ment, its last effective application having been the expulsion of Napoleon III from Mexico.

American merchant vessels encountered obstacles in landing at Rio de Janeiro. On complaint by Isador Strauss of New York concerning one of these, Gresham replied: "I can say to you in confidence, that should European powers attempt to reëstablish the monarchy in Brazil the Monroe Doctrine will not only be asserted by the administration but maintained." 18 Nor was the government content with words. Thomas F. Bayard, Cleveland's former Secretary of State, now minister to London, made active representations to the British Government against support for the insurgents. And Sir Julian Pauncefote, British minister at Washington, was persuaded to announce that British ships would give no aid to the Brazilian navy. To leave no doubt concerning America's own position, an admiral who had saluted the insurgent flag was summarily recalled and in his place Admiral Benham with a flagship and three modern cruisers was sent in January, 1894, to the scene of the disturbances.

The presence of American warships produced a naval crisis in Brazil and a diplomatic crisis in Washington. The Amy, of Baltimore, had a cargo of flour which was spoiling in the tropic climate and required immediate landing. The insurgents would not grant a permit. On January 18, 1894, Admiral Benham notified the Brazilian Admiral Da Gama that he proposed to convoy the Amy to the wharf and to sink any vessel offering interference. Moreover any captives he would treat as pirates, which under the law of nations was their actual status, their belligerency having not been recognized. Next day he carried out his threat. Da Gama fired one shot, a blank. Benham replied with a solid shot. Da Gama surrendered. The rebellion was ended. It was the last attempt to restore a monarchy in the Western Hemisphere.

The episode had a striking aftermath. The Brazilian minister informed Gresham that his government believed that 18 Gresham, Matilda, Op. Cit. II, 778.

Admiral Da Gama was to find a refuge on a British warship. The rumor suggested international complications. These were confirmed by cablegram from Rio de Janeiro that Da Gama was actually on board the British flagship. Dead of night though it was, Gresham and his secretary, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, drove post haste to the British embassy, awakened the entire household, and got results. On the minister's inquiry as to why he was thus honored and at such an hour, Gresham told him, "Sir Julian, I have word from Brazil that your flagship has taken Da Gama aboard. Of course that is not true. You and I know it is not true, but I must be able to tell the President and Cabinet when we meet this morning that it is not true. Good morning, Sir Julian." When the Cabinet did meet it really was not true. Sir Julian cabled London. London cabled Rio. Da Gama was restored to his own ship and to the consequences of a rebellion that had failed.19

MINOR ISSUES

On another issue with Great Britain arising at this time, American relations were more accommodating. In an altercation between Great Britain and Nicaragua, the United States upheld the independence of the latter. But on the outbreak of a revolution in that impulsive land, which drove both British and Americans from the zone of trouble, the two made common cause. Our government remonstrated effectually and Americans were permitted to return. The British were less fortunate and for a time war appeared a possibility. A question thus arose as to the extent of our interest and responsibility for safeguarding Latin nations from the consequence of folly. Blaine's doctrine of our natural protectorate would naturally have involved the United States in any dispute which might arise between Latin-America and Europe. The position assumed by Gresham in the present case was the right of other nations to enforce their Latin-American claims just as they would others even to the temporary occupation of territory, pro19 Ibid. II, 779-781.

viding it was not made permanent. If Nicaragua had done a wrong—and it seemed to us she had—as an independent nation she must abide the consequences.

20

The question, whether one accepts the interpretation of Blaine or Gresham, is a necessary consequence of the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, it touches one of the most sensitive aspects of our Latin-American diplomacy. Even now it is not definitely solved, though President Roosevelt in decisions which will be treated later established precedents which are likely to be guiding in the future.

The Cleveland Administration witnessed preliminary developments in two issues which later grew to overshadowing importance. An episode in Cuba is suggestive of the forthcoming war with Spain, and the Chino-Japanese War of 1894 brought us face to face with the integrity of China and the policy of the open door. A Spanish warship striving to enforce a blockade of Cuba fired on an American merchantman in the Windward Passage six miles off the Cuban coast and on a main highway of trade. The vessel was bound from Colon to New York and had no communication with the Island. The government demanded disavowal of this excess of zeal and a pledge of future caution in the treatment of our ships. After some delay the apology was offered.21 In the Asiatic war, both China and Japan availed themselves of America's good offices, and our minister to each took over custody of the other's interests. The war came to an abrupt ending, moreover, because Japan accepted seriously our warning that if she continued her attacks on China the European powers, under pretense of preserving order in the Empire, would partition it among themselves.22

In advising China and Japan, America was pursuing a well defined Far-Eastern policy which favored the integrity of China. As we have noticed, Buchanan avoided recognition of the Taipings from a conviction that the Manchus offered better assurance of an undivided China. And in 1894, when the Chino-Japanese War revealed the Empire's 20 Gresham, Matilda, Op. Cit. II, 781-785.

21 Ibid. II, 785-787.

22 Ibid. II, 787-789.

utter weakness and corruption, the mission of America's ex-Secretary of State, John W. Foster, to aid the Chinese in their negotiations with Japan, though unofficial in so far as America was concerned, nevertheless had the approval of Secretary Gresham and accorded fully with America's settled policy.

Foster won a great ascendancy over Li Hung Chang, the Chinese viceroy. He persuaded him to face the facts of Japan's victory rather than rashly to prolong the war. He introduced an occidental speed into oriental negotiations. And when they were completed, he personally appeared before the Tsungli Yamen, the Chinese foreign office, to urge that China's honor was involved in acceptance of a treaty which at every stage of its negotiation had been communicated to the Son of Heaven. He even went with Lord Li, the Viceroy's son, to aid in the formal handing over of Formosa to Japan, in order to lend his moral influence to the unhappy official when confronting so unpopular and therefore dangerous a mission.

Though employed by China, and serving her with extraordinary efficiency, Foster enjoyed throughout the confidence of Japan, whose authorities appreciated the service rendered them in persuading China to a treaty which Russia, France, and Germany opposed, for reasons of their own, not China's. It thus appears that John Hay's solicitude for China, which will be alluded to when we examine the foreign policy of McKinley, was not a sudden interest in the Orient. The integrity of China is an ancient concern of the United States, 23

So far, in questions confronting his department, the hand of Gresham is in evidence in a policy of honesty and caution. The latter quality especially would have been useful in the Venezuela incident, the administration's major crisis. But death claimed the Secretary before his term was over, and his chair was filled by Richard Olney, a man of other mold.

23 The mission to the Asiatic belligerents is admirably described in John W. Foster's Diplomatic Memoirs (Boston and New York, 1909).

THE FIRST Venezuela INCIDENT

The Venezuela Boundary Dispute really dated from the Congress of Vienna. When Great Britain acquired the Dutch possessions on the Caribbean Sea, she acquired a decidedly uncertain boundary." The Dutch had built two forts in territory west of a mouth of the Orinoco River. Great Britain claimed the line through these as hers beyond a doubt. On inquiring further into Dutch land titles, she laid claims to territories even farther west. But these extremer claims she never pressed, and in 1844 she even offered arbitration, which Venezuela, torn by revolutions, did not accept, so that the offer was allowed to lapse. In 1876, a dispute arose once more, which the United States regarded with growing apprehension. In 1887, in Cleveland's first term, Secretary Bayard recommended arbitration. But the Venezuelans were intent upon forcing America's hand in a test of the Monroe Doctrine, and Great Britain rejected what she earlier had offered. Gold had meanwhile been discovered on the disputed area, and British settlements were penetrating the interior.2

25

By December, 1894, the crisis was acute. The impasse between Venezuela and Great Britain was complete, and the United States confronted the gravest test the Monroe Doctrine had met in its seventy years' existence. If Great Britain in the face of opposition made good her claim to lands along the Orinoco, the Doctrine was subverted. America could not evade responsibility on the score that it was none of her affair. What so immediately concerned the territorial integrity of a neighbor in this hemisphere was vital to ourselves as well.

On December 1, 1894, Gresham wrote to Bayard that "England and America are fully committed to the principle of arbitration, and this government will gladly do what it can to further a determination in that sense." 26 When death overtook him, the Secretary was elaborating more compre

24 Dewey, Davis Rich, Op. Cit. 304.

25 McElroy, Robert, Op. Cit. II, 175-202. 26 Gresham, Matilda, Op. Cit. II, 794.