government was matter of political routine scarcely affecting the domain of foreign policy. The same was true of local administration in Hawaii and Porto Rico. Only in Cuba did the erection of a native government create a foreign nation with whom the relations of our government must come primarily within the State Department's purview.

THE PLATT AMENDMENT

Coöperation with Cubans in the recent war did not impress Americans with their capacity for self-government. The fear was entertained that one more Latin nation would follow South American precedents of frequent revolutions. Nevertheless we were pledged to Cuba libre, and a war which broadened into rank imperialism must be permitted to retain its sole original idealism. Cuba must be free, subject to a connection with stabilizing forces within the United States. The political machinery needful to this nexus was devised by Orville H. Platt, United States Senator from Connecticut, and bears his name, the Platt Amendment.3

30

Senator Platt originally opposed the war. Once entered on it, however, he became a convinced expansionist. He opposed all compromise upon the Philippines. They must be ours in toto. Toward Cuba, he proposed to keep the faith. As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Cuba, he had it in his power to do so. Two years of military government under General Wood had cleansed the island's sanitation. Corruption coming to light, however, among certain American officials considerably embarrassed the administration, and there was satisfaction in both countries when in 1900 the General declared that in his judgment the islanders were ripe for independence. A constitutional convention met at Havana in November, 1900. Radicals controlled it. Fear arose that Cuba set adrift might plunge into anarchy or might, at any rate, enter upon connections inimical to the United States, and our government determined before McKinley's term expired to safeguard our future relations.

30 The account which follows is based on Coolidge, Louis A., An Old Fashioned Senator, Orville H. Platt (New York, 1910), pp. 336-356.

In haste, therefore, considering the far-reaching character of the legislation, the Platt Amendment was drafted and accepted. The credit for the measure was later ascribed to Secretary Elihu Root, but belongs primarily to Platt himself and secondarily to Senator Spooner, his able coadjutor on the committee.

In drafting the Amendment, Platt was at great pains to safeguard Cuban sovereignty. No country is completely sovereign which admits any restrictions whatsoever on its freedom of action. Thus in the broadest sense no nation is completely sovereign, since the judgments of mankind impose a more or less intangible restraint. Civilized communities admit the binding character of international law. But in the case of Cuba, restrictions upon initiative in diplomacy constitute so definite a limitation upon sovereignty, that although Platt was theoretically opposed to such an outcome, his Amendment imposed upon the island the status of a vassal territory.

Eight provisions were embodied in the Platt Amendment. The first restricted Cuban freedom to "enter into any treaty. or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba." In detail the application was assured of the Monroe Doctrine. The second limited the public debt to an amount within the resources of the island-an important stipulation if independence were to be maintained against the economic imperialism of European or indeed of American banking interests. A third provision reserved to the United States the right of intervention on behalf of Cuban independence and of assuring an orderly government capable of enforcing the obligations which the Peace of Paris imposed upon the United States as guarantor. Next the acts of the United States during the recent military occupation were validated. The Cuban government also agreed to maintain and extend the work already undertaken to rid the island of epidemics and infections. Title to the Isle of Pines was reserved for adjudication in the future. The right to purchase coaling and naval stations in the interest of itself as well as Cuba was reserved to the United States. Finally

all the provisions agreed upon in the Amendment were to be incorporated in a formal treaty.

The Platt Amendment thus became a portion of the fundamental law of Cuba. It was adopted with but slight discussion as a strictly party measure. The vote was taken in the Senate February 27, 1901; the House accepted promptly; and on March 2d, with but two days remaining in McKinley's term, the measure became law so far as the United States could make it. Adoption by the Cubans was less prompt. Suspecting the motives of the United States, they sent a delegation to inquire concerning our interpretation of the Amendment. These inquiries elicited from Platt the explicit statement that "All that we ask is that Cuba shall assent to our right to help her maintain her independence and to protect our own interests." He asserted that the provision for making treaties was a specific recognition of Cuban sovereignty. Treaties were never made between sovereign nations and dependencies. They presupposed a jointly sovereign status. Though this was true, it could not be denied that Cuban self-determination was curtailed.

Whatever might be the views of authorities on international law, Cuba was granted as complete autonomy as seemed consistent at the time with her own preparedness for self-government, and with the safety of the United States. The Platt Amendment subsequently served to excuse American intervention, but this has been infrequent, and the actual course of the United States has justified the Senator in his interpretation and predictions.

The mighty problems thus attendant on the war with Spain, the triumph of imperialism over old traditions of democracy, the championship of the Open Door in China, the frank insistence of John Hay upon an Anglo-American entente, all combined at the close of the Nineteenth Century in a foreign policy which was brilliant in inception and far-reaching in results. McKinley and his gifted Secretary are imposing figures in our diplomatic annals.

T

CHAPTER XXIII

THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE FIRST TERM

HE election of 1900 should logically have turned on the issue of imperialism, with McKinley as its advocate and Bryan its opponent. But the issue was, in fact, not sharply drawn. Bryan revived the question of Free Silver, and on imperialism he faced both ways. The triumph of McKinley was none the less a vindication of his policies, and the administration continued as it had begun. Its early endeavor was to negotiate an Isthmian Canal convention which would meet the approval of the Senate.

THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY: SUCCESS

With this in view, Ambassador Choate secured Lord Salisbury's assent to a reopening of the question. Hay and Pauncefote negotiated as before, though in this second treaty Choate and Lansdowne, the British foreign secretary, had larger influence than before and Hay was more attentive to senatorial opinion. In particular he consulted Henry Cabot Lodge, who was largely responsible for the failure of the earlier draft. And Lodge's insistence that the American people would never accept a treaty which assigned to them the cost and burden of constructing the canal and then refused them sole rights to its defense, now bore fruit.

Hay himself had meanwhile been converted to the necessity of a fortified canal, or, at any rate, of one susceptible of fortification in emergency. He approved, as well, the formal abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. He did his utmost to conciliate opposition senators. He was rewarded on December 26, 1901, by the passage of the treaty with which his name is permanently identified. It went through, as he expressed it, "with no opposition, except from the ir

reclaimable cranks. Seventy-two to six was near enough unanimity."

While the negotiations were pending, the President was stricken down by an assassin. The State Department underwent no change, however, as Roosevelt and Hay were on most friendly terms, and respect for the lamented President dictated an invitation to members of the cabinet to retain their posts. Hay served throughout the term. He lent a useful poise and grace, the traditional urbanity of the diplomat, to the perhaps exuberant aggressiveness of his chief. Their combination was effective, though letters recently published reveal that Roosevelt looked upon his Secretary as an over-rated statesman.2

Both adopted an identical attitude toward Germany and the Kaiser. The latter's checkmate by Roosevelt in the Venezuelan affair of 1903 is probably the most brilliant episode in the Rooseveltian diplomacy. As has been noted, Hay's own experience with Germany aroused a permanent antagonism. He regarded the Kaiser's protestations of autocracy and a partnership with God as both dangerous and vulgar. He viewed with apprehension an ostentatious propaganda designed to cover over memories of Samoa, Manila Bay and China with pretenses of affection. He rejoiced at Roosevelt's masterful handling of the Venezuelan crisis.3

The adoption of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty made the Isthmian Canal a certainty. From that moment Germany determined to secure a foothold for a fortress which should threaten the canal. German warships in 1901 investigated certain islands off the Venezuelan coast as to suitability for a naval base. The Kaiser was also negotiating with Mexico at this time for two harbors on the coast of Lower California. Neither venture had results. But in 1901 and 1902 a seemingly more favorable opportunity was presented by the claims of several European powers against the government of President Castro in Venezuela.

Economic penetration is a most insidious wedge of empire. Sovereign powers may borrow; creditors may lend;

1 Thayer, William Roscoe, The Life of John Hay, II, 262.

2 Capt. Archibald Butt to his sister-in-law, as syndicated in the press. 3 Thayer, William Roscoe, Op. Cit. II, 269-295.