NAPOLEON III. PROPOSES A PEACE CONGRESS. 159 sentenced to death by a military court-martial, with the concurrence of the nation, and was shot for his crimes against the independence of the nation at Queretaro, on the 9th of June, 1867, in company with Generals Miramon and Mejia. Peace be to his ashes!" A few days afterwards the city of Mexico surrendered, and Juarez became once more absolute master of the kingdom, or rather of a republic, which, in the space of less than fifty years, had been the scene of upwards of thirty changes of government. At the close of the year he was elected president. The Archduchess Charlotte, ex-Empress of Mexico, contrived to escape from the country, and returned to Europe in a condition of mind which aroused the respectful sympathy of all who knew her sad history. She continued in a state of mental derangement for two or three years, and by the advice of her physicians travelled from place to place, but with little hope of complete restoration of her physical health, or cure for the mental malady which had ensued from the grief she had undergone and the terrible scenes she had witnessed. The policy of Napoleon III. seems to have been to combine the development of the internal material resources of France with such a degree of foreign influence as would make his opinion, supported by the nation, a power not only in Europe but in distant countries. In Syria, where French arms vindicated the rights of the Christian population; in Montenegro, where the national desire to become part of a single government, including all the principalities, was upheld by French influence; in Cochin China, where an expedition had been organized for promoting French colonial interests; in Spain, where the questions of the frontier line and the debt of 1823 were settled without further misunderstanding; and in Switzerland, where the differences arising from disputes about the valley of the Dappes were explained and remedied, this prompt and aggressively conciliatory intervention was exercised. France was powerful and respected even where suspicion still existed as to the probable intentions of her ruler; for nearly all the world seems to have agreed to give Napoleon III. credit for subtle statecraft, while he himself assumed to be the least secret and the least combinative of European sovereigns. He claimed credit for frankness, and professed to pursue a candid and easily estimated policy. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the promptitude of action, combined with the liberal sentiments which characterized the whole policy of the emperor, had placed the country high in the rank of nations with reference to all questions affecting peace and mutual understanding between European states. It was with this assurance that, on the 4th of November, 1863, the emperor proposed to the other powers to regulate the condition of Europe, and to secure its future by a congress of nations or an international council. This proposition was accompanied by an invitation, which said: "In case the princes, allies and friends of France, should think proper to heighten by their presence the authority of the deliberations, I shall be proud to offer them my cordial hospitality. Europe would see, perhaps, some advantage in the capital from which the signal for subversion has so often been given, becoming the seat of the conferences destined to lay the basis of a general pacification." After some diplomatic correspondence, in which it was stated that the emperor had already indicated the questions of Poland, Denmark, and Germany, the Danubian Principalities, Austria and Italy, and the occupation of Rome, to be those which would demand discussion; Earl Russell, on the part of the English government, declined participation in the congress, on the ground that those questions could not be decided by the mere utterance of opinions, while if the mere expression of wishes and opinions would accomplish no positive results, it appeared certain that the deliberations of a congress would consist of demands and pretensions put forward by some and resisted by others. That there being no supreme authority in such an assembly to enforce the decisions of the majority, the congress would probably separate leaving many of its members on worse terms with each other than they had been when they met; while if this would be the probable result, it followed that no decrease of armaments would be likely to be effected by the proposed congress. The Emperor of Russia gave his entire adhesion to the principle of settling the peace of Europe by such a representative meeting of the sovereigns, but thought it essential that Napoleon III., who initiated the proposal, should define clearly the questions which, in his opinion, should be the subject of an understanding, and the bases upon which this understanding would have to be established. The Queen of Spain gave her ready adhesion to the proposal, and promised cordial co-operation. The Emperor of Austria considered it essential to have a clear understanding upon the point of departure, to define the object and means of action held in view, and to determine beforehand the line of conduct that would be followed. The King of Prussia considered the measures to be discussed should first be submitted to the responsible ministers of the respective states. The pope accepted the proposition with the utmost gratification, only reserving, with satirical caution, the power to sustain with the greatest rigour the rights of the Romish Church. The Swiss Confederation, the new King of Greece, and the King of Denmark accepted the proposal without reserve; and the replies of the King of Hanover and the King of Bavaria were equally favourable. It was evident, however, that the English minister had stated the true difficulty; the objections of Prussia, Russia, and Austria were proofs that this difficulty was sufficient to prevent any lasting advantage from a deliberative assembly to which each member would go with the view rather of confirming than relinquishing the demands of his policy. It would have been well, indeed, if some of the questions then arising in Europe could have been settled by pacific discussion. The effusion of blood during the Polish insurrection would then have been stayed; the question of the claims of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein might have been so settled as to avert the events that led to the dreadful war between Austria and Prussia; the liberty of Italy might have penetrated Rome, set free from the threatenings of French bayonets. But the very statement of these subjects of discussion is almost sufficient to show that no decision was likely to be come to, involving the satisfactory arrangement of affairs which had already been made of vital importance by the states which included them in their most unyielding demands. Small war clouds gathering and bursting in other places challenged comparatively little attention while the roar of the great tempest of strife continued in America. The sufferings of Poland excited much emotion, the expedition to Mexico aroused curiosity not unmixed with apprehension of the result. The archduke consented to take his cue from an actor who had written only his own part in the drama which ended in a tragedy, net for Maximilian only, but as some thoughtf l statesmen believed, for the French emperor also. There were forewarnings that the prestige of Napoleon III. would never survive the Mexican fiasco, and that, from the moment of its becoming known, it would lead to the downfall of his power. If this opinion was founde 1 on the belief that he had already given evidence of a weak reliance on false or incompe tent advisers, it was signally verified; but it is characteristic of many prophecies that they are fulfilled in a manner or under conditions not clearly perceived by the prophet himself. Meantime, while the wretched dénouement of the Mexican story was scarcely guessed at, and while fresh difficulties in China and the neces sity for insisting on reparation for attacks on British traders in Japan were engaging & re notice here, the arrogant assumptions wha Prussia had for some time been exhibiting, threatened the peace of Europe. The Schleswig-Holstein question, though by no means a laughing matter, was, at the time, jocularly mentioned as another way of expressing an insoluble problem. The rival claims of the kingdom of Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein as represented by the hereditary prince of SchleswigHolstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg were n THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN DIFFICULTY. clear to people who heard of them for the first time, nor was it by any means to be concluded that the King of Prussia had any just claim to make such an easy display of the growing power of his authority, by commencing hostilities against a small state in defiance of European opinion. He had become strong enough to refuse the urgent invitation of the Emperor of Austria to attend a congress of the German sovereigns at Frankfort for the purpose of forming a Bund or confederation of all their states. The dream of "United Germany" must be realized, if it were to be realized at all, by the domination of Prussia -and thus it was realized years afterward; but not till Austria had been temporarily crushed by a war which, for a time, crippled her resources and left her German scarcely even in name. There is no need to go into the remote history of the relations between the German states, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and the kingdom of Denmark. The dispute which menaced the peace of Europe was, as the Times said, not calculated to inspire implicit confidence in the arrangements of governments assembled in congresses or in conferences. The chronic difficulty of the duchies attached to the Danish crown had been unexpectedly rendered urgent by the death of Frederick VII., the last king of the house of Oldenburg. As long as the kings were absolute in Denmark their ducal sovereignty in Schleswig and Holstein involved no subordination of their German subjects to the Danes of the kingdom. It was only when a representative constitution was granted in 1846 that the conflict of races seriously commenced, and in 1848 it produced civil war. With the aid of Prussia the Germans of Holstein and Schleswig expelled the Danish forces from both duchies, but on the withdrawal of the Prussian troops the Danes recovered the greater part of Schleswig; and finally, the authority of Frederick VII. was re-established in both duchies by various conventions in 1850 and 1851. Austria and Prussia, on behalf of Germany, assented to the dissolution of the ancient union between Holstein and Schleswig, and, in return, Denmark undertook to perform VOL. IV. 161 the federal engagements which were due in Holstein, and to maintain various privileges and immunities which were claimed by the German inhabitants of Schleswig. In 1852 the great powers thought it expedient, in anticipation of the extinction of the dynasty, to provide for the integrity of the Danish monarchy, including the ancient dependencies of the crown. By the Treaty of London, executed by the five powers and by Denmark and Sweden, the succession was settled on Prince Christian of Schleswig-HolsteinGlücksburg, whose wife became, by aid of certain family renunciations, the heiress of the royal crown of Denmark. The Duke of Augustenburg, who was heir of Holstein and claimant of Schleswig, was induced to relinquish his pretensions; and the King of Prussia, who was head of the ducal house of Holstein - Gottorp, agreed to postpone any hereditary claim which he might have asserted. All the principal German states, except Bavaria and Baden, afterwards adhered to the treaty; and on the death of Frederick VII. Prince Christian possessed an undisputed diplomatic title. In the interval, however, extreme irritation had existed between Germany and Denmark, especially when Frederick VII. was said to have encroached on federal rights by a patent establishing a constitution in Holstein, issued in the spring of the year 1863. Federal execution in the duchy was imminent, when the accession of King Christian IX. in Denmark afforded an excuse for opening the question of his right to the duchies. Prince Frederick, son of the Duke of Augustenburg, disputed the validity of his father's renunciation, and nearly every legislative assembly in the German states urged their respective governments to recognize his title. But the points actually in dispute, the concessions in regard to which Prussia and the diet had at one stage of the negotiations virtually agreed to accept, may be all summed up in a single question-that of the budget. The duchy and the diet had rejected any plan for a constitution of the whole monarchy by Frederick VII., and any reasonable plan for a provisional government of the duchy alone. As the government had to be carried 74 on, however, the only way that remained was through the King of Denmark as absolute Duke of Holstein and the old assembly of estates. It was quite obvious, also, that while any connection remained between the government of Denmark and Holstein, the latter must contribute to the expenses of that government. It was on the budget, therefore, that the dispute between the king and the duchy arose. The Holstein estates made the demand that they themselves should decide the amount of their contribution to the revenue, and that the budget of the duchy should be submitted to their consideration. This the Danish government had refused, but as the diet had actually urged the extravagant demand that the budget for the whole monarchy should be submitted to the deliberate vote of the Holstein estates, the three great powers-Russia, France, and England-had recommended Denmark to make concessions enabling the estates to deliberate on the budget for the duchy. In a new provisional constitution for the duchy these concessions were granted on the advice of the great powers who were parties to the original treaty, in order to preserve the peace of Europe; but the estates, supported by Prussia and the diet, continued to reject the proposals though they included the demands which had formerly been made. It was therefore not unnaturally concluded by Denmark that the great powers would address a firm, united, and urgent remonstrance to the diet and Prussia, and would support Denmark by protesting against any federal execution being attempted. But the very proposal of the constitution, in which the concessions were included, was resented as an unauthorized assumption of power. On the accession of King Christian IX. Austria and Prussia were for demanding the repeal of the constitution of the kingdom, which included Schleswig, and proposed to the diet that the duchy should be occupied till the concession was made. They did not desire to proceed to actual war, and the Prussian minister did not recognize the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg, while Austria was believed to be not unwilling to yield to "moral" intervention. Bismarck and the Prussian sovereign were pro bably averse to take a position in hostilities against a small state when they could only do so by acting in conjunction with those other German states, the congress of which, under Austrian influence, they had refused to attend. Austria had perhaps no relish for measuring her military efficiency with that of Prussia at such a time. But the minor states, under the direction of the Saxon minister, Baron Beust, outvoted Austria and Prussia in the diet, and insisted on immediate war. Not till the 2d of December, 1563, did the Prussian chambers, by a majority of 231 t› 63, pass a resolution "that the honour and interests of Germany demand that all the German states should preserve the rights of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, that they should recognize the hereditary prince of Schleswig-Holstein - Sonderburg-Augustenburg as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and should lend him assistance in vindication of his rights." Probably this was a timely diversion of the attention of the Prussian assemblies from the autocratic contempt which Count Bismarck and the king had constantly shown for popular demands and parliamentary representations. The King of Denmark declared that he would resist all revolutionary movements in Holstein. The Danish fortig minister afterwards addressed the ministers of Prussia, Austria, Saxony, and Hanover, pronouncing the decree of the federal diet for giving effect to procedure of execution in the duchies to be devoid of binding force because of the exclusion of the plenipotentiary of Denmark from the assembly. He also atnounced that the mediation which had been proffered by the British government had bez accepted. His representations were made o the 19th of December. On the 23d a deta lment of Saxon and Hanoverian troops Holstein. Of course neither Prussia nor Austria c.u! hold back on an occasion when it was nee sary for them to assert their importance as chief states in the German Confederation. Circumstances had imposed on thera the cutdition that they should only be able to assert their rivalry by becoming allies. On the 10th of January, 1564, the federal commiss a FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND ENGLAND DECLINE TO INTERFERE. having supressed the administration of Holstein and established a ducal government at Kiel, Austria and Prussia demanded of Denmark that the constitution of November, 1863, should be suppressed within forty-eight hours. This was refused, and an Austro-Prussian army under Marshal Wrangel, entered Holstein on the 21st. England had remonstrated. Earl Russell had spoken with considerable plainness. On the 31st of December, 1863, he had addressed a note to the federal diet demanding in the interests of peace that a conference of the powers that signed the Treaty of London should, in conjunction with a representative from the German Confederation, meet in Paris or London to settle the differences between Germany and Denmark, and that the status quo should be maintained till the conference had concluded its work. The "status quo," as we have seen, had been changed before anything was done. Even if Austria and Prussia had been inclined to hold their hands after the serious representations of England, they were urged on by the smaller confederated states, by which Prussia had previously been accused of a want of a national spirit for hesitating to break the treaties which secured the Danish monarchy. It was a juncture when the state that must take the lead in a possibly united Germany of the future would have to sacrifice some scruples, and even risk the disfavour of the other powers of Europe. Was the risk so very great? The queen's speech at the opening of the English parliament in 1864 set forth that the death of the late King of Denmark brought into immediate application the stipulation of the treaty of 1852 which declared that it was conducive to the preservation of the balance of power and to the peace of Europe that the integrity of the Danish monarchy should be maintained; but this speech was delivered four days after Austria and Prussia had told the Diet of Frankfort that they should take the occupation of Schleswig into their own hands as parties to the treaty of 1852; and had summoned Denmark to annul the constitution by which Schleswig was incorporated with the kingdom, and to surrender the duchy which General de 163 Meza, the Danish commander, said he had orders to defend. The very day before the opening of the British parliament the Prussians had bombarded and begun to burn Missunde; three days afterward the Danes had retreated from the Dannewerke, leaving behind all the heavy artillery which defended the forts; in less than a week the Austro-Prussian army had occupied North Schleswig. Then the Danes quitted the place, declaring both duchies in a state of blockade, and before the end of the month (February, 1864) Denmark had first opposed the proposal of Earl Russell to leave the settlement of the question of succession to a conference of the powers concerned in the former treaty. It was not unnatural that Denmark should hope for material aid from England, or from England and France together; but the English government declined to enter into a conflict alone, with the probability of finding that their action had produced a war which would alter the relative disposition of all the powers of Europe. France, Russia, and Sweden showed no alacrity in joining to force the hand of Prussia and defeat the demands of the German Confederation. Denmark was obstinately deaf to the advice that by yielding to certain claims which had been interpreted into engagements to Germany, her own undoubted claims might be more effectually supported. Earl Russell argued that England was not bound to act alone while there were other parties to the treaty, and therefore the honour of England was not involved because the Danes had formed expectations of our assistance while refusing to accept advice. At all events the Emperor of the French did not seem disposed to propose any joint action with this country. He had been piqued at the refusals to join in a general congress of nations, and he had himself received no overtures from us when he was supposed to be willing to intervene on behalf of Poland. On the other hand, Russia was shy of both France and England. The Polish insurrection had been put down in fire, in carnage, and in banishment; and the element of religious persecution had been imported into it till the cruelties against the Roman Catholics of |