the good name of England for loyalty and candour, too soon to be sacrificed by his successors. I have endeavoured,' he wrote in one of his dispatches, from a principle of candour, not by way of assuming an imperative tone . . . to give open answers, in order to shorten delays by obviating misunderstandings and to avoid the reproach of having acted delusively even with an enemy.'

CHAPTER XVIII

PITT'S DOWNFALL

τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πᾶσι μὲν ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἕτεροι ἑτέρων ἠξίωσαν ἄρχειν· ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται.

THUC. ii, 64 (Pericles's speech).

To be censured and maligned for a time hath been the fate of all those whose merit hath raised them above the common level; but wise and judicious is the man who, enjoying this superiority, despiseth the envy.

Pitt's translation.1

ONE of Pitt's reasons for breaking off the negotiations with France was his knowledge that Choiseul had reinsured himself by an offensive alliance with Spain. Of this he had sure evidence, not only from Stanley, who had seen the article of the secret convention pledging France to support the Spanish claims, but also from an intercepted correspondence between Fuentes and Grimaldi, the Spanish ambassadors in London and Paris. Two letters from Grimaldi, of August 31 and September 13,2 could leave no doubt in Pitt's mind that

1 See vol. i, p. 214.

2 Chatham Corr. ii, 139, 141. A good deal of unnecessary mystery has been made about Pitt's knowledge of the Franco-Spanish treaties. In the Quarterly Review, No. 190, it is suggested that Dutens, author of Mémoires d'un Voyageur qui se repose (see vol. i, p. 207), who was secretary of the English legation at Turin, obtained copies from Tanucci at Naples and sent them to Pitt. But Dutens in his Mémoires refers to information sent in 1760, not 1761. Whether Pitt actually saw copies of the treaties, one of which sooner or later came into Newcastle's hands, is a question of slight importance. He knew enough for his purpose from the intercepted correspondence of Grimaldi and Fuentes to which he alluded at Cabinet meetings. (See Dr. von Ruville's discussion of the point, Life of Chatham, ii, 405 sqq.)

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this offensive treaty had already been signed and that Spain was only waiting for the arrival of her treasure fleet at Cadiz to declare herself. Having broken off with France Pitt determined to act on this intelligence and strike at Spain instantly.

6

The

Since the beginning of the war there had been ample material for a quarrel between England and Spain in the three questions referred to in Bussy's memoir of July 23.1 In September, 1757, d'Abreu, the Spanish minister, had presented ten memorials, enumerating fifty cases of outrage on Spanish shipping by English privateers, and thenceforward he and his successor Fuentes were kept busy drawing up similar complaints, in spite of Pitt's efforts to check the outrages. question of logwood-cutting had long been at issue between the two nations. Under the Treaty of Utrecht the English Baymen,' as they were called, had certain rights of logwoodcutting in the Bay of Honduras, but had gradually encroached by settlements in Yucatan and Campeachy Bay in violation of Spanish territory. Pitt had already agreed, 'out of pure friendliness,' to turn the Baymen out of their illicit settlements if Spain would define their rights of logwood-cutting, but Spain had refused to define the rights until the Baymen had been turned out, and left the dispute to drag on. Spain had no stronger justification for her third claim, -advanced for the first time in 1758-to fish for cod off Newfoundland, than the argument that cod was a necessity for the Spaniards on fast days. Would the King of Spain,' retorted Pitt, 'consider a scarcity of gold and silver in England as any foundation for his Majesty to give passports to his subjects to fetch it for themselves from Mexico or Peru?' and in his instruction to Bristol, who succeeded Keene at Madrid in 1758, he had laid it down that England would never permit 'an interest so essential as the Newfoundland fishery, one great nursery of our seamen, and a DISPUTES WITH SPAΙΝ, 1757-61

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principal basis of the maritime power of Great Britain, to be in any degree pared off and divided.'

While Ferdinand reigned, these disputes, though troublesome, had never broken the good understanding between the two countries, thanks to the equal determination of Pitt and Wall to keep the peace. But Don Carlos, who acceded in August 1759, did not need Choiseul's insinuations 1 to cast in his lot heartily with France. The only reason he did not declare himself sooner was the need of time to make good Ferdinand's neglect of the army and navy. Pitt was well aware of Spain's unreadiness, and was thus the more inclined to accept as true for the present Wall's assurances of his master's pacific intentions-given to Bristol in May 1761 'with the most friendly openness.' Hence Bussy's memorial of July on the Spanish claims came as a surprise to him; but he was as ready to deal faithfully with Spain as with France. In a stormy interview with Fuentes he comported himself 'like a Lucifer,' complained Wall; 3 and he ordered Bristol to remonstrate with energy and firmness on 'the unexampled irregularity of such a proceeding on the part of Spain not only still in amity with Great Britain but whose intercourse has hitherto professed itself to be friendly'; to recapitulate the English arguments about the Spanish grievances, including their 'stale and inadmissible pretensions to fish at Newfoundland'; and to require 'an explicit and categorical éclaircissement with regard to the destination of her fleets.'

Until this final incident Pitt cannot be accused of undue provocation to Spain. He had not only attempted to gain her by the offer of Gibraltar in 1757, but, except on the Newfoundland question, had always been willing to listen to argument and even to go some way to meet her. To Don Carlos himself he had shown especial attention and, when the King left Naples for Spain, facilitated arrangments whereby one of his sons succeeded him in Naples and his brother, Don

1 See vol. i, p. 389.

2 In 1760 Bristol reported that Spain had only fifty line-of-battle ships

and under 100,000 men enrolled in the army. (Chatham MSS. 93.) 3 Bourguet, Choiseul et l'Alliance Espagnole, p. 228.

Philip, was secured in Parma.1 But he had now come to see that efforts at conciliation were useless. When he received Bristol's dispatch of August 31, stating that Bussy's memorial had been sent with the King of Spain's full approval, he knew at once that it meant war with Spain as well as France, and was not sorry for the opportunity of crushing both branches of the hated House of Bourbon at one blow. He had already told Bussy that it would pay England better to fight Spain than to have such a one-sided neutrality as Don Carlos gave her, and he had measured, better than Choiseul, Spain's weakness. The combined Bourbon fleets, according to his calculations, barely equalled the English fleet in numbers and were immeasurably inferior in seamanship and in all the advantage which the prestige of long-continued victory confers. All his plans for prompt action were laid. Attacks on Panama and the Philippines had been under consideration and appeared feasible, and he meditated a more audacious stroke which would cripple Spain at the outset. He rightly guessed that some temporizing expressions in Spain's answer to the memorial were introduced partly because the annual treasure fleet from America, then on its way, had not yet reached Cadiz. On this fleet Don Carlos depended to find not only the pay for his own army and navy but also a loan to enable his ally to pay hers. Pitt's plan was to recall Bristol immediately and strike at this fleet before Spain had time to warn it: Keppel with sixty sail off Cape Finisterre was available for the purpose. Since Spain intended to fight, why, he asked himself, allow her a moment's breathing space to complete her preparations?

6

On this principle,' he reminded the House of Lords nine years later, ' I submitted my advice for an immediate declara

1 Pitt's policy on these arrangements is clearly enunciated in his dispatches of November and December 1758 and January 1759 to Gray at Naples and Mackenzie at Turin, in Record Office, Sardinia and Savoy, 67, and Naples and Sicily, 16, 17.

* Aff. Etr. Ang. Cor. Pol. 444, f. 216.

• Anson calculated that in September 1761 the English fleet had 105 of the line and 111 frigates, while Pitt's intelligence told him that France could put only 48 and Spain 57 ships into line. (See Waddington, iv, 631, and Corbett, ii, 196.)