 | Alfred Hix Welsh - 1882 - Страниц: 1108
...or from nny other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on soim1 perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never... | |
 | George Berkeley, Alexander Campbell Fraser - 1884 - Страниц: 436
...all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...I always stumble on some particular perception or other—of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure (ie something merely phenomenal).... | |
 | Noah Porter - 1885 - Страниц: 600
...the same ego which now recalls it? This truth has been extensively overlooked or denied. Thus Hume says : " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call mytelf I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love... | |
 | Noah Porter - 1886 - Страниц: 716
...consciousness cognizes the operation only, and nothing besides. Thus Hume says: "For my part, wheft t enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, oi heal or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any... | |
 | Harald Høffding - 1891 - Страниц: 386
...or from any other, that the idea of self is derived ; and consequently there is no such idea. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...myself, I always stumble on some particular perception J or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself... | |
 | Edward Douglas Fawcett - 1893 - Страниц: 464
...Unknowable. of what we call onr self ; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...always stumble on some particular perception or other. ... I can never observe anythinfl but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time,... | |
 | Harald Høffding - 1893 - Страниц: 394
...or from any other, that the idea of self is derived ; and consequently there is no such idea. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception1 or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can... | |
 | John Locke - 1894 - Страниц: 692
...that all substance is impossible, was the essence of Hume's scepticism. ' For my part,' he argues, ' when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception orother. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception. We only ' feign the continued existence... | |
 | Friedrich Paulsen - 1895 - Страниц: 474
...simplicity." He goes on to state that unluckily his experience does not agree with these assertions. " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...always stumble on some particular perception or other, heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time... | |
 | Friedrich Paulsen, Frank Thilly - 1895 - Страниц: 474
...simplicity." He goes on to state that unluckily his experience does not agree with these assertions. "For iny part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular percep4 tion or other, heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, » pain or pleasure. I never can... | |
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For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love 1 Bk. 
