a treaty between Texas and Great Britain inadvisable, for it would complicate his country's foreign policies and to that extent endanger its admission to the Union. Furthermore, as between Great Britain and the United States, the latter was the more desirable, for "Domestic Slavery in the United States and Texas, must, from various circumstances, stand or fall together." 943 Drifting without an anchor, Texas could not fail to interest the European nations. In 1839 friendly overtures were made by France, where recognition waited only on the action of Great Britain, which for the moment was delayed by difficulties in Canada. French recognition, it was thought, would insure a loan from Biddle, the great American financier. During 1838 and 1839 the correspondence of Texan ministers suggests a deep regard for the United States. But before Van Buren's term was over, this sentiment had veered. This altered feeling led to an approach to Spain. for a commercial treaty between Texas and Cuba. It was pointed out that Cuba might obtain the Texan market "now supplied principally through the United States." " Also the Santa Fé trade now routed through Missouri might be diverted to Texan ports with profit to both Cuba and herself. Finally, if the two regions possessed no other common bond, slavery would alone suffice, "both regarding with extreme regret, the spirit of fanaticism abroad in certain portions of the world." 45 43 "Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas," Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept., 1907, vol. II, 316-317. 45 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 482. Four years had witnessed, then, a great decline in friendliness. The Jackson policy as continued by Van Buren had run its course. New times demanded other methods. Nor did a neutral policy which cost the President so many Southern friends prove more popular at the North, where Canada was its object. Posterity marvels, in face of the proofs Van Buren gave of self-restraint and courage and desire for fair dealing among the nations, that he was rated by so many of his contemporaries as a politician without a conscience. Their estimate proceeded, doubtless, from personal antagonisms rather than objective balancing of facts. AMERICA'S NEUTRALITY IS MENACED Parallel with Texas and its problems, there arose one of the gravest crises in the history of American neutrality. Canada was in uproar, and the echoes reverberated along our entire northern border. The government of both Upper and Lower Canada was vested in a governor, a council of his own appointment, and a legislative body elected by the people. A popular demand arose in Lower Canada for an elective council. It was denied. A deadlock followed. The costs of government continued, but necessary taxes were not voted. In April, 1837, Lord John Russell, liberal at home but reactionary toward Canada, obtained the sanction of the British Parliament to apply against the accumulated deficit certain funds in the possession of the Receiver General of Lower Canada. Here was an egregious case of the taxation which drove America to revolution. Insurrection broke out in November, 1837, but was suppressed. In Upper Canada, the tactless governor was responsible for a widespread feeling that reform within was permanently blocked. News from Montreal inflamed the discontent. But the outbreak was speedily extinguished. It was then that America became a factor. Refugees pouring over the border called forth intense enthusiasm and sympathy. William Lyon Mackenzie, a ringleader in the Canadian revolt, was in fact a citizen of the United States. On December 12th he made an incendiary speech at Buffalo, and shortly afterward seized Navy Island in the Niagara, setting up a government with flag, and seal, paper currency, and an army of several hundred men. Such action fired the Canadian militia. On December 29th a body of them crossed to Navy Island in the hope of capturing the Caroline, a vessel which Mackenzie had equipped. Not finding it at the Island, they pushed across to the American shore where they killed several of the crew and set the Caroline adrift. Provocation was considerable, but the act was rash, and led to trouble. 46 Van Buren was compelled to action. On January 5, 1838, he proclaimed a rigid enforcement of neutrality, at the same time sending General Winfield Scott to the border, and demanding authority from Congress to seize and punish offenders. William L. Marcy, the Governor of New York, upheld the administration by calling out militia. Eight days later the insurgents surrendered their island. A lesser movement centering in Detroit subsided presently and by autumn the affair was over. Her lesson learned, Great Britain set about correcting the abuses. Lord Durham came out to Canada on a mission of inspection. His recommendations later brought about a new relation between the mother country and her Canadian provinces. For America the immediate sequel was the trial and imprisonment of Mackenzie. Van Buren upheld the court's decision, thereby making for himself an inveterate and treacherous enemy, and forfeiting the votes of that enemy's numerous adherents, for the frontier mind could scarcely comprehend an honorable neutrality. Base truckling to the British crown was the only explanation possible when a good American was punished for so virtuous an act. The correct view was, undoubtedly, Van Buren's. "There being no pretense that he was innocent of the charge and having reason to apprehend that his pardon would obstruct pending negotiations between us and Great Britain, I refused to interfere in the matter until after he had been 46 Richardson, James D., Messages and Papers of the Presidents, III, 399-400. in confinement for nearly two-thirds of the time for which he was sentenced when I remitted the residue of the term. On another issue with Great Britain, now grown chronic, final action was postponed. In the uncertainty of boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, the timber on disputed areas was liable to destruction. Rival loggers maintained a well-nigh open warfare. There was little hope of peace until the line should be adjusted. Pending such a settlement, the President favored compromise. He approved a legal process by civilians in protecting property threatened with destruction, but, barring an armed invasion from New Brunswick, he opposed all military action and announced his intention to resubmit the issue to arbitration. It was hoped that such a move would result in a more definitive award than the Dutch King had proclaimed. Congress, catching the fever of the frontier, meanwhile, voted credits for $10,000,000 and authorized a call for 50,000 volunteers. But Van Buren persisted in his peaceful course and paid the price in 1840 when the patriots of Maine cast their votes against a candidate they regarded as so pusillanimous. To sum up the policies of Jackson and his amiable successor, peace with England was an object from the West Indies treaty to the punishment of Mackenzie and the restraint of northern lumbermen. The difficulties with France so admirably arranged by Jackson were not renewed, though French designs on Texas were viewed with a certain apprehension. Mexico, toward whom Jackson maintained neutrality with unusual self-control, overtaxed his patience at the end, and figured largely in the calculations, but not the actions, of Van Buren. Neutrality, the key-note of Van Buren, was maintained toward Texas with results of doubtful value; toward Great Britain, with much credit to the integrity and good judgment of the President, but at heavy cost to his popularity. In the field of diplomacy the administration of Van Buren might well be termed an "era of good feeling." It marked the close of an epoch. It was in fact a period of liquidation. 47 The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, p. 538. |